Automation dependency stripped of political correctness.
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Great to see the ball rolling. I was wondering how it is now with many 'apprenticeships' less than half what they were in 80's & 90's. How is it swimming in the deep end so early? It's not just about flying, it's about managing the daily operation, taking responsibility, using your authority and making decisions about non-QRH issues.
Good luck to all. Let's hear more.
Good luck to all. Let's hear more.
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At the end what we are talking here is a twofold thing: knowledge and skill.
You need to have some knowledge: how a wing flies, what AOA is, what stall means, how you have to react to stall, what the backside of the power curve is, what happens in high level aerodynamic (coffin corner), what it means to fly on mach, the concept of energy in terms of alt, speed, weight and wind vs. distance to go, pitch and power values for the usual flight regimes incl. go around and single engine go around, function of slats and flaps, effect of underslung engines, danger of WS and TS...
That is what comes to my mind when I don't think about it more deeper. I am sure others will come up with some more points.
It is really not that much, and all these things can be learned and understood under own efforts, independantly what your airline does. The examples (accidents) are easy to find to learn and understand these basics. No excuses possible!
So lets move to skills: once you have understood above basics, how do you make it work in real live, in the sense that a skill is a knowledge that is applied correctly and made to use in reality?
The most important skill is scanning. Scanning of your instruments, your basic T plus the engine instruments. Your eyes need to be fix in wandering around, scan, scan, scan... The best way to train this is by flying manually, ALWAYS with ATHR off when the AP is off (remember, speed MUST be in your scan), and you want to be proficient in pitch and power. Regularly you should even switch of the FD. Hand-eye-coordination will become much better.
Here the airlines come into play, some have a good culture in switching AP/FD/ATHR off, some not. A good culture encourages switching AP/FD/ATHR off, and has a basic understanding among pilots and some rules when it is appropriate to do so and when not.
Once you have been accustomed to it, it is really no big deal anymore. Your scanning capacity becomes so good, that is becomes a peace of cake to supervise your autopilot.
[I can understand that on longhaul, it is a bit more difficult.]
Then no one is stopping you from ignoring FMS managed descent calculations (if not required by airspace, route, ATC) and being skilled in judgement of wind, weight, speed, alt vs. distance to go. Just refine every day out there the point you start your idle descent towards the field.
At least the message is getting out there, leaders in safety and training have since quite a while been past the point where automation was seen as the be end of all.
However, individual airlines still are lagging behind, but at least most of the big carriers seem to have understood.
It is not rocket science, it does hardly cost money, it just has to be done.
You need to have some knowledge: how a wing flies, what AOA is, what stall means, how you have to react to stall, what the backside of the power curve is, what happens in high level aerodynamic (coffin corner), what it means to fly on mach, the concept of energy in terms of alt, speed, weight and wind vs. distance to go, pitch and power values for the usual flight regimes incl. go around and single engine go around, function of slats and flaps, effect of underslung engines, danger of WS and TS...
That is what comes to my mind when I don't think about it more deeper. I am sure others will come up with some more points.
It is really not that much, and all these things can be learned and understood under own efforts, independantly what your airline does. The examples (accidents) are easy to find to learn and understand these basics. No excuses possible!
So lets move to skills: once you have understood above basics, how do you make it work in real live, in the sense that a skill is a knowledge that is applied correctly and made to use in reality?
The most important skill is scanning. Scanning of your instruments, your basic T plus the engine instruments. Your eyes need to be fix in wandering around, scan, scan, scan... The best way to train this is by flying manually, ALWAYS with ATHR off when the AP is off (remember, speed MUST be in your scan), and you want to be proficient in pitch and power. Regularly you should even switch of the FD. Hand-eye-coordination will become much better.
Here the airlines come into play, some have a good culture in switching AP/FD/ATHR off, some not. A good culture encourages switching AP/FD/ATHR off, and has a basic understanding among pilots and some rules when it is appropriate to do so and when not.
Once you have been accustomed to it, it is really no big deal anymore. Your scanning capacity becomes so good, that is becomes a peace of cake to supervise your autopilot.
[I can understand that on longhaul, it is a bit more difficult.]
Then no one is stopping you from ignoring FMS managed descent calculations (if not required by airspace, route, ATC) and being skilled in judgement of wind, weight, speed, alt vs. distance to go. Just refine every day out there the point you start your idle descent towards the field.
At least the message is getting out there, leaders in safety and training have since quite a while been past the point where automation was seen as the be end of all.
However, individual airlines still are lagging behind, but at least most of the big carriers seem to have understood.
It is not rocket science, it does hardly cost money, it just has to be done.
Last edited by 1201alarm; 8th Jan 2016 at 22:48.
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Here the airlines come into play, some have a good culture in switching AP/FD/ATHR off, some not. A good culture encourages switching AP/FD/ATHR off, and has a basic understanding among pilots and some rules when it is appropriate to do so and when not.
At least the message is getting out there, leaders in safety and training have since quite a while been past the point where automation was seen as the be end of all.
However, individual airlines still are lagging behind, but at least most of the big carriers seem to have understood.
Oh that it were true. There are airlines out there where they claim to encourage manual flying, but only with full AFDS guidance. FD's must be on at all times. Worse than that visual approaches might be allowed, but with LNAV/VNAV guidance to a 'not to close' final wpt. and even then with use of the A/P & A/T to make a visual approach. If that culture permeates throughout the industry, often driven by the financial bean counters who perceive too many G/A's are too expensive. They do not see any motivation in better training of such old-tech things a real piloting.
At least the message is getting out there, leaders in safety and training have since quite a while been past the point where automation was seen as the be end of all.
However, individual airlines still are lagging behind, but at least most of the big carriers seem to have understood.
Oh that it were true. There are airlines out there where they claim to encourage manual flying, but only with full AFDS guidance. FD's must be on at all times. Worse than that visual approaches might be allowed, but with LNAV/VNAV guidance to a 'not to close' final wpt. and even then with use of the A/P & A/T to make a visual approach. If that culture permeates throughout the industry, often driven by the financial bean counters who perceive too many G/A's are too expensive. They do not see any motivation in better training of such old-tech things a real piloting.
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RAT 5, indeed, would that this were true but I don't think it is. But I'd be interested in specifics, not naming an airline of course, but affirmations that one's carrier encourages a balance of fully-manual and fully-automated flight and has in place a reasonable automation policy for their crews' guidance.
Carriers who have experienced screw-ups when the automation has been turned off were, and I think still are quick to tighten up automation policies due expense and liability concerns, regenerating not fixing, the original problem. I watched this occur twenty-five years ago; it became a recursive process, with known, and in my view unfortunate results.
In terms of skill, I think one ought to be able to do a visual approach just by looking out the window. For the bean-counting crowd, it saves a bit of fuel and time, (by the flight data, not a lot of savings though), and it maintains skills such as self-perception as part-of-the-machine, S.A., judgment, timing, energy-management, scan, (outside & in), & hands-&-feet.
PS, seen-in-the-box, I sure liked your post, thank you for taking the time. Very real, and well worth reading for other pilots as it's speaks a lot of truth.
Carriers who have experienced screw-ups when the automation has been turned off were, and I think still are quick to tighten up automation policies due expense and liability concerns, regenerating not fixing, the original problem. I watched this occur twenty-five years ago; it became a recursive process, with known, and in my view unfortunate results.
In terms of skill, I think one ought to be able to do a visual approach just by looking out the window. For the bean-counting crowd, it saves a bit of fuel and time, (by the flight data, not a lot of savings though), and it maintains skills such as self-perception as part-of-the-machine, S.A., judgment, timing, energy-management, scan, (outside & in), & hands-&-feet.
PS, seen-in-the-box, I sure liked your post, thank you for taking the time. Very real, and well worth reading for other pilots as it's speaks a lot of truth.
Last edited by FDMII; 9th Jan 2016 at 17:47.
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In terms of skill, I think one ought to be able to do a visual approach just by looking out the window. For the bean-counting crowd, it saves a bit of fuel and time, (by the flight data, not a lot of savings though), and it maintains skills such as self-perception as part-of-the-machine, S.A., judgment, timing, energy-management, scan, (outside & in), & hands-&-feet.
Love it 100% + 'confidence in your own abilities'. It was the norm in the old days for every line pilot & IMHO this should be part of a command upgrade check. If you can't do it you should not be in command of a commercial a/c. I've experienced carriers where the visual arrival, for cost saving, was written in the books. However they did not train it nor ask captains to demo it so the F/O's apprenticeship was not enriched. What happened on summer CAVOK days was the number of G/A's due unstable approaches increased alarmingly. After the winter months no-one had been practicing. Solution? discourage manual approaches, or if you do them, use the automatics.
Bean counting gone mad.
I still ask the question. How is that, in general, airline piloting skills are less than 2 generations ago? Some will disagree, but I think they are in their lucky bubble. During my varied airline exposure in both employer, technology and national culture I think it has.
Love it 100% + 'confidence in your own abilities'. It was the norm in the old days for every line pilot & IMHO this should be part of a command upgrade check. If you can't do it you should not be in command of a commercial a/c. I've experienced carriers where the visual arrival, for cost saving, was written in the books. However they did not train it nor ask captains to demo it so the F/O's apprenticeship was not enriched. What happened on summer CAVOK days was the number of G/A's due unstable approaches increased alarmingly. After the winter months no-one had been practicing. Solution? discourage manual approaches, or if you do them, use the automatics. Bean counting gone mad.
I still ask the question. How is that, in general, airline piloting skills are less than 2 generations ago? Some will disagree, but I think they are in their lucky bubble. During my varied airline exposure in both employer, technology and national culture I think it has.
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one ought to be able to do a visual approach just by looking out the window
Indeed ... sometimes it got a tad interesting ..
One of my fondest memories is of a licence renewal check on the 727 .. the checkie (thanks, Brian) required everything useful in my vision to be switched off at about 70-80 DME into SYD on a severe CAVOK day (I couldn't see Sydney, let alone the airfield) .. and the task was to intercept the extended ILS (Mk 1 eyeball only) and fly it to touchdown. Local knowledge of mountains, rivers, etc., saved the day .. as he, no doubt, intended. Not a usual event but typical for pushing the learning boundaries and, on this occasion, during a quite low traffic period.
Another regular exercise on routine line ops (PER-MEL) was to be held high for an ILS onto 27 .. but then be offered straight in on 09 (T-VASIS and nothing else as I recall) .. near invariably we would take the offer to save a heap of time .. good fun and I can't ever recall there being a need for a miss .. it follows, though, that the Mk 1 brain was well employed throughout to make it all work ....
Another fun night I recall saw us LST-SYD on the Electra .. standard noise arrival required out north and turn back in for a significantly displaced 16 threshold landing .. started descent FL300 abeam the airport .. didn't go north of the harbour and still needed to power up in the normal manner .. we three were quite relaxed about it all .. the ATC-er, though, thought it all a bit stressful, methinks .. at 0-dark-30, though, it did increase the cerebral activity .. No real purpose other than for the learning exercise .. nil traffic at the time.
This was all routine grist for the mill at AN back in the good days .. if the kids these days miss out on such exercises it is all a bit sad ..
Indeed ... sometimes it got a tad interesting ..
One of my fondest memories is of a licence renewal check on the 727 .. the checkie (thanks, Brian) required everything useful in my vision to be switched off at about 70-80 DME into SYD on a severe CAVOK day (I couldn't see Sydney, let alone the airfield) .. and the task was to intercept the extended ILS (Mk 1 eyeball only) and fly it to touchdown. Local knowledge of mountains, rivers, etc., saved the day .. as he, no doubt, intended. Not a usual event but typical for pushing the learning boundaries and, on this occasion, during a quite low traffic period.
Another regular exercise on routine line ops (PER-MEL) was to be held high for an ILS onto 27 .. but then be offered straight in on 09 (T-VASIS and nothing else as I recall) .. near invariably we would take the offer to save a heap of time .. good fun and I can't ever recall there being a need for a miss .. it follows, though, that the Mk 1 brain was well employed throughout to make it all work ....
Another fun night I recall saw us LST-SYD on the Electra .. standard noise arrival required out north and turn back in for a significantly displaced 16 threshold landing .. started descent FL300 abeam the airport .. didn't go north of the harbour and still needed to power up in the normal manner .. we three were quite relaxed about it all .. the ATC-er, though, thought it all a bit stressful, methinks .. at 0-dark-30, though, it did increase the cerebral activity .. No real purpose other than for the learning exercise .. nil traffic at the time.
This was all routine grist for the mill at AN back in the good days .. if the kids these days miss out on such exercises it is all a bit sad ..
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Although I never made a statistic, if I would have to make an educated guess (as Clooney had to do when he faced st. peter 
) I would say all the big ones in north america have a strong focus on piloting skills and let pilots go fully manual. Same can be said for Lufthansa Group. I also observed the same on AF/KLM group lately, although it might take time on the french side to become the norm. EJ seem to be relaxed about automatics off at appropriate times from what I hear, don't know about BA and RYR. The charter carriers in Europe could not function without automatics off.
I would guess all these mentioned above together make more than 50% of worldwide commercial annual movements.
Then the chinese seem to put emphasize on manual skills in their checkrides, don't know how they handle it in daily ops though.
It is a slow process, and such discussions as we have here will continue to remain important to spread the word. But my impression is definitively that we have turned the tide and the message is coming through.
) I would say all the big ones in north america have a strong focus on piloting skills and let pilots go fully manual. Same can be said for Lufthansa Group. I also observed the same on AF/KLM group lately, although it might take time on the french side to become the norm. EJ seem to be relaxed about automatics off at appropriate times from what I hear, don't know about BA and RYR. The charter carriers in Europe could not function without automatics off. I would guess all these mentioned above together make more than 50% of worldwide commercial annual movements.
Then the chinese seem to put emphasize on manual skills in their checkrides, don't know how they handle it in daily ops though.
It is a slow process, and such discussions as we have here will continue to remain important to spread the word. But my impression is definitively that we have turned the tide and the message is coming through.
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EJ seem to be relaxed about automatics off at appropriate times from what I hear
But my impression is definitively that we have turned the tide and the message is coming through.
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Centaurus,
EJ means Easyjet, not Emirates.
Don't know what is happening in the middle east, but the flying circus there with airline managers and regulators being the same, not accounting for a lot of duty time etc., govermentally financed is sure not an industry model. Do not forget that they are mainly flying longhaul and in terms of movements are not really big players in the grand scheme of things.
They might very well be erased by a political black swan one day, but that is another story.
EJ means Easyjet, not Emirates.
Don't know what is happening in the middle east, but the flying circus there with airline managers and regulators being the same, not accounting for a lot of duty time etc., govermentally financed is sure not an industry model. Do not forget that they are mainly flying longhaul and in terms of movements are not really big players in the grand scheme of things.
They might very well be erased by a political black swan one day, but that is another story.
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Centaurus, 
1201alarm;
I would surely like to believe this, but I have several colleagues / friends instructing at various Asian carriers and am informed that they are by no means "emphasizing" manual flight in the sim, even after San Francisco. "Engagement of the autoflight systems is expected immediately after liftoff; no one disconnects", is what I am hearing. A strict though informal social/military hierarchy also appears to be observed; such would affect cockpit dynamics and decision-making processes. In addition, the Asians continue to use flight data analysis programs to punish and even fine (as in $$ fines) pilots for "transgressions", an unbelievably unenlightened approach to flight safety processes and procedures.
I have friends at Emirates - I believe it is the same standard.
I can't speak regarding EJ or European carriers' approach to autoflight policies. I would expect that they'd be "enlightened", perhaps more than N.American carriers but I just don't know. I know again from friends that some S.American carriers are "enlightened", (eg., Lan Chile) but do not know to what extent manual flight is practised.
I would again surely like to believe it, but, in my view, no airline really "gets it", primarily because they believe that they can't afford to; it is true some are better than others but I would not accept that "the tide has turned" until I saw actual performance data from each carrier supporting the claim - big study I know, but the claim is equally big.
Perhaps we could hear from those doing the daily work - that would be a good start.
In my view, many airlines are afraid to turn their pilots loose with the controls even as they may (or may not) have automation policies.
Now we have to quickly acknowledge that reduced navigational separation standards to pack more airplanes into busier airspaces demands more accurate tracking and speed control and it is wise to engage the autoflight systems otherwise one is indeed asking for trouble. But this is mere "guidance for wise men* and obvious, (or should be!) So the engagement of autoflight systems becomes a habit even when the opportunity for manual flight practise is presented.
I am keeping in mind also, safetypee's post, regarding how society itself has changed, and how it has changed us regarding the automation of routine processes. If I may interpret, (and be corrected by s.p. as needed!), the emphasis shifts to managing flight which concurrently requires the same levels of high situational awareness skills but by design de-emphasizes manual skills. I am not in disagreement with this shift in primary requirements recognized and commented upon in the post, except that when required, manual skills need to be there, supported of course, by some understanding of the subjects mentioned in the previous post.
In shorter words, I would not advocate a return to manual flight. Automation, particularly the Airbus design, is almost certainly the greatest contribution to the enhancement of flight safety since EGPWS & TCAS. It's just that many if not most carriers treat automation as the third pilot, (or even the second pilot!), and not the toolkit that it is, (notwithstanding original intentions by the manufacturers).
*it's a saying; obviously it applies to all genders...
1201alarm;
Then the chinese seem to put emphasize on manual skills in their checkrides, don't know how they handle it in daily ops though.
I have friends at Emirates - I believe it is the same standard.
I can't speak regarding EJ or European carriers' approach to autoflight policies. I would expect that they'd be "enlightened", perhaps more than N.American carriers but I just don't know. I know again from friends that some S.American carriers are "enlightened", (eg., Lan Chile) but do not know to what extent manual flight is practised.
I would again surely like to believe it, but, in my view, no airline really "gets it", primarily because they believe that they can't afford to; it is true some are better than others but I would not accept that "the tide has turned" until I saw actual performance data from each carrier supporting the claim - big study I know, but the claim is equally big.
Perhaps we could hear from those doing the daily work - that would be a good start.
In my view, many airlines are afraid to turn their pilots loose with the controls even as they may (or may not) have automation policies.
Now we have to quickly acknowledge that reduced navigational separation standards to pack more airplanes into busier airspaces demands more accurate tracking and speed control and it is wise to engage the autoflight systems otherwise one is indeed asking for trouble. But this is mere "guidance for wise men* and obvious, (or should be!) So the engagement of autoflight systems becomes a habit even when the opportunity for manual flight practise is presented.
I am keeping in mind also, safetypee's post, regarding how society itself has changed, and how it has changed us regarding the automation of routine processes. If I may interpret, (and be corrected by s.p. as needed!), the emphasis shifts to managing flight which concurrently requires the same levels of high situational awareness skills but by design de-emphasizes manual skills. I am not in disagreement with this shift in primary requirements recognized and commented upon in the post, except that when required, manual skills need to be there, supported of course, by some understanding of the subjects mentioned in the previous post.
In shorter words, I would not advocate a return to manual flight. Automation, particularly the Airbus design, is almost certainly the greatest contribution to the enhancement of flight safety since EGPWS & TCAS. It's just that many if not most carriers treat automation as the third pilot, (or even the second pilot!), and not the toolkit that it is, (notwithstanding original intentions by the manufacturers).
*it's a saying; obviously it applies to all genders...
Last edited by FDMII; 10th Jan 2016 at 17:43. Reason: Add reference to safetypee's post
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t's just that many if not most carriers treat automation as the third pilot,
In mid 90's I worked in Italy and this was the attitude of the XAA. You could operate 16 hrs with 2 crew if the A/P was available. It was the 3rd pilot to allow crew to sleep in the cockpit. Heavy crew = 24hrs. That was only 20 years ago in Europe. EASA has, perhaps, made some improvements.
no airline really "gets it", primarily because they believe that they can't afford to;
Indeed, from experience.
I was appalled/intrigued to see a Peugeot 208 advert lauding the auto-active braking system and self-parking system. The video showed a demo of the braking system if you became too close to metal rocks ahead. And this is supposed to enhance driver awareness? How long before motorway tail-gating at 70mph becomes the norm because you believe HAL will say the day. You select cruise control and do no more than steer.; but there is even a lane wander warning system too. so...???? And when you arrive home to push PARK and then go inside for a cold one. Let's wait and see what happens after the first huge motorway pile up and a smoking hole.
The world is going mad and in the hands of technocrats. They do because they can, not necessarily because it is necessary. Sound familiar?
In mid 90's I worked in Italy and this was the attitude of the XAA. You could operate 16 hrs with 2 crew if the A/P was available. It was the 3rd pilot to allow crew to sleep in the cockpit. Heavy crew = 24hrs. That was only 20 years ago in Europe. EASA has, perhaps, made some improvements.
no airline really "gets it", primarily because they believe that they can't afford to;
Indeed, from experience.
I was appalled/intrigued to see a Peugeot 208 advert lauding the auto-active braking system and self-parking system. The video showed a demo of the braking system if you became too close to metal rocks ahead. And this is supposed to enhance driver awareness? How long before motorway tail-gating at 70mph becomes the norm because you believe HAL will say the day. You select cruise control and do no more than steer.; but there is even a lane wander warning system too. so...???? And when you arrive home to push PARK and then go inside for a cold one. Let's wait and see what happens after the first huge motorway pile up and a smoking hole.
The world is going mad and in the hands of technocrats. They do because they can, not necessarily because it is necessary. Sound familiar?
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As a new A320 pilot, a few line captains have encouraged me to do a bit of flying with all the automation turned off, and I've found that the airplane is a real joy to fly.
A previous poster mentioned that BA doesn't allow the AT to be disconnected. Can anyone confirm that? I hope it isn't true. Is the AT considered a no-go item? Is it an emergency if the AT fails in flight?
As for hand flying with the FD on, I'm really not a fan. I feel a lot more out of the loop. I concentrate more on the FD than the instruments. With the FD off, I feel as though I'm much more aware of what's going on.
A previous poster mentioned that BA doesn't allow the AT to be disconnected. Can anyone confirm that? I hope it isn't true. Is the AT considered a no-go item? Is it an emergency if the AT fails in flight?
As for hand flying with the FD on, I'm really not a fan. I feel a lot more out of the loop. I concentrate more on the FD than the instruments. With the FD off, I feel as though I'm much more aware of what's going on.
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Hi Check Airman,
I don't know the present position, but it was true many years ago.
There were several SESMA events on the Airbus fleet when crews were taking the auto-thrust out in order to "practice for their next sim check". This was a case of the tail wagging the dog. Extra sim practice with AT off was then given to the Airbus crews.
There was no AT restriction on Boeing crews, since all manual flight is conducted with the AT off due to the pitch/power couple (& advantage of feed back loop "feels heavier when slow" etc).
A previous poster mentioned that BA doesn't allow the AT to be disconnected.
There were several SESMA events on the Airbus fleet when crews were taking the auto-thrust out in order to "practice for their next sim check". This was a case of the tail wagging the dog. Extra sim practice with AT off was then given to the Airbus crews.
There was no AT restriction on Boeing crews, since all manual flight is conducted with the AT off due to the pitch/power couple (& advantage of feed back loop "feels heavier when slow" etc).
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There were several SESMA events on the Airbus fleet when crews were taking the auto-thrust out in order to "practice for their next sim check"
I was always amazed at this idea. If all you want to do is 'practice' basic flying then something is wrong with your daily routine. If you are not competent nor confident then a couple of 'practices' will not solve the problem. There is an old story of someone taking this to the extreme when on a ferry between to close airports they flew it on 1 engine: to practice for the sim. I think it was a no tea no biscuits consequence.
I was always amazed at this idea. If all you want to do is 'practice' basic flying then something is wrong with your daily routine. If you are not competent nor confident then a couple of 'practices' will not solve the problem. There is an old story of someone taking this to the extreme when on a ferry between to close airports they flew it on 1 engine: to practice for the sim. I think it was a no tea no biscuits consequence.
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rat5, it was a Jetstream in northern Sweden, in 2003. It got more than a few dents as a result...
Like the idea of flying manually (kind if the reason we started to aviate, ain't it?) and Our company culture encourage the crews to pick a visual up when conditions permit.
And even in our manual it is actually stated that when flying a visual or circling and FD not needed they should be off... So we fly them lookin out the window which is quite nice
Like the idea of flying manually (kind if the reason we started to aviate, ain't it?) and Our company culture encourage the crews to pick a visual up when conditions permit.
And even in our manual it is actually stated that when flying a visual or circling and FD not needed they should be off... So we fly them lookin out the window which is quite nice
FDMII, we are looking in the same direction
If we consider the many different views in this thread as parts of the same safety issue, then we could reconsider the operational continuum with a wider perspective. We should refrain from focussing on isolated problems, or with the hindsight of the last accident; Dekker - all viewpoints (ref).
If the industry adopts this way of thinking, then ‘the problem’ becomes which views might offer an adequate solution, given that there is no ideal in time, money, (automaton, training) or with assurance of human behaviour (training).
Refs: In the system view of human factors, who is accountable for failure and success? Note the concluding pages.
Also see: Managing the Unexpected and Safety Differently (read the summary).
Amalberti. The paradoxes of almost totally safe transportation systems 2001.
Cook, Rasmussen. Going Solid 2005.
If we consider the many different views in this thread as parts of the same safety issue, then we could reconsider the operational continuum with a wider perspective. We should refrain from focussing on isolated problems, or with the hindsight of the last accident; Dekker - all viewpoints (ref).
If the industry adopts this way of thinking, then ‘the problem’ becomes which views might offer an adequate solution, given that there is no ideal in time, money, (automaton, training) or with assurance of human behaviour (training).
- Regulation and training may be seen to be the quicker to implement, but perhaps the least effective, particularly without changing automation or the operational environment.
- New automation could help, but this is neither a quick process or low cost; and we must consider the existing ‘grandfather rights’ aircraft still in-service (B737 AMS Rad Alt, MD80 MAD TOCW accidents).
- Changes to the operating environment could affect commerce – we may not be able to reduce workload by going back to the old ways. However, it might be possible to adjust the current operational environment to reduce complexity and workload, e.g. the way we implement SOPs, reduce overburdening call outs, and simplify flightpath procedures.
- What social contributions influenced crew behaviour in QZ8501; everyday we might switch a computer (automation) Off then On to rectify a fault. We have acquired Ctrl-Alt-Del mentality.
- What were the commercial–environmental-social contributions in AF447; we like (need) direct routing, we have better WXR thus we might cut CBs closer than in previous operations, but the industry ‘overlooked’ ice crystals. Or did the regulator see the human as a hazard in need of (UAS) training opposed to the human as an asset who could avoid CBs if this were to be the focus of training – avoidance vs recovery.
- What regulatory training influences were there in Cogan; ice related tail-stall (not a realistic hazard, if at all, in that aircraft) where the training involved a film, no hands-on to reinforce knowledge that there would not be a stick shake – nor that tail stall did involve aerodynamic wing stall and thus conventional recovery action did not apply.
Refs: In the system view of human factors, who is accountable for failure and success? Note the concluding pages.
Also see: Managing the Unexpected and Safety Differently (read the summary).
Amalberti. The paradoxes of almost totally safe transportation systems 2001.
Cook, Rasmussen. Going Solid 2005.
I understand from conversations that the FBW Boeing types have the same policy but the 747/767 do not.
I joined a loco with around 300h. Manual flight raw data was encouraged during line training (all landings were done without FDs until proficient) and it my first permanent base in Italy. Several crusty old captains took time to invest in keen FOs and teach them to explore the envelope, meet the performance assumptions on every landing and so on.
I then moved to a large UK base, where a lot of line training takes place, and the line captains were less keen on manual flight, and were in general too fed up with constantly flying with 500h FOs to invest in mentoring as much. However, raw data flying was still available with the right captain. The command course also includes a lot of raw data manual flight to increase the capacity of the candidates.
The airline in general however discourages manual flight on the line, and has forbidden switching off FDs except where required by normal procedures. The good old boys talk about the days before OFDM where on ferry flights they would practice V1 cuts in the aircraft by one pilot closing a thrust lever after V1, conduct quiet approaches, tight visual approaches &c &c
"Visuals" are flown in LNAV/VNAV following the magenta line to a minimum of a 4 mile final and nothing disconnected until established on path on final.
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The airline in general however discourages manual flight on the line, and has forbidden switching off FDs except where required by normal procedures
Clearly the management has little faith in the instrument flying skills (?) of its crews if they are unable to manage without the crutch of a flight director even in VMC. Quite tragic really.
What about when a decision needs to be made in the moment, can a computer run DODAR/TDODAR/PIOSEE the same way two humans can? Can the computer apply reasoning and judgement.
What if a fire develops and the aircraft systems are damaged.
Could a modern day computer have dealt with Sioux City, or QF32? Could it make the decision to go/no-go with a failure approaching V1? Could a computer decide when to evacuate an aircraft (BA2276), or what to do in the event of a double engine failure over a built up area (US1549)?
What about with a critical medical emergency over the Atlantic. How does the computer decide where to go?
The most important and viable reason for removing a pilot from the aircraft is risk-to-life.
Such as with combat UAVs. It also allows for smaller (therefore cheaper) aircraft.
The same could happen for cargo and freight eventually.
But when you've got 100-500 passengers on an aircraft, removing the pilots for that reason is irrelevant.