Originally Posted by
George K Lee
WEBF - One could probably state that the genesis for the QE ships was the very rapid evolution in US combat aircraft plans post-Cold War and post-Desert Storm, including the demise of A-12, the invention of all-service STOVL/CTOL/CV fighter concepts by DARPA, Lockheed, Macs and Boeing, and the early-1993 binning of A-X and MRF.
The subsequent emergence of JAST/JSF magically "solved" the Marine/RN problem, which was not just the difficulty of defining a supersonic STOVL Harrier replacement, but the fact that funding such a thing was hard to justify in the Cold War and almost unthinkable after it. I don't think anyone would have been very excited about building new carriers to operate a Harrier III.
Of course, it was purely an accounting gimmick and not a real solution. Developing a stealthy STOVL fighter (including a monster engine you didn't otherwise need) was always going to cost a ****ton of money, but if you rolled that in with the CVs and CTOLs and projected you'd build 4000+ units, the program acquisition unit cost - (R&D + Production)/Units - didn't look ludicrous. Basically, most of the STOVL cost ended up on the USAF and CV Navy tab, which I suppose that (if you are RN or USMC) is as close to an economic miracle as you can get.
George,
I'd like, if I might, to offer a couple of observations on your post. Others might find them of some interest. (or probably not).
Yes, 'one could probably state' all sorts of theories about the genesis of the QE class. The QE class were approved in 1998 by the then UK Labour government. Studies into large carriers were certainly underway in the UK in the late 80s and the early to mid 90s. I'm not sure that you can reliably link the genesis of the QE class to the demise of a US programme in 1993. Where I would (sort of) agree is that by 1995, in large part thanks to the efforts of certain RN officers located in the US, the UK was well aware of what was going on in the US with regard to JSF.
A supersonic STOVL Harrier replacement was certainly defined - I know the guy who wrote the original Naval Staff Target - as to how hard it was, I can't comment. I would wholeheartedly agree that developing an all new aircraft to meet a probable buy of around 65 aircraft for the RN was always going to be a non-starter. By 1995, STOVL JSF was most certainly the 'front runner'. mainly driven by the UK's desire to use its STOVL expertise as a lever to get the best possible deal from the US. (That actually worked to an extent, as it was the reason the UK got its 'Tier 1' status)
However, the 'CVF' Requirements document took some pains to keep STOVL and CV options open from the start, with F/A-18, Rafale and even a non-existent 'navalised Typhoon' listed as possible aircraft.
I do have to gently demur from your assertion that the JSF programme was an 'accounting gimmick'. As I've previously posted, the US DoD made a deliberate decision to push the USAF and USN to adopt a single seat, single engined design solution to their next generation tactical aircraft needs. STOVL made an excellent lever to achieve this, as the technology to make a twin engined STOVL aircraft (I mean here an aircraft with two main propulsion engines, like an F/A-18 or an F-15) din't exist then, and doesn't exist now. The reason that they did this was the massive and costly failures of a number of tactical aircraft programmes over the preceding decade or so (e.g. A-12, ATF, NATF, etc). The common thread that the DoD staff identified was that large (heavy) twin seat twin engined aircraft are always expensive. And the F-22 programme was busy proving the point, even with a single seat. At this range (remember they were having to do this stuff in the early to mid 90s), their logic is understandable. As I've often posted, it's easy to criticise future planning staffs when you have 20/20 (years) hindsight. Their jobs are often terrifyingly hard. What I do know is that, at the time, cost projections for a set of 'next generation' large tactical aircraft to meet USAF, USN and USMC requirements were eye-wateringly high.
Again, as I've posted a number of times, it's clear that the JSF (then F-35) hasn't delivered the cost advantages the DoD sought all those years ago. Reasons why? Many, but my list would include (in approximate chronological order):
1. Underestimates of levels of technical risk, especially in the areas of electrical flying controls and integrated power packs
2. Over optimistic plans - good old optimism bias, common on both sides of the Atlantic. Anyone remember the original ISD for 'Eurofighter'?
3. Failure by LM and the JPO to carry out adequate requirements development after contract award - the top level requirements document (the JORD) was, in my view, pretty good, but LM failed completely to properly decompose those requirements into the comprehensive and detailed set required to drive the design.
4. Failure by LM to control the weight of the aircraft. This was especially difficult to understand, given the fact that the main KPP for the STOVL aircraft explicitly required a light airframe. They got it so wrong that the F-35A and C were also horribly overweight. Putting this right delayed the programme by around 15 months all by itself.
5. Failure (again my LM and JPO) to adequately control and manage the mission systems development. This was compounded by the lack of requirements decomposition (see 2 above) and led to huge rewrites of initial software loads. The situation was compounded by the decision not to build a second mission systems integration rig. The single rig has not been able to provide enough run time to test and clear software in the timescales required.
There are others, but that's my stab - I know others will be able to do better.
The people I know who are working the programme (experienced professionals, and not 'fanboys') are more than happy at the aircrafts' capabilities and performance. They are busy working out the best ways to exploit this capability from the ship, and deliver it reliably and effectively under all conditions. For what little it's worth, they have my vote.
Best Regards as ever to all those doing the long days and nights' work to take UK Naval Aviation into the future,
Engines