Or, as said earlier, the gas shackle modification was not introduced into MoD service as a result of a manufacturer identified hazard with the original shackle. Equally I am not aware that MB proposed the gas shackle modification to any foreign user to resolve a safety issue with the original design. I do not think a civilian AD was raised for the civilian operators of ejection seats fitted with a scissor shackle either.
Returning to the original flawed design, it can be resolved (and was) by a simple and cheap bolt change. There has been no panic upgrade to gas shackles as a result of this issue; the problem was a single-point safety critical failure in the original shackle and bolt design. If MB had gripped the issue when identified 2 or 3 decades ago the old bolt design would have been withdrawn and all seat users would have received a modified retaining bolt. As we learned, MB was still providing this flawed part to multiple customers up to and shortly after this terrible incident.
Of course, we should not forget the safety pin that, when inserted, may not actually make the seat safe, or the firing handles effectively becoming a hair trigger, or the man sep handles being fatally ‘live’ when the seat is still in the aircraft, or a seat design change leading to a seat coming adrift and killing its occupant, or QRFs that can inadvertently release the occupant post-ejection and I could go on... Not all was well in MB’s safety process and things had to change.