@Airbubba
Thanks, I was of course right, and the journo and the know-nothings who I responded to were as I depicted them: both ignorant and wrong. What got me to respond at all was the foolish commentary on qualifications.
I don't see anywhere that the instructor wasn't qualified to fly the T-45.
Of course not.
The previous CNATRA got fired over the OBOGS thing (among others). Trying to lay this all on current CNATRA is (IMO) absurd. Aside: he ought to have had fair warning when the JO's felt empowered to make what looked like "going on strike" was their attitude. The culture he feel in on was already sick. (I have spoken to two senior O-6's whose root cause analysis of cultural problems reach to the sequester issue ... but that's a different topic).
When you and I were nuggets, the number of deaths like those described in the report were "not uncommon" in terms of occurrence rates. Flat-hatting has been a bogey chased by CO's of squadrons since before you and I were born. We in the aviation community attract Type A personalities. A side effect off that is the risk of the above: sure, I can do that! It's been in the NATOPS(OPNAVISNT 3710 series) for a very long time: rules covering flathatting, and how wrong it is, predate me earning my wings nearly 40 years ago. I suspect that Orville and Wilbur had a few heated conversations over who was doing what with their one plane, way back when.
a failure of leadership to oversee training operations to ensure strict adherence to all approved publications
I have written flag officer endorsements on both JAG investigations and mishap reports for fatal accidents. (That's part of why I drink). I am fully aware of what goes into the kind of document you provided excerpts from. (Thanks). The critical leadership failures are the usual suspects: CO's and Wing Commanders who do not do a thing called "deck plate leadership" (Also a a fine old Navy tradition.) and Ops O's who don't ride herd on a bucket full of Type A personalities, or, and this is another recent problem, whose hands are tied by the current Navy culture from putting a boot in the right arse at the right time. (I've seen both ...)
When I was an IP the Ops O's freedom to stuff in the boot was not so constrained.
FWIW, if you want to read a few pages of "it makes me sick" accident summary, go to the late 90' and a mid air collision in a VT squadron. A few lives lost... and part of that problem was an unbriefed formation flight, sort of an ad hoc formation that ended in tears.