Originally Posted by
Aerostar6
I have just stumbled across this thread, and a lot of what has been said is now water under the bridge, but I feel minded to reply. In hindsight, I can agree with some of the strategies that have been postulated by the online experts. Yes, I should have left the formation earlier. Yes, I could have changed tanks earlier (BTW the boost pump was always on). Yes, I might have tried the priming pump to see if this gave me some power. Yes, I might have turned in slightly earlier, although my vector towards the crowd would have been greater. No, I couldn't have landed down wind, as 12 Spitfires were landing the other way (or so I modelled in my overloaded brain).
For those that have sat through the entire interview I gave to Rich McSpadden at US AOPA (who as an ex- leader of the USAF Thunderbirds, knows a thing or two), I put my hand up to most of these failings. But the main reason I did the online chat, and shared the video was to allow the aviation community to re-live my predicament vicariously and debate what they themselves would do in similar circumstances, not necessarily in a P-51. Was it a textbook reaction to an intermittent failure? Of course not. We will all react to these kinds of events in different ways. However, if just one pilot watches the video and devises a plan to deal with a similar situation when the noise up front ceases, then it has been worthwhile.
Great job, Mark. Not only did you save yourself and not hurt anyone on the ground but you allowed the recording of a tremendously instructive, and honest, interview about the incident.
I doubt if anyone reading/writing this thread could have done any better!
Thinking back to my own training, and brief time instructing, perhaps actions in the event of an engine failure were overcomplicated. My checklist, albeit committed to memory at the time, consisted of about 10 items- far too much to cope with in an emergency, particularly if not much height is available.
I now think the engine failure at take-off drill was much more realistic and focused on a few vital actions which can be applied to all engine failures. And perhaps we should be trained to treat partial engine failures in single engine aircraft as full engine failures if there is somewhere realistic to land?
Having said all that, again, very well done, Mark. You did the absolutely the most important thing well- you flew the aircraft all the way down to the ground (and for another 100 yards)!