Fullwings:
In my experience, it is rare in real life to encounter conditions that deteriorate to the extent that there is an adequate reference at DA(H)/MDA but not later on in the approach, so when it does happen, it’s something unfamiliar that requires positive action to remedy, especially if the deterioration is slow or subtle. Has happened to me twice in 25 years. I agree about the “shopping list” in terms of references, especially on a NPA, and just because you have managed to tick one of them off, doesn’t mean that you are stable and/or can successfully land off the approach.
We are debating NPA techniques and crew duties to try and avoid further similar dangerous scenarios. But back to root cause of the dangerous nature that eschewed; there was a perception that a 'visual clue' had been obtained, and the Canadian rules allowed them to continue, plus the earlier ATC meteo data. Would EASA or FAA rules have allowed them to continue? It would seem No. The 'hotel', or whatever, was not on the shopping list. Thus does a major root cause go back to the Canadian rules? Different crew duties and techniques might not have prevented such a low descent. Descending below MDA in manual flight without positive visual reference is an airmanship thing. Limitations of the a/c, without a glide slope, require disconnection, but scratching around over the sea, semi blind, is not calm or relaxing. That's a self preservation thing.
CAA rules are one thing, but risk to my own health & safety is another. Limits are limits, but you can always impose your own buffer.
What pressure is there for Canada to review its rules? Surely after the recent incidents/accidents they are incumbent to do so. If a threat is perceived and demonstrated does it not need to be addressed? I know it's early days, but any nudie knowledge? It is within the remit of operators to change their own rules more in line with EASA & FAA.