I understand why Bomber Command engaged in a war of attrition over Germany in WWII, notwithstanding the very heavy air crew casualties. I hold no truck with the revisionists who seek to question the policy from their armchairs decades later.
Where I do question policy is during the period when Sholto Douglas, having replaced Hugh Dowding, who was by common agreement shoddily treated after Fighter Command's finest hour, embarked on "big wing" attacks against Luftwaffe fighter aircraft over France during 1941 and 1942.
Many distinguished Battle of Britain fighter pilots were KIA or captured during these operations.
The real tragedy of Sholto Douglas's policy was two fold:
1. It was totally ineffective. In 1941 German losses in combat were 103 c/f with Royal Air Force losses of some 400 fighter aircraft -- being shotdown over France, even if the pilot survived, invariably meant 4 years in a POW. In 1942 the introduction of the FW 190 meant that the Spitfire MK V was not only outgunned but under powered. it was only with the introduction of the Spitfire MK IX that the balance was restored. It is to be noted that these Fighter Command operations were not intended to support Bomber Command. Bomber Command didn't bomb over France and if they did, it would have been at night.
2. The unnecessary losses over France in 1941 and early 1942 meant that much needed experienced pilots and Spitfires were in short supply for the defence of Malta and the Battle of El Alamein. Whilst Hurricanes were extensively used in North Africa to drop bombs on enemy positions, there were insufficient (faster) Spitfires to provide air cover, leading to heavy losses of Hurricanes and pilots over the Med and North Africa in 1941 / 1942.
It was only in late 1943 and early 1944 with the introduction of the Spitfire MK IX (and other faster aircraft) and pilots trained under the Arnold Scheme in North America, that the Royal Air Force (in combination with the USAF) achieved control of the air in Europe.
I suspect that the justification for the 1941 Sholto Douglas policy was that it helped Britain's new ally, Russia. If so that was a pretty thin excuse. Germany lost the war in Russia for the same reason Napolean did. Military forces with overstretched supply lines and inadequate clothing for the extremely cold Russian winters.
What prompted this post was reading this Obituary from 2000.
https://www.theguardian.com/news/200...dianobituaries