In this thread there has been a confusion in the discussion by some people advocating the recovery from approach to stall and others answering with recovery from full stall techniques; and vice versus. Some back & forth has not been apples & apples, hence some agitation. If the topics were separated then perhaps clarity would prevail.
IMHO the only opportunity power might be used to aid recovery is if the wing is not aerodynamically stalled. I can't see how brawn can overcome brains.
Many TRIs emphasize that minimum altitude loss is the key to a "correct" recovery.
I doubt SFI/TRI/TRE's made the rules. Was it not that they were instructed by XAA's to do so? If so, where did the error lie?
The bit about 'ground contact being a threat' always tickled me. Having been a crop sprayer being close to the ground meant 'at most times on the job', without hitting it. i..e 3-5m depending on the application. Doing pipeline surveillance it could mean 200-500' as allowed.
Recovery from approach to stall at 500' on finals full flaps IMHO does not mean maintaining 500'; it means recovery from your predicament without hitting the ground, and not making it doubly difficult by entering a secondary stall, which often meant you stood a better chance of doing so. It was a delicate manoeuvre where low kinetic energy needed to be increased and if there was some potential, energy to help you do so, why not use it with finesse? Do you fail the tick in the box if you recover and fly away safely at 200' from 500', or must you achieve the same sweating success above 400'? In real life they both pass.
At 200' the dices are loaded and more delicacy & finesse are required. In the days of real training in the sim it was nice to do both, and the crews loved it. Sadly time has been stolen from real training.
When Boeing FCTM said "recovery from stick shaker (low level) was apply thrust and reduce attitude" I interpreted that not as apply thrust 1st then reduce attitude; I considered it as both at the same time, and if the student pressured the elevator before thrusting the levers by a split second there was no admonishment. But if they did it the other way round, and secondary stalled, there was.
It's taken a longtime but I think common sense has woken up a little; not enough. Why should there be only one size fits all? We have other recall procedures that need quick decision making; we are supposed to be intelligent trained professionals. Or is this one size fits all a reflection on what the opinion is of the standard of professionals. Only time to think of one thing, when as a pilot we should be able to choose the best applicable. IMHO.
With that question I lump the new Unreliable Airspeed procedure introduced a few years ago. It took 2 minutes and 8 check items to tell me what I already knew to do; by which time the a/c had transitioned from its last steady state and needed to be returned to it. That has been discussed previously, and I don't which to open that debate. I think the debate is much deeper about the true depth of professional pilot training and what is expected of us.
I've run out of tin hats.