Good arguments for modifying procedures from operating manual

[Smooth Airperator]

Following on from my thread at: Your company Airbus checklist variations, I would like to find out how one can go about justifying modifying an operating procedure from that stated in the operating manuals. I find myself at an airline with a very overtaxing SOP. Almost everything is a song and dance that must be done in the correct order and when I contest, I'm told "it's in the book". Lo and behold, it mostly is but sometimes it's clearly the opinion of a very opinionated little man. Now I'm not talking about technical aspects of the aircraft operation but more softer topics like sticking to preliminary cockpit check items like glue to the point where even switching the ADIRS on a bit early or getting the Oxygen check out of the way nice and early is frowned upon. Guess I've been lucky and operating the Airbus the lazy and flexible way. So, is there ever a good argument for changing/ignoring what a manufacturer asks to do? Once again, I'm not talking about technical aspects of flying but more related to cockpit organisational / preparatory tasks.

In my experience, previous Airline SOPs have somehow worked out where the standard Airbus SOP has overdone it (according to their own interpretation) and have remove bits or simplified/combined procedures to make for an easy day out. Now I find myself "following the book" verbatim and tiring the crap out of myself before we've even started the flight.

[pineteam]

There is the SOP and then there is airmanship and common sense. I remember having a captain who will be watching carefully how I will be doing the cockpit preparation and bugged me every 10 seconds cause I did not do exactly as per '' his interpretation of the FCOM procedure''. I try to do the preparation by the books but will you switch on the parking brakes during preliminary cockpit prep when your brakes are still very hot? Or turning on the fuel pumps when you have a 2 hours delay... A part from instructors doing a line check or training flight, people being picky about your way of doing the cockpit preparation have probably a lack of confidence or poor knowledge of the aircraft.

[FlightDetent]

If you have a full set of SOPs from the manufacturer, only when you want to
​​​​​​- abuse the hardware
- increase the costs
- reduce the performance
- create confusions
- uncover traps.

While the above reads unnecessarily sarcastic, take whatever company specific procedure you see, and audit it against the points above. There are quite a few in my OM-B. Regardless of the fact that for sure the author was a clever and well intending Pilot.

[megan]

So, is there every a good argument for changing/ignoring what a manufacturer asks to do?

Can think of a 747 incident where the airline SOP didn't conform with the manufacturers and crew became unsure of usable fuel state, BA three engine LAX - UK. QF over run BKK using procedures manufacturer didn't endorse. Used to fly a particular type where interruption of pre start check often resulted in engine start with fuel off, would run for about two seconds before rapid movement of fuel lever instantly restored the noise.

[vilas]

Developing one's own procedures in FBW aircraft like airbus is fraught with danger. The manufacturer designs the aircraft with a design philosophy. They design the procedures in accordance with that. Only they have access to the software, wind tunnel and test pilots results. Operators have only the FCOM which is not good enough to overrule manufacturer's recommendations. It happens that in one part of the world an airline decides to things differently while in another part that procedure had already caused an incident. So if any change is contemplated the least an airline can do is to consult the manufacturer. Some years ago Jetstar Australia and two other airlines on a GA had relegated the FMA call to after gear up. That caused incidents of dangerous descent below minima in poor visibility in all three airlines. The captains had had inadvertently pushed THR levers short of TOGA. And airline procedure asked for FMA after gear up. Gear up was not done because there was no positive climb and that was because FMGC remained in approach mode. The lowest one aircraft came was 14ft. All of them reverted to original procedure. And especially an individual pilot should never have personal procedures. That is the surest of putting the other guy out of the loop.

[blind pew]

BA 777 example of how modified checklists can go wrong

HEATHROW crash..on ground emergency had been changed so that the fuel tank shut off valves remained open as there was no power supply to close them because of the action sequence being split between the two pilots.
I too was one who once tried to change a checklist but you have to be extremely clever to understand the whole picture and very few of us are although we might think it.

[Check Airman]

I'd be inclined to consult the manufacturer before changing their procedures in any meaningful way. The checklists and procedures in use at my company would be almost unrecognisable to the manufacturer, let alone a pilot from another airline. However, the front of the book says my employer is responsible, so nothing can go wrong. Right?

[Smooth Airperator]

villas,

I completely get everything you say however it's not the technical operating matters I'm talking about but more related to the prep/organisational aspects of the day (I have edited my post to clarify). My previous airline has over 25 years experience with the A320 series and I guess over time felt the need to condense and simplify certain tasks or simply allow for flexibility.

You say Airbus, being the manufacturer and having access to all the data, clearly should not be ignored because they know what they're talking about. However, I'd like to play devils advocate for a minute and ask the question: Do Airbus fly their planes on a daily basis with real world operational constraints (time being the primary one)? Were the procedures written with 10 interruptions by cabin crew, handling agents or ATC? No Airline operates within a sterile vacuum, therefore overtime adapts procedures to suit a typical day. Aviation doesn't care if you fly Airbus, Boeing or Embraer!

It might be a crude example, but just consider this one for a second. The Oxygen Mask test appears towards the end of the Cockpit Prep tasks (when both pilots are seated). The amount of things pilots must do before they get to the lateral console and glare-shield setup in the real world is simply crazy. We currently do manual loads sheets and have countless interruptions before we get to the briefing. Often there's 3 minutes to go prior to push back (fully loaded A321). Now the Engineer is connected and before we check the masks we need to ask the engineer to temporarily disconnect/remove his headset. What I'm saying is the preparatory tasks as specified by Airbus assume a text book day out. Flexibility can be a bad and a beautiful thing. I should be allowed to get the Oxygen test out of the way when I arrive into the flight deck. Some might say you just take the common sense approach to things, I agree... but when your common sense is questioned because "it's not in the book" you begin to wonder.

Don't get me wrong, we need a standard set of procedures. We need a starting point after all but to forcefully "follow the book" in the precise order it's written when the world around you makes it difficult is IMHO stupid. The glove no longer fits, but we keep forcing it on.

[RAT 5]

There were occasions where I 'liked to get on with set ups'. Why? I've been sitting on the a/c for 10-15 mins; nice & early., but not doing much. Perhaps the a/c has been shut down for a couple of hours, or is first flight of the day. I liked to get some systems fired up to see if they are working while we have an engineer and time to fix any snags. Discovering there is a problem with only 5 mins to push back and a slot seemed to be unnecessarily 'pushing it'.

Regarding modification of manufacturer's techniques: I once flew B767 for 2 different operators whose CP's didn't like VNAV close to the ground on departure. In one, flap retraction was done in V/S and for the other SE acceleration was done in Alt HLD. Both had come from steam driven a/c and like 'the old ways of doing things'. They could not give a sensible reason to those of us who'd come from Boeing trained airlines. Frustrating, messy and not confidence generating in Flt Ops managers.

[vilas]

SA
The examples you give are a bit arbitrary and vague. Airbus doesn't operate an airline but surely their product is to be used in certain way. Let us consider the use of mobile phone. It is definitely not meant to be used while driving a two wheeler. In my country you can see people using it twisting their head and holding the phone against the shoulder. They will say there's no problem. If you prepare the cockpit with a dozen interuptions may be that needs to be changed and not the procedure. You're setting up a trap. Any time error will appear. This is how wrong stab setting are set, thrust applied in hurry sucking the technician in the engine.There is a a video by airbus in which they show the approach briefing is disrupted repeatedly by cabin crew with a peoblem and that leads to descent to a wrong altitude. I know an airline which has placards to leave the crew alone when they so desire. I am afraid I cannot agree to your examples. They don't justify change in procedures. There are things like putting landing lights off at 5000ft instead 10000ft or using different acceleration altitude instead of standard no problem.

[Denti]

There is quite a bit more in the SOPs than just the flying the aircraft part, and some of that might be counterproductive, simply daft or way too long winded for the intended operation. And of course yes, one can use other than the OEM procedures, but should be very sure that his legal department agrees with it.

That said, when i tried to change an SOP i wrote emails to the relevant guys and at usually some ASRs as well, especially if those SOPs were not particularly safe (single point of performance calculation for example which me and a few others changed with ASRs in one company). Underpinning your point with helpful examples, pointers to industry standards and being polite in ones language does help though, but that is just normal stuff anyway.

Quite a bit of the current airbus SOP set seems to be squarely aimed at the lowest common denominator in training possible. And that is needed in certain companies, but not in all. SOPs have to go in line with the prevalent company culture, and have to be relevant for the operation and the type of personnel used, otherwise parts of it will not be followed which creates a negative confirmation bias for the whole set.

[blind pew]

I would suggest that your company and its captains has got it wrong as in two of my employers no one was allowed to interrupt the flight crew doing checks. Speak when you are spoken to.
And Airbus do have experience of your real world as I have a mate who works for them doing line training for their customers.
my last company changed their checklists on the 747 which resulted in them not being allowed into the USA as both Boeing and the FAA decided that it was illegal.

[Check Airman]

In my opinion, things as trivial as that can be done slightly out of order. SOP is important, but not at the exclusion of good sense and judgement.

Consider this- SOP has us go to the cockpit first, perform a few checks, then go out to do the walkaround. When the inbound airplane is late, or it's about to rain etc, it's quite common to see a pilot go down the jet bridge and do the walkaround before stepping onto the plane. SOP? No. Sensible and safe? Yes.

[pineteam]

Originally Posted by vilas

. I know an airline which has placards to leave the crew alone when they so desire. I am afraid I cannot agree to your examples..

An optional ''ATTND ADV'' push button next to the MECH p/b on the overhead panel can be installed and is used to alert the flight attendants that, during periods of high work load, flight deck entry would be a distraction. I saw that in the A320 Checkride application. We don't have that in our fleet tho. Any of you guys have seen it before?

[Capn Bloggs]

An optional ''ATTND ADV'' push button

What about "CREW BUSY"?

Seriously....

Originally Posted by Check Airman

When the inbound airplane is late, or it's about to rain etc, it's quite common to see a pilot go down the jet bridge and do the walkaround before stepping onto the plane. SOP? No. Sensible and safe? Yes.

Hear hear.

[Vessbot]

All you guys saying that manufacturer's procedures shouldn't be changed because they're thought out in accordance with the design philosophy... I only agree with you as far as they are actually thought out; and that is NOT necesarrily true!

For example I flew a King Air for two different jobs a while ago. In one of them (the first one) they had a company checklist that was organized for effecient operation (multiple legs a day and quick turns inbetween) as refined over decades of experience.

The other, well... they didn't use a checklist. But I did have access to a training center's sim checklist (marked "not for use in flight," which I did use in flight) and... the manufacturer's checklist! Which was, in a word, atrocious. It had been designed by someone who thought of all the switch flips it takes to perform a flight and vomited them onto a few pages, with zero thought put to how it might actually be used. Not even one practice run inside their head, let alone in a sim or even in front of a paper tiger or whatever.

For before engine start, there was no differentiation between an acceptance/origination/preflight/cockpit setup (whicever you want to call it) and the actual before engine start procedure. Everything was mashed up and interspersed in one. So, if you were to follow it strictly, you'd twiddle your thumbs and drink coffe while waiting for the passengers, and and after loading them up and their bags, you'd sit down in front of a clean slate and go through 5-10 minutes of setup and system checks, etc. whereas you could have done all of that before, and now go just do 5 seconds of procedure and 10 seconds of checklist of the items only necessary to do immediately before the engine start.

Before takeoff - 12 items most of which could have been done earlier instead of clogging up time at the hold short line.

I was gonna give a blow by blow of all its problems for the whole flight, but hopefully you get the idea. But for the end, here I'll post the Landing checklist. Years later, I still can't get over how astoundingly stupid this is.

LANDING
Cabin sign.......................................................O N
Standby pumps...............................................ON
Flaps...............................................APPROACC H
Prop synch.....................................................OF F
Speed levers..................................................HIGH
Landing gear...............................DOWN, 3 GREEN
Flaps....................................................... ...100%
Landing and taxi lights...................................AS REQ'D
Pressurization............................................CH ECKED
Manual fuel/ignition......................................AS REQ'D
Power levers .................FLT IDLE, GND IDLE, REVERSE
Brakes....................................................AS REQ'D

Notice it starts with things you'd do at a few thousand feet, and ends with the rollout. There's no meaningful start and end point and no point at which you can perform it and say "approach checklist complete" or "landing checklist complete." "Power levers idle, Brakes as required..." gee ya think? Am I supposed to pull this out and read it right after I touch down to check those items? Or wait until a convenient time (stopped after landing) in which case if I forgot to pull the power to idle and apply brakes, I'll have already run off the runway and it's too late. It's not just difficult or onerous to use, but literally impossible.

After going through this experience, I can completely see the potential for lower-grade failures to think ahead to real-life operations even by modern airliner designers (such as the oxygen mask check being inconveniently at the end, from a few posts up). What it takes to do a test flight, which itself might be the center of maybe days or even weeks of organization, and the entire operation revolves around that flight, is not gonna be sufficient for the efficiency required to do routine 25 minute turns with flight attendants and gate agents and mechanics and dispatch in the picture.

In my only airline experience we have company-designed SOP's and checklists, and I'm actually very curious to see Bombardier's raw procedures for the CRJ.

[Vessbot]

Originally Posted by Check Airman

In my opinion, things as trivial as that can be done slightly out of order. SOP is important, but not at the exclusion of good sense and judgement.

Consider this- SOP has us go to the cockpit first, perform a few checks, then go out to do the walkaround. When the inbound airplane is late, or it's about to rain etc, it's quite common to see a pilot go down the jet bridge and do the walkaround before stepping onto the plane. SOP? No. Sensible and safe? Yes.

I partially agree. Sometimes the sensible way to do something would go against SOP like your example. But then the SOP should be designed to allow things to be done that way! Merrily going about your way violating SOP (because this one item is stupid) now undermines the entirety of the SOP structure (because any other item may be considered to be stupid and worth ignoring). Every single time a plane has crashed due to a violation of SOP, the crew thought that item was stupid and not worth doing. So how do we know we're not making the same mistake?

A safe and efficient operation is approached from both ends. Crew complying with SOP, and SOP being designed in accordance with sensible and efficient operation.

[Vessbot]

Originally Posted by vilas

SO
If you prepare the cockpit with a dozen interuptions may be that needs to be changed and not the procedure..

Interruptions are a reality of the operating environment like thunderstorms, icing, and winds. To the extent reasonable, SOP's need to be designed to accomodate that. (Along with the crew needing the mental discipline to remember where they left off and continue methodically from there.) The safest and most efficient operation is one where the procedures are designed around reality, not a principled fantasy.

On a quick turn, we're "preparing the cockpit" from the moment we set the parking brake until the pushback commences. If someone needs your attention, making them wait 30 seconds until your next convenient break point is reasonable. Making them wait until you're ready to push back, is not. Because whatever issue they needed you for, is itself probalby something necessary for the flight to commence, and needed some time after your attention, for itself to be resolved.

[767-300ER]

Aircraft manufacturers write SOPs/FCOMs with the lowest common denominator in mind. Issues like single engine taxi are reluctantly added because of demand, not because the manufacturer endorses this practice. Airlines with multi-manufacturer fleets will often try to make SOPs more similar where possible. Regulators will typically require the Airline to get an NTO letter (no technical objection) from the manufacturer before allowing an Airline to modify the basic FCOM/SOPs...

[stilton]

Originally Posted by megan

Can think of a 747 incident where the airline SOP didn't conform with the manufacturers and crew became unsure of usable fuel state, BA three engine LAX - UK. QF over run BKK using procedures manufacturer didn't endorse. Used to fly a particular type where interruption of pre start check often resulted in engine start with fuel off, would run for about two seconds before rapid movement of fuel lever instantly restored the noise.

I must be missing something


how did you start an engine with the fuel off ?