interesting and will QF go back to routing to UK in addition via SIN also go via BKK again or compete with BA (and MH) and a route via KUL???
There was a very directed switch from Qantas to JQ, perhaps part of ideology and labour unit cost considerations, circumventing the legislatove restriction. We simply do not know. The problem with a low fare airline is that yield is difficult to find. One need only look at the ASK flown by JQ (48% of Qantas) yet they only generate 22% of the Revenue Qantas can generate. It is a high volume, low yield business and whilst having a role, not sure it was the solution to all ills.
- Qantas lost a lot of ground as aircraft poured into JQ. Qantas lost around 400,000 passengers from their aircraft as the cut services into Europe and code shared with EK
- There is little to no code share revenue observable in the statutory accounts. (Group revenue declines in real terms)
- The alliance secured Qantas very little and already weakened, they were lucky the ACCC only gave them 5 years, instead of the 10 Mr Joyce wanted.
It is
probable all Qantas European flights had to hub through Dubai for the duration of the 'alliance': the UAE is very sensitive to revenue capture from passengers and staff (ask the pilots about trying to live out of Dubai).
I
t is plausible that Perth to London was not covered by the alliance and therefore a way around it?
We are well aware of huge conflict at senior management level about the 'alliance' and lack of tangible benefit for Qantas. (it couldn't end soon enough)
Logistically the route is thin and suffers from real operational constraints, both from regulatory and meteorological perspectives. The aircraft can physically do it at least it APPEARS to, however the people operating it are very constrained. A planned TOD of 19.50 leaves no room. European weather being what it is EGLL may require a few early diversions, standby crew positioning and where they are positioned adds more variables.
Our hunch is that, given the flight wasn't oversold and some passengers appeared transferred from the existing service through Dubai, it may well quietly be curtailed, a bit like the AOC being split and the many millions spent before abandoning that 'idea'
Mr Joyce for all his favourable press, high remuneration and self promotion, does not seem in the cold light of day to execute well. This could be viewed as poor strategic modelling and a hierarchical management structure. Complex systems need broad inputs and route selection with a new aircraft is a big puzzle.
Mr Joyce's tenure shows examples of poor execution that may indicate poor strategic governance.
JQ HK comes to mind , whereby the plan as submitted did not comply with the Principal Place of Business rules. Very poor that an airline didn't know the rules, inexcusable really. A hasty re-write and a big cheque to Stanley Ho, with an introduction form Mr Packer conceivably, was still not successful. Red Q, lacked similar strategic thought. First Malaysia, then Singapore, then quietly dropped. A quick investigation of AOC applications at the time shows that these were made coincidentally around the same time as the announcement.
Perhaps this service results from a poorly structured model too. Poor strategic thinking, announcing and running a route that may well from a reliability (weather and crew limits) perspective may not be achievable sufficiently frequently to generate the Operating Revenue and patronage.
We would not be surprised to see a QF9 service via Singapore in the Northern Winter.