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Old 14th Nov 2018, 05:53
  #1145 (permalink)  
CurtainTwitcher
 
Join Date: Jul 2014
Location: Harbour Master Place
Posts: 621
Originally Posted by BuzzBox View Post
The B737 FCOM states:
How does that differ from the operation of MCAS when approaching a stall? MCAS seems to be based on AOA while STS is based on IAS, but is there any other major difference, such as trim rate, duration, range of trim operation, etc? Would a pilot of a MAX aircraft who knew about MCAS handle the JT610 scenario any differently to one who did not?
Complete the Runaway Stabiliser NNC checklist memory items prior to the flaps being retracted. I just so happens that the first 2 items of the runaway checklist ALREADY covered by the Airspeed Unreliable NNC memory items.

Net result is actually very simple: Airspeed Unreliable NNC memory items, THEN stab trim cutoff switches.....CUTOFF

Originally Posted by JRBarrett​​​
I’m still very curious as to why a system that is designed to automatically change the aircraft configuration without pilot input (via stab trim) would act based on the output data of only one of the two AOA probes. The stick pusher, which also activates based on AOA, requires both probes to agree that a stall is imminent before it will trigger, specifically because AOA probes can and do malfunction.
$$$$ - Saved some development or certification costs. Rated De covered this succinctly in #1083
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