Originally Posted by
safetypee
(If so then there may be a ‘hole’ in the latest emergency trim checklist - what if the ‘errant’ vane gives a low AoA)
Not a B737-specific reply, but.
The reason for the two independent shakers architecture is to assure the reliability of stall warning, which typically has to meet 1e-7 per FH or better. Thus the absence of a shaker on one side is implicitly catered for in the design - it is assumed that EITHER shaker achieves the required function of stall warning. Thus a low reading vane, which effectively means loss of shaker on that side, is the reason for the architecture and requires no additional inflight procedures. You still have a working shaker in such a case.
Of course, it's a non-dispatchable condition, because you are then down to a single-string stall warning architecture, and that DOESN'T meet 1e-7 at all.