PPRuNe Forums - View Single Post - When are you allowed to put your hand back on thrust levers after V1?
Old 11th Apr 2018, 13:16
  #27 (permalink)  
sheppey
 
Join Date: Aug 2011
Location: Australia
Posts: 423
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
I doubt the romanian A310 crew had much time to contemplate non-normal checklists when they flipped over due to a throttle jam. Enlighten me as to what harm my hands do on the thrust levers after gear is selected up.
One particular 737 operator (Asian) had a policy during an instrument approach of both pilots putting their hands on their knees unless operating a lever or MCP panel switch. The simulator instructor suggested it was a good idea for the PF to rest his hand lightly on the thrust levers during the latter part of a coupled ILS approach. The PF, who was chief pilot, rejected that recommendation.

The next sequence was a 15 DME arc leading to an ILS. As the 737 was descending during the arc with 18 track miles to touch down, it was clean at 210 knots at idle thrust. Both pilots had their hands on knees. With the thrust levers at idle power, at this point the instructor failed the No 1 thrust lever clutch motor. There is no warning light of this in the 737 and the pilots would not have been aware of anything unusual until an increase of power was needed

Turning final, the PF called for the usual sequence of flap extension to slow up including gear down and final flap. The autothrottle system then increased power to counter drag and set up the three degree still coupled approach. Due to the "failed" clutch motor on the No 1 thrust lever, that lever stayed closed at idle while the No 2 engine spooled up to high power required by gear and landing flap down. Initially about 75% N1. The PF must have seen the control wheel deflection - in fact both pilots would have been aware of it as they were both experienced on type. Yet, neither pilot said a thing.

The autopilot reacted by applying considerable control wheel rotation to counter the increasing yaw and roll. The PF and PM still had their hands on their knees as per company SOP. At 1500 feet the autopilot suddenly disengaged itself, unable to cope with gross control wheel angle.

Under the influence of high thrust on one engine and idle thrust on the other engine, with the PF taking absolutely no action (not even rudder) to prevent the aircraft from rolling into a spiral, the PF then, to the astonishment of the simulator instructor, called for the engine failure and shut down checklist. The PF's hands were still glued to his knees. There was nothing wrong with the idle power engine that manually pushing up its thrust lever would not have fixed.

While the PM was heads down scrabbling around the floor trying to locate the QRH page on engine failures, the 737 went into an ever steepening spiral past 90 degrees angle of bank all the time the PF kept both hands on his knees shouting for the PM to hurry up and read the QRH

The simulator instructor then mercifully "froze" the simulator to prevent further "loss of face." The apparent culture of the operator meant that the PM would not dare to speak up.

if the PF had kept his hand on the thrust levers during the ILS approach, he would have quickly picked up the ever increasing split thrust levers and (hopefully) take the appropriate action of disengaging the autothrottles and operated them manually.
sheppey is offline