This error, also called the correspondence bias, describes the tendency for observer’s to attribute other people’s behavior to internal or dispositional factors and to downplay situational causes. We all suffer to degree, often enhanced by hindsight bias.
It is a harsh reality that in today’s highly complex operations there are situations where combinations of factors interact in such a way it is impossible for humans to sufficiently understand and safely manage outcomes.
In part, these situations involve increased use of automation, changed pilot training, and an evolving operational environment, ATC, management, regulation, commercial pressure, etc.
Thus it is unrealistic to require even greater human capability in situations where the human is often found wanting, either due to limitations in awareness, understanding, memory and recall, workload management, or all of these, often seen in accidents.
As safety improves, there are fewer accidents, often unique to circumstance. If these exceed human capability, then demanding even more training and checks is unlikely to improve human performance, and also any change enables the possibility of introducing a new unforeseen problem.
The alternative is to consider other contributions; the technical systems, certification, ATC, etc. Previously, technical change, including software has been difficult and expensive, nowadays this cost is being balanced by the demands for safety, and particularly that it is very difficult to change the human condition (James Reason), nor be assured that new training will be effective.
It appears that some manufacturers, regulators, and even (unbiased) investigators have yet to accept these issues.
As for the 777, it is disappointing that even where technical solutions appear to be available, the human (training) solution is still chosen. Similarly relating to the 737 accident in AMS; the FAA (Boeing) comments in the appendix to the report, the ‘blame the human view’ prevails, enabling a defensive view of, ‘not our problem in design or certification’, to be maintained.
These are accidents of assumption; an assumption by design / regulators that the human will be able to manage; however few people are considering how much the circumstances in the initial assumption have changed over time.