This extract from page 51 is particularly revealing with respect to IUTs:
We also need standardized instruction in CNATRA, and not all IPs bring the same level of experience in low-altitude fast jet operations, which is a very unforgiving regime of fight. The gradual expansion and de-standardization of the scope of the ONAV syllabus was extended to IPs whose background does not adequately prepare them to fly, let alone instruct, the expanded scope of a mission they are learning to perform for perhaps the first time in their career.
The safety net of verified and approved fight procedures does not exist in publications or lectures, or even at all for this aircraft. We rely on IUTs to request additional IUT sorties until they feel “comfortable” instructing ONAV missions. In this, case, it appears LT Ruth was essentially making up his own procedures and was clearly comfortable with aggressive maneuvers at low altitude.
I believe his comfort level was built upon overconfidence and a misperception that the level of knowledge, experience, and oversight provided to him as an ONAV instructor was adequate. It was not.
I don’t know if he would feel comfortable flying a T-45C at the edge of its envelope at low altitude, but I don’t believe he was given the tools, including oversight, to even recognize he was there. The system failed at every level: the cowboy attitude of the individual, the lack of oversight by the squadron and the Wing, and the lack of adequate training resources from CNATRA.