It is interesting to consider that a contributing factor to this accident may have been the Boeing (vs Airbus) approach to introducing automation into the cockpit. Both the STS and elevator feel systems are provided to make the retained Boeing yoke feel (in some flight modes) as if you are flying a simple manual and longitudinally stable aircraft, with assigned stick force per G, and apparent aerodynamic feedback through the controls.
It seems questionable to me if these systems are coded to continue at all in the UAS condition, as they will substantially increase workload and the chance of catastrophic upset if they are being fed with bad airspeed data. The elevator feel system (which just applies force at the yoke) will be quite unhelpful, but the STS is worse as it is physically altering the horiz stab incidence. It doesn't seem hard to imagine that although most experienced but automation-centric crews will not be overwhelmed dealing with the UAS with these additional challenges (as appeared to occur in the flight before the accident), some may leading to catastrophic upset (possible explanation for this flight).