Digital world
I still wonder how the MCAS trim down logic was certified based on a single AOA input. Even if this has a reason that is buried somewhere between FAA and Boeing, there are plenty of other sensors/data available that could help the MCAS computer to determine it shall better not trim down, like pitch, roll, radio height, gps vertical rate, ground speed, you name it.
We build autonomously driving cars with amazing intelligence identifying objects and doing some kind of plausbile action. But we cannot program a simple logic for a commercial aircraft that carries 200 people that says: when pitch is normal AND there is no excessive bank AND at 5000 ft radio height AND at 300 kts ground speed, this MCAS system better does not push, but presents a caution about implausible sensor data? No, we can't, because of certification grandfather rights thinking. Just touch what's absolutely necessary.
This fits perfectly into the picture that an AOA disagree indicator is sold as an option, i.e. Boeing tries making money by upselling a safety feature, and the FAA grants them doing so.
A trim runaway is always a serious incident. Just saying, there is the pilot as a backup, he just needs to run the memory items and all is good, is too easy. This thinking is out of time. The age of analog heros is over, we live in a digital world. Hundreds of complex rules of ANDs and ORs and IFs on a digital flight deck are overwhelming human beings. The digital system must help itself, at least to some extent.