Originally Posted by
b1lanc
Thank you for some sanity! Late 70's our organization reviewed Airbus testing procedures for FBW SW under development. I'm going purely on dated memory here, but as I recall AB contracted out 3 separate test beds in three countries, none of whom knew of the other's existence, to independenly test FBW software. Each were expected to develop their own test procedures. We reviewed the test results and the rationale for their strategy (not for AB but for an independent program). AB expected that each location would find different 'bugs'. It didn't turn out that way. Well over 90% were identical findings with very little if any (I don't remember any at least) unique critical FBW bugs discovered. That is not the result that they expected.
There were also early and persistent concerns of deep stall potential with the F-16 at high AoA (unrelated to FBW). So I'll ask this question. Did Boeing put in some additional 'safeguards' to prevent a potential reoccurence of AF 447?
This software scenario is not applicable in this case. This is an aircraft systems design issue as simple as: two out of two sensors show different data. This has nothing to do with software. It is a conceptional issue. Anything in an aircraft that is able to drive primary control elements should never be able to be triggered by a non-majority vote. This is simple basics.
It is also very surprising that an AOA difference display is on the list of options only. This is a pure up-selling concept to make more profit. It has nothing to do with incremental costs during manufacturing.
The whole "the aircraft design is safe", "the manufacturer did a good job", "well trained pilots would have recovered", "maintenance did a bad job", "third world habits" is arrogant and very biased to say the least. This accident happened in the aviation world of FAA certification processes that cost taxpayers and aircraft buyers millions.