A320 status showing in op systems without prior ECAM caution
Thread Starter
Join Date: Jul 2009
Location: Coast to Coast...
Posts: 199
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
A320 status showing in op systems without prior ECAM caution
Occasionally on MSN >6000 we get an ECAM status page showing
CAT3 SINGLE ONLY with CAT3 DUAL listed under inoperative systems, this without any kind of ECAM warning or caution. Only in the air. Anyone shed some light as to why this might be happening and how, technical speaking, Airbus pilots must treat this when determining landing requirements for an LVO approach?
CAT3 SINGLE ONLY with CAT3 DUAL listed under inoperative systems, this without any kind of ECAM warning or caution. Only in the air. Anyone shed some light as to why this might be happening and how, technical speaking, Airbus pilots must treat this when determining landing requirements for an LVO approach?
Going back to some of the early three digit msn A320F it was due to an ADR disagree.
The next time it happens look at the cfds and select current leg report.
If the aircraft has decided you are Cat3 single then that is what you will get.
See also:
http://www.pprune.org/tech-log/56293...y-no-ecam.html
The next time it happens look at the cfds and select current leg report.
If the aircraft has decided you are Cat3 single then that is what you will get.
See also:
http://www.pprune.org/tech-log/56293...y-no-ecam.html
Join Date: Apr 2004
Location: australia
Posts: 11
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
This can happen on the ground also. On the ground, if you hard tune an ILS in the Rad Nav page then clear the ILS it removes the status. I can't remember why this works, it was explained to me one day but I can't recall the logic!
Join Date: Sep 2011
Location: FL390
Posts: 238
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
If the aircraft says Cat 3 single then plan for Cat 3 A approach. The reason you don't get an ECAM caution is because there's no associated ECAM message or actions for the specific failure - as others have said it is often down to an ADR disagree, and one of the reasons we review the status page before starting an approach.
CFDS will give you a rough idea in flight if you're curious with more detailed reporting on the ground.
CFDS will give you a rough idea in flight if you're curious with more detailed reporting on the ground.
Join Date: Jul 2009
Location: London
Posts: 77
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I had one the other day
NAV LS tuning disagree. A disagree between MMR1 and MMR2 which is a joint GPS/ILS box.
On the ground we had no caution but inop CAT 2 (interesting one as you can't arm the approach pb).
The caution came up at 1500 feet, once out of TO inhibit.
Easy way to solve it is to hard tune the ILS in the rad nav page.
NAV LS tuning disagree. A disagree between MMR1 and MMR2 which is a joint GPS/ILS box.
On the ground we had no caution but inop CAT 2 (interesting one as you can't arm the approach pb).
The caution came up at 1500 feet, once out of TO inhibit.
Easy way to solve it is to hard tune the ILS in the rad nav page.
Join Date: Oct 2010
Location: 5° above the Equator, 75° left of Greenwich
Posts: 411
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
This one actually goes away by itself when you're preparing the approach and select the runway for arrival. At least that's how it's happened to me the 2 or 3 times I've got it.
You prepare for a Cat 3 approach with DH.
You prepare for a Cat 3 approach with DH.
Join Date: Sep 2008
Location: In the land of smog
Posts: 195
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Join Date: Mar 2004
Location: FL 391
Posts: 106
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
As previously mentioned, it happens usually when ADRs disagree. I have been showed a trick which worked in flight ( don't know the technicalities behind it though ) : engage AP 2, reset FAC 1, then engage AP1, reset FAC 2. That can rid you of the CAT 3 SINGLE ONLY on the memo. Of course it goes without saying that if you have CAT 3 SINGLE ONLY memo, you will of course be able to shoot a CAT 3 SINGLE ONLY approach.
Happy landings.
Happy landings.
Join Date: Apr 2003
Location: Europe
Posts: 3,039
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I have been showed a trick which worked in flight ( don't know the technicalities behind it though )
Join Date: Apr 2010
Location: IRS NAV ONLY
Posts: 1,230
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
As previously mentioned, it happens usually when ADRs disagree. I have been showed a trick which worked in flight ( don't know the technicalities behind it though ) : engage AP 2, reset FAC 1, then engage AP1, reset FAC 2. That can rid you of the CAT 3 SINGLE ONLY on the memo. Of course it goes without saying that if you have CAT 3 SINGLE ONLY memo, you will of course be able to shoot a CAT 3 SINGLE ONLY approach.
Happy landings.
Happy landings.
Doing some random non-approved resets in flight on a very complex and computer-driven aircraft. What could possibly go wrong....
WHEN you reported this fault after arrival, in the tech log not on a scrap of paper pinned to the table, what did the engineer/mechanic sign it off with? There should be a TSM/AMM reference for the fix.
Or am I missing something?
Or am I missing something?
Join Date: Sep 2011
Location: FL390
Posts: 238
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
QRH gives green light to computer resets in flight, with the caveat that you do it one at a time...
There's also a difference between pulling the CB for a computer (bad idea) and using the push button control.
There's also a difference between pulling the CB for a computer (bad idea) and using the push button control.
Join Date: Oct 2010
Location: 5° above the Equator, 75° left of Greenwich
Posts: 411
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Join Date: Oct 2015
Location: 43N
Posts: 264
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Exactly. We operate SOP. We are pilots not engineers. We use the Airbus approved manual to operate the aircraft safely, we don't write nor rewrite, nor selectively quibble the clear meaning of the manual.
"The PIC had seen the engineer resetting the FAC CB on the ground. Having experience of witnessing and performing FAC CB reset, the PIC might consider that he “fully understand the consequences”. Resetting the FAC CB on the ground and in flight has different consequences. The FAC CBs were not included in the list of the CB allowed in OEB and TDUs to be reset in flight. The consequences of resetting FAC CBs in flight are not described in Airbus documents. It requires good understanding of the aircraft system to be aware of the consequences."
QZ8501. 162 dead.
"The PIC had seen the engineer resetting the FAC CB on the ground. Having experience of witnessing and performing FAC CB reset, the PIC might consider that he “fully understand the consequences”. Resetting the FAC CB on the ground and in flight has different consequences. The FAC CBs were not included in the list of the CB allowed in OEB and TDUs to be reset in flight. The consequences of resetting FAC CBs in flight are not described in Airbus documents. It requires good understanding of the aircraft system to be aware of the consequences."
QZ8501. 162 dead.
