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Old 17th Nov 2018, 19:16
  #1365 (permalink)  
tdracer
 
Join Date: Jul 2013
Location: Everett, WA
Age: 68
Posts: 4,356
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In the past, I've seen sanity check algorithms experience resistance from old management. They think "we've never had to do that before" and "we don't know how the FAA would certify the sanity check" and "Don't cost the company extra expense or you're fired." types of arguments. They are very conservative. 'Split Cockpit' design philosophy here extended to nose-down trim authority, which I think crossed a safety line.
Quagmire, when Boeing became a delegated authority, they implemented robust protections against "Undo Pressure" - arguably much better than before delegation. When I was a DER, if I felt I was being pressured to approve something, my only real recourse was to go to the FAA - a very drastic step - and the FAA didn't really have a defined process to handle it. When Boeing initially moved towards becoming delegated, one of the first things they did was set up a process for 'Undo Pressure" - with training (both for the newly defined 'Authorized Representative" - AR - what the DER job morphed into - and for management. It worked - on the rare occasion when I thought management was getting out of line, all I had to do was say "This is starting to border on undo pressure" - and they'd immediately back off. Heck, one time I was catching flak from Rolls because I was refusing to approve some new FADEC software, a Boeing manager actually told Rolls to back off - I was just doing my job.
I don't know what happened during the certification of MCAS, but I seriously doubt it was management interference. Educated guess is that it simply wasn't identified as a flight critical system and didn't get the level of scrutiny appropriate for a system that can have catastrophic consequences if it malfunctions.
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