Having followed this thread from the start, there are a couple of questions which have arisen in my mind.
1. Earlier in this thread it was stated that Boeing introduced the MCAS system because, without it, the B737 MAX would not meet the requirements for passenger aircraft certification in respect of longitudinal stability. If this is true, should a fully functional MCAS be a specified item in the MEL as a mandatory requirement for release of the aircraft to revenue flights? Surely, if it was mentioned in the MEL both flight crew and engineering staff at Lion Air would have asked "What's this MCAS all about?". Is it normal for a system deemed necessary for certification of an aircraft not to be referenced in the MEL?
2. The maintenance record for the previous flight states that the crew thought that the STS was working 'in reverse', which we now know was due to MCAS (a system whose existence they were unaware of at that time). The crew of the flight that crashed would have read the maintenance report before departure and also were unaware of the existence of MCAS. Is it likely they would have been predisposed/alerted to the idea that the STS might 'go rogue' and operate in reverse? After repeated manual NU trim inputs, which were negated by MCAS ND trim, do the shorter manual NU trim inputs just before the aircraft dived towards the sea suggest that the crew were beginning to think their manual NU trim inputs were the cause of their problems?