Originally Posted by
safetypee
#1644: Except that MCAS does not have any ‘grandparents’. The ideas behind this ‘single-failure prone system’ may have its origins in modern aircraft with their high integrity stability enhancements based redundant architecture. Perhaps this is the shadow of grandfather designing, test and certification, and dated regulatory practice. Time to dust off James Reason’s views on organisational accidents.
Irrespective of what the Indonesian authorities identify in their investigations, the deficiencies in disseminating knowledge and crew checklists must be investigated.
I doubt that Indonesia alone would be able to pursue an investigation involving the FAA and Boeing in the US; according to Annex 13 they should, but …
The NTSB should be sufficiently independent to look at the FAA and delegated regulatory process, minimising any of criticism of an internal coverup.
An investigation would be in everyone’s interest worldwide. Without understanding where the design and certification process failed the confidence in aviation safety remains open to question, particularly for Boeing and all their aircraft types.
A separate investigation might also enhance the need for other regulators to review the integrity of their certification processes, and consider the effectiveness of the oversight of joint international approvals.
“Trust, but verify.”
I would be concerned if the NTSB would enter into any kind of assessment regarding the adequacy of a regulatory process (e.g. reviewing "integity", and "effectiveness" ) as that is entirely delegated to the regulator body. However the burden of an impartial investigations and recommendations may simply point out the failure circumstances against any standards in the regulation as written.