EAP86, Rigga, et al
Many Thanks.
Haddon-Cave confirmed the real problem is implementation. He didn't uncover this, he was just pointed to directives that staff should NOT implement them, but falsely declare they had. That, surely, is where the MAA should have been focusing attention.
Looking at at well over 70 deaths discussed here over the years, I can point straight to the 'old' regulations, set out in one Def Stan and one chapter of another, that, if implemented, would have avoided them. I can't identify the same conciseness in the MAA regs. To me, that means the MAA has gone down the wrong path. The Hawk XX177 accident rather proves the point.
I know the MAA set about auditing project teams when it was formed in 2010. But if this didn't reveal the invalid Hawk safety case and lack of basic audit trail, then it didn't ask the right questions.