Automation dependency stripped of political correctness.
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Hello Centaurus;
Davies* should be required reading for all airline pilots and especially those joining our ranks today.
Automation should not alter anything, but we have permitted it to do so and blamed automation for our own shortcomings. There is certainly no mystery or trick to flying the Airbus, (or the Boeings, Lockheeds or Douglases).
I see very little of a true, deep enthusiasm which you so aptly describe from Davies. The laments we hear here and elsewhere have become a culture of complaint with regard for tools of navigation and performance that, in the sixties, eventies & eighties, we would have died for..., oh, wait...
It is a mystery to me why knowledge, experience and keenness are dismissed and questions are not asked incessantly until one's practise is as close to perfect as one's capabilities will allow.
I loved the automation, particularly the Airbus - it was a dream to handfly, in all conditions, within the AOM's usual limitations. I understood it and taught it on the A320. The candidate was always made to hand-fly, no autothrust, no flight directors during line indoc. While flying the line I offered to turn/pull/push the knobs while the F/O flew for fun and found almost no takers, particularly with autothrust off.
I thought it was a shameful to admit one didn't understand one's airplane well enough to fly it. Such refusal is an indictment not of the airplane, the designers or the fabulous nav & performance tools now available, but of the pilot him/herself.
That is why the character and nature of accidents has changed over the last decade.
*Handling the Big Jets, D. P. Davies, Air Registration Board 1967, CAA 1975
Google the title for availability - there are some still available from various online booksellers.
Davies* should be required reading for all airline pilots and especially those joining our ranks today.
Automation should not alter anything, but we have permitted it to do so and blamed automation for our own shortcomings. There is certainly no mystery or trick to flying the Airbus, (or the Boeings, Lockheeds or Douglases).
I see very little of a true, deep enthusiasm which you so aptly describe from Davies. The laments we hear here and elsewhere have become a culture of complaint with regard for tools of navigation and performance that, in the sixties, eventies & eighties, we would have died for..., oh, wait...
It is a mystery to me why knowledge, experience and keenness are dismissed and questions are not asked incessantly until one's practise is as close to perfect as one's capabilities will allow.
I loved the automation, particularly the Airbus - it was a dream to handfly, in all conditions, within the AOM's usual limitations. I understood it and taught it on the A320. The candidate was always made to hand-fly, no autothrust, no flight directors during line indoc. While flying the line I offered to turn/pull/push the knobs while the F/O flew for fun and found almost no takers, particularly with autothrust off.
I thought it was a shameful to admit one didn't understand one's airplane well enough to fly it. Such refusal is an indictment not of the airplane, the designers or the fabulous nav & performance tools now available, but of the pilot him/herself.
That is why the character and nature of accidents has changed over the last decade.
*Handling the Big Jets, D. P. Davies, Air Registration Board 1967, CAA 1975
Google the title for availability - there are some still available from various online booksellers.
Last edited by FDMII; 4th Jan 2016 at 16:00.
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There is constant talk that pilots need to have an in-depth knowledge of the automatics and a precise understanding of how to use them: i.e. what to use & when to achieve a specific task. That is often covered by SOP's; but in my experience those who use rigid SOP's teach only a small fraction of the options available. Discretion, judgement, often common sense has been diluted by those rigid procedures. As a result only those portions of the automatics necessary to comply with the SOP's are taught. When things go awry, be it nature, ATC or gremlins then many pilots are left clueless. Those other capabilities remain a secret, or there is a belief they are not allowed to be used; in violation of SOP's!
Now basic handling: the TR courses include a very rudimentary basic handling introduction. The same old items that existed in steam driven jets. Look at the LST syllabus form; it's from the dark ages. The only real handling done regularly is raw data ILS, a loss of thrust ILS & G/A & landing, and a low level disconnect on finals after a circle. The rest, turns, steep turns, access/decel are a one off. That's it. After that it's autopilot with FD on. No wonder the students' scans are so below average; they don't have the education.
However, it was the same in B732 days for the TR courses, but the big difference is we went on to the line and flew manual visuals at every opportunity. It was the norm! Thus the skills that had been 'introduced' in TR were honed on the line by practice & repetition. (I'm not in agreement that flying manual in climbs & descents to/from high FL is a real benefit.) It was the last 10,000, manually, into the circuit on to aid-less rwys that taught you the most. ILS's with decent vis & OK cloud base were flown manually. Thus we could 'feel' the a/c and keep scans sharp.
When we went onto EFIS a/c it was astonishing & wonderful, but we (those who bothered) kept those old scan skills sharp and didn't let the FD become god. It was a tool to be used when useful. The culture of visual manual approaches continued. We had foundations and the sensible few kept them in good maintenance. With little use decay would creep in subtly. Dangerous. So, when HAL went AWOL or 'walkabout' we knew it and knew what to do about it. The best computer on the a/c was always between our ears. The rest were tools. Decisions were still made 'upstairs'. We knew what level of automation to use and were not afraid to disconnect. (no children of the magenta line syndrome)
What is missing today are those foundations. After the TR courses the closest many get to real handling is base training; but once that is over many don't allow such cowboy flying anymore and then some pilots even become scared to try. OFDM will be watching. OFDM is a good thing, but any decent pilot shouldn't go any where near their triggers. Airbus seem to have woken up to this lack of foundation, but adding more handling to the TR course will only be a solution IF it is carried through onto the line. Therein lies the problem. XAA's can stipulate all the content of the TR's but they can't, or won't, interfere with line SOP's to the extent of manual flying. That is an airline culture, and with most being under the thumb of accountants and not pilots, don't hold your breath.
Back to knowledge of the automatics: IMHO there is not enough REAL education about what major screw ups the automatics can create and what to do about it. (Boeing non FBW). I realise the FBW a/c can be real bucking broncos if they get crossed wires and have a bad hair day. How much the airlines can train in the initial TR is limited otherwise information overload will happen. But, within a 3 year period, IMHO all the nasties and traps should have been experienced; certainly before command is gained. There has to be 1 person on the FD who has seen all this chaos. This needs careful planning of an educated recurrency training, not just tick in the box exercises.
When allowed, I often used to write recurrency training based on real life events. How many airlines have introduced an AF or QZ scenarios in their sim training; even the XL icing problem?
There has to be a very deep fundamental review of TR content and the testing there-of. That has to start in the XAA's as they sanction them for national/EASA licence standards. Is it happening or, is the risk of these events happening, within an acceptable frequency? How many incidents occur that nearly become accidents, and as a result we don't hear about them and the rose tinted glasses stay firmly in place? This is such a critical & vital debate to have, and a sound conclusion reached. The future of pilot training, a/c design and the safety of future passengers depend on it.
Now basic handling: the TR courses include a very rudimentary basic handling introduction. The same old items that existed in steam driven jets. Look at the LST syllabus form; it's from the dark ages. The only real handling done regularly is raw data ILS, a loss of thrust ILS & G/A & landing, and a low level disconnect on finals after a circle. The rest, turns, steep turns, access/decel are a one off. That's it. After that it's autopilot with FD on. No wonder the students' scans are so below average; they don't have the education.
However, it was the same in B732 days for the TR courses, but the big difference is we went on to the line and flew manual visuals at every opportunity. It was the norm! Thus the skills that had been 'introduced' in TR were honed on the line by practice & repetition. (I'm not in agreement that flying manual in climbs & descents to/from high FL is a real benefit.) It was the last 10,000, manually, into the circuit on to aid-less rwys that taught you the most. ILS's with decent vis & OK cloud base were flown manually. Thus we could 'feel' the a/c and keep scans sharp.
When we went onto EFIS a/c it was astonishing & wonderful, but we (those who bothered) kept those old scan skills sharp and didn't let the FD become god. It was a tool to be used when useful. The culture of visual manual approaches continued. We had foundations and the sensible few kept them in good maintenance. With little use decay would creep in subtly. Dangerous. So, when HAL went AWOL or 'walkabout' we knew it and knew what to do about it. The best computer on the a/c was always between our ears. The rest were tools. Decisions were still made 'upstairs'. We knew what level of automation to use and were not afraid to disconnect. (no children of the magenta line syndrome)
What is missing today are those foundations. After the TR courses the closest many get to real handling is base training; but once that is over many don't allow such cowboy flying anymore and then some pilots even become scared to try. OFDM will be watching. OFDM is a good thing, but any decent pilot shouldn't go any where near their triggers. Airbus seem to have woken up to this lack of foundation, but adding more handling to the TR course will only be a solution IF it is carried through onto the line. Therein lies the problem. XAA's can stipulate all the content of the TR's but they can't, or won't, interfere with line SOP's to the extent of manual flying. That is an airline culture, and with most being under the thumb of accountants and not pilots, don't hold your breath.
Back to knowledge of the automatics: IMHO there is not enough REAL education about what major screw ups the automatics can create and what to do about it. (Boeing non FBW). I realise the FBW a/c can be real bucking broncos if they get crossed wires and have a bad hair day. How much the airlines can train in the initial TR is limited otherwise information overload will happen. But, within a 3 year period, IMHO all the nasties and traps should have been experienced; certainly before command is gained. There has to be 1 person on the FD who has seen all this chaos. This needs careful planning of an educated recurrency training, not just tick in the box exercises.
When allowed, I often used to write recurrency training based on real life events. How many airlines have introduced an AF or QZ scenarios in their sim training; even the XL icing problem?
There has to be a very deep fundamental review of TR content and the testing there-of. That has to start in the XAA's as they sanction them for national/EASA licence standards. Is it happening or, is the risk of these events happening, within an acceptable frequency? How many incidents occur that nearly become accidents, and as a result we don't hear about them and the rose tinted glasses stay firmly in place? This is such a critical & vital debate to have, and a sound conclusion reached. The future of pilot training, a/c design and the safety of future passengers depend on it.
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The candidate was always made to hand-fly, no autothrust, no flight directors during line indoc. While flying the line I offered to turn/pull/push the knobs while the F/O flew for fun and found almost no takers, particularly with autothrust off.
I thought it was a shameful to admit one didn't understand the airplane well enough to fly it. Such refusal is an indictment not of the airplane, the designers or the fabulous nav & performance tools now available, but of the pilot him/herself.
That's why the character and nature of accidents has changed over the last decade.
I thought it was a shameful to admit one didn't understand the airplane well enough to fly it. Such refusal is an indictment not of the airplane, the designers or the fabulous nav & performance tools now available, but of the pilot him/herself.
That's why the character and nature of accidents has changed over the last decade.
Nowadays, the company will bite your head off for tripping one of the "gates" which is always more likely when hand flying, so the captains understandably are not keen.
Added to this is the fact that the captains have not been doing it themselves so are further from their comfort zone where they are happy to let the baby copilots explore the edges of the boundaries whilst learning their craft.
There is no reward structure whatsoever in any airline I am aware of for being excellent.
There are only punishments for not being adequate, with adequate being a remarkably low bar.
As long as you meet the minimum standard, you are treated the same as everybody else.
I can think of no other industry in the world that operates like that yet expects a high level of performance.
There is no other profession requiring training, skill and aptitude where progression is based upon joining date rather than excellence.
If piloting skill were rewarded, then perhaps the decline could be halted.
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The notion of "SOPs" has recently, (last decade or so), been taking its cue or borrowing its meaning from SMS & the audit process, which, in my view, are substantially different (and at odds with) the original notion behind SOPs.
By this I mean, SOPs, a) used to be a great guide especially doing memorized abnormal/emergency drills and, b) a huge safety improvement over keeping notes on how each captain one flew with liked things done, which I recall doing in the early days.
That changed after a fatal accident resulted from two different ways of arming the spoilers which killed 109 passengers & crew. That's when the notion of SOPs (and their enforcement) was adopted at that air carrier.
Today SMS and the audit process have emphasized documentation and equivalence in terms of performance. An audit process checks what is written and audits what is done, and if it is not done precisely the way it is written there is a "finding", which must be responded to within a certain time period.
In aviation, such narrowness is a problem.
As with all good ideas that are overtaken by perhaps well-intentioned, over-enthusiastic adherents or those who are satisfying their superiors, the audit process clamps down the SOP process such that a perceived and real need to deviate from SOPs say, in an emergency, is assessed as a "failure" rather than an understandable need to act.
This is particularly a problem today with the profession and standards so dumbed down as to actually need such a rudimentary reaction. But the audit process discourages & even punishes thinking and acting according to one's experience.
I would be the first to state that audits are a necessary process within an SMS environment and that strict adherence to SOPs IS a necessary requirement when flying transport aircraft.
But a slavish adherence to SOPs in the face of circumstances which demand an alteration of SOPs actually increases risk of an accident.
Of course, such an approach requires experience, in-depth knowledge and that old-fashioned concept known as "airmanship". There is less of that today, so strict adherence, with little expectation of thought, is the requirement and that's what audits focus on.
One cannot account or quantify thought or even creative imagination in such a system, yet aviation is as much if not more an art than science.
Another thing - the notion that the aircraft commander IS the legal commander responsible for the safety of the flight, and in the end is the sole decision-maker on board the aircraft is gradually being made subservient to the audit process where such authority is "modified". Certainly the commander must answer for each and every action, but the assessment of such action must be based upon a broader set of "rules" than mere standard documentation.
These are subtle human factors issues as much as they are structural issues within a changing aviation system which is finding itself needing to be less accommodating to the notion that SOPs are more of a guide than a strict rule, simply because many pilots today don't know the difference. Such rapidly-growing aviation systems as we are seeing are a known factor in increased risk simply because training systems can only convey the basics while only time-in can provide the necessary experience to be an airline pilot.
The notion of "SOPs" has recently, (last decade or so), been taking its cue or borrowing its meaning from SMS & the audit process, which, in my view, are substantially different (and at odds with) the original notion behind SOPs.
By this I mean, SOPs, a) used to be a great guide especially doing memorized abnormal/emergency drills and, b) a huge safety improvement over keeping notes on how each captain one flew with liked things done, which I recall doing in the early days.
That changed after a fatal accident resulted from two different ways of arming the spoilers which killed 109 passengers & crew. That's when the notion of SOPs (and their enforcement) was adopted at that air carrier.
Today SMS and the audit process have emphasized documentation and equivalence in terms of performance. An audit process checks what is written and audits what is done, and if it is not done precisely the way it is written there is a "finding", which must be responded to within a certain time period.
In aviation, such narrowness is a problem.
As with all good ideas that are overtaken by perhaps well-intentioned, over-enthusiastic adherents or those who are satisfying their superiors, the audit process clamps down the SOP process such that a perceived and real need to deviate from SOPs say, in an emergency, is assessed as a "failure" rather than an understandable need to act.
This is particularly a problem today with the profession and standards so dumbed down as to actually need such a rudimentary reaction. But the audit process discourages & even punishes thinking and acting according to one's experience.
I would be the first to state that audits are a necessary process within an SMS environment and that strict adherence to SOPs IS a necessary requirement when flying transport aircraft.
But a slavish adherence to SOPs in the face of circumstances which demand an alteration of SOPs actually increases risk of an accident.
Of course, such an approach requires experience, in-depth knowledge and that old-fashioned concept known as "airmanship". There is less of that today, so strict adherence, with little expectation of thought, is the requirement and that's what audits focus on.
One cannot account or quantify thought or even creative imagination in such a system, yet aviation is as much if not more an art than science.
Another thing - the notion that the aircraft commander IS the legal commander responsible for the safety of the flight, and in the end is the sole decision-maker on board the aircraft is gradually being made subservient to the audit process where such authority is "modified". Certainly the commander must answer for each and every action, but the assessment of such action must be based upon a broader set of "rules" than mere standard documentation.
These are subtle human factors issues as much as they are structural issues within a changing aviation system which is finding itself needing to be less accommodating to the notion that SOPs are more of a guide than a strict rule, simply because many pilots today don't know the difference. Such rapidly-growing aviation systems as we are seeing are a known factor in increased risk simply because training systems can only convey the basics while only time-in can provide the necessary experience to be an airline pilot.
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There is no reward structure whatsoever in any airline I am aware of for being excellent.
There are only punishments for not being adequate, with adequate being a remarkably low bar.
Indeed Tourist: IMHO I've seen mediocre from my day become the adequate today. Very sad.
In the 80's, in one of my airlines, the command pass rate was apalling low, until it was eventually realised that too many of the training dept. were trappers & not guiders/encouragers/developers. Once the selection process was improved and the up-grading restructured made more realistic the pass rate rose to where it would be expected to be. That was in the days when 7years/5000hrs was the threshold. I wonder how it's is working today with 4years/3000hrs quite common?
One other factor I have noticed is SFI's being 2 year experienced F/O's rather than more seasoned pilots, even captains, as in the older days. IMHO a 2 year ex-cadet SFI might be nothing more than an SOP lecturer and supervisor. I wonder if students, with real problems of a wide spectrum, handling, understanding of MCC/jets/automatics etc. can be provided with quick effective guidance.
If training needs to go back to basics, and then include more understanding of automatics, can this be achieved with low experience SFI's? There are, indeed, good teachers in their ranks, but the knowledge data base can only be a little more than what was gained in their own TR course a couple of years previous.
What are the opinions in different airlines and countries about the average experience of SFI's?
There are only punishments for not being adequate, with adequate being a remarkably low bar.
Indeed Tourist: IMHO I've seen mediocre from my day become the adequate today. Very sad.
In the 80's, in one of my airlines, the command pass rate was apalling low, until it was eventually realised that too many of the training dept. were trappers & not guiders/encouragers/developers. Once the selection process was improved and the up-grading restructured made more realistic the pass rate rose to where it would be expected to be. That was in the days when 7years/5000hrs was the threshold. I wonder how it's is working today with 4years/3000hrs quite common?
One other factor I have noticed is SFI's being 2 year experienced F/O's rather than more seasoned pilots, even captains, as in the older days. IMHO a 2 year ex-cadet SFI might be nothing more than an SOP lecturer and supervisor. I wonder if students, with real problems of a wide spectrum, handling, understanding of MCC/jets/automatics etc. can be provided with quick effective guidance.
If training needs to go back to basics, and then include more understanding of automatics, can this be achieved with low experience SFI's? There are, indeed, good teachers in their ranks, but the knowledge data base can only be a little more than what was gained in their own TR course a couple of years previous.
What are the opinions in different airlines and countries about the average experience of SFI's?
FDMII; references, 
automation, SMS, SOPs,
As much as we should support the use of excellent references in aviation, the practicality of modern operations (life the universe, and everything), is that they are unlikely to be read; or SMS application after risk assessment, or ill-conceived SOPs applied correctly, – horses to water etc.
We have to accept that ‘aviation’ has changed; it has evolved and continues to evolve as influenced by society and the operational environment, which includes the availability (need) and use of automation.
We require automation, mainly to take over tedious manual tasks, routine calculations, or for high accuracy path following, but that should not mean that we depend on automation for all the process of flying, particularly thinking. The latter requires that we must pay greater attention to the overall flight regime, management of the flight, management of the aircraft and of automation, management of ourselves.
Thus the safety issue is not that pilots are weak (manual flight), but that we are poor managers in modern day situations including the rarer and particularly surprising situations.
Most pilot training is sufficient for the overwhelming majority of operations; we are a safe industry, pilots can takeoff, land, – fly in the every day situations as required, in which they have been trained for. However, human performance will suffer in those rare unforeseen situations which we only identify with hindsight; if we could see these with foresight then we might be able to train for them.
In a similar manner the qualities of airmanship have changed, the drive for knowledge and expertise, the need to practice both the skills of flight and of managing – the aircraft and our thoughts; these have been reduced by society’s norms. We are no longer the people who we think we were.
Opposed to considering more of the ‘old way’ of flight training we should first consider what has changed, and why; then we might better understand the problems of modern operation (and there are many of them), and thus consider improvements.
Modern aviation is intractable; we are not able to fully understand the working of our aircraft, nor the operational situations; thus start with the problem of how we might manage these with less than a complete understanding.
automation, SMS, SOPs, As much as we should support the use of excellent references in aviation, the practicality of modern operations (life the universe, and everything), is that they are unlikely to be read; or SMS application after risk assessment, or ill-conceived SOPs applied correctly, – horses to water etc.
We have to accept that ‘aviation’ has changed; it has evolved and continues to evolve as influenced by society and the operational environment, which includes the availability (need) and use of automation.
We require automation, mainly to take over tedious manual tasks, routine calculations, or for high accuracy path following, but that should not mean that we depend on automation for all the process of flying, particularly thinking. The latter requires that we must pay greater attention to the overall flight regime, management of the flight, management of the aircraft and of automation, management of ourselves.
Thus the safety issue is not that pilots are weak (manual flight), but that we are poor managers in modern day situations including the rarer and particularly surprising situations.
Most pilot training is sufficient for the overwhelming majority of operations; we are a safe industry, pilots can takeoff, land, – fly in the every day situations as required, in which they have been trained for. However, human performance will suffer in those rare unforeseen situations which we only identify with hindsight; if we could see these with foresight then we might be able to train for them.
In a similar manner the qualities of airmanship have changed, the drive for knowledge and expertise, the need to practice both the skills of flight and of managing – the aircraft and our thoughts; these have been reduced by society’s norms. We are no longer the people who we think we were.
Opposed to considering more of the ‘old way’ of flight training we should first consider what has changed, and why; then we might better understand the problems of modern operation (and there are many of them), and thus consider improvements.
Modern aviation is intractable; we are not able to fully understand the working of our aircraft, nor the operational situations; thus start with the problem of how we might manage these with less than a complete understanding.
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safetypee, thank you; - a refreshing and engaging interpretation of the state of modern aviation, and one with which I am not at all in disagreement.
To clarify, the urgency of "knowing one's aircraft" encompasses knowledge of high-altitude, swept-wing, high-speed, large-transport flight.
, "rarer and particularly surprising situations"
Clearly I and a number here come from cables-and-pulley aircraft and steam cockpits, retiring off high-automation aircraft, and many have incorporated what was known and accepted as "wisdom" then, into modern operations because it worked and kept us alive. I take from your comments that this no longer is wholly the case and that such circumstances are not necessarily undesireable. We might say it is nowhere near the change made in the sixties from piston-to-turbine, straight-wing to swept-wing flight!
In terms of the original thesis regarding autonomous commercial transportation at levels we currently have, I think human performance either in the cockpit or displaced to the ground, will remain a challenge, and not entirely due to the difficulty in writing the code for such systems.
Foreseeing situations and either training, or writing software and firmware for such eventualities will I believe, obtain approximately the same outcomes (in terms of occurrences), for reasons stated earlier.
At the moment, (and I am always prepared to change, given evidence), it seems to me that pilotless commercial flight is an equivalent to Mr. Turing's test, and if the machine can pass it, we will have achieved that goal!
To clarify, the urgency of "knowing one's aircraft" encompasses knowledge of high-altitude, swept-wing, high-speed, large-transport flight.
, "rarer and particularly surprising situations"Clearly I and a number here come from cables-and-pulley aircraft and steam cockpits, retiring off high-automation aircraft, and many have incorporated what was known and accepted as "wisdom" then, into modern operations because it worked and kept us alive. I take from your comments that this no longer is wholly the case and that such circumstances are not necessarily undesireable. We might say it is nowhere near the change made in the sixties from piston-to-turbine, straight-wing to swept-wing flight!
In terms of the original thesis regarding autonomous commercial transportation at levels we currently have, I think human performance either in the cockpit or displaced to the ground, will remain a challenge, and not entirely due to the difficulty in writing the code for such systems.
Foreseeing situations and either training, or writing software and firmware for such eventualities will I believe, obtain approximately the same outcomes (in terms of occurrences), for reasons stated earlier.
At the moment, (and I am always prepared to change, given evidence), it seems to me that pilotless commercial flight is an equivalent to Mr. Turing's test, and if the machine can pass it, we will have achieved that goal!
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Safetypee brings up the notion of management, and mentions it often. I agree; it is a vital integral component of the captain's role.
I brought up the question of low experience SFI's teaching the next generation of low hour cadets, and if this is a good method of building a solid foundation in aviation, not just one version of SOP's. (I have met low hour captains from this type of pilot farm who believed there was only one way to fly a procedure.)
Now what about the low hour captain and their expected handling capabilities? There seems to be some common idea that those are being eroded due to lack of experience first & practice second. So now what about management? How much of commands in rapidly expanding modern airlines pays attention to operations management? OK, they trot out the regular CRM stuff; they pump in a few slightly more than average QRH non-normals and see how the new ace handles the situation, according to the book. What about 'total operation management?' That means, ground ops, catering, flight planning, ATC, slot times + problems, passenger problems, baggage problems, en-route weather problems, diversion problems including managing the pax handling in a foreign country where you are not expected, technical diversion, pax problems on board = divert yes/no et.c etc. Now of these have a QRH, MEL or DDG. You have no coms back to base. You are at the front line and in charge. Do most 4 year experienced 28year olds have what is all necessary?
A discussion point.
I did some command training, in a foreign country from our own airline, while operating a charter contract for a local airline. It was fascinating. Over a week, everyday, something needed a captain's decision which was not in any manual. The answer was based on knowledge of the environment, common sense, multi-tasking and problem solving using all agencies and resources available while pleasing the customer. It was excellent and the candidate was good enough to make some himself and learn from suggestions & hints. He was a mature (age) pilot with 7 years as F/O including some long-haul and quite a few sub-charter ops. He'd seen quite a lot, but unfortunately had been lumbered with captains who did not teach and demonstrate ( e.g. what would you do?) but just gave orders with no explanation. He rose to the challenge. I wonder how much of today's rapid command process can really prepare the newbie for what they will will have to handle. Handling the a/c is one thing, managing the whole operation, out of sight, is another.
This is even more relevant with the 'management' of an intercontinental wide-body operation. No you can throw in the night-stop issue that will breed unforeseen problems. If the rapid command criteria were applied to those flights, and LOCo's branch into intercontinental ops, you could see quite young low houred captains. Would that be healthy or should there be higher thresholds?
A cross-channel ferry is one thing, a world cruise is another.
I brought up the question of low experience SFI's teaching the next generation of low hour cadets, and if this is a good method of building a solid foundation in aviation, not just one version of SOP's. (I have met low hour captains from this type of pilot farm who believed there was only one way to fly a procedure.)
Now what about the low hour captain and their expected handling capabilities? There seems to be some common idea that those are being eroded due to lack of experience first & practice second. So now what about management? How much of commands in rapidly expanding modern airlines pays attention to operations management? OK, they trot out the regular CRM stuff; they pump in a few slightly more than average QRH non-normals and see how the new ace handles the situation, according to the book. What about 'total operation management?' That means, ground ops, catering, flight planning, ATC, slot times + problems, passenger problems, baggage problems, en-route weather problems, diversion problems including managing the pax handling in a foreign country where you are not expected, technical diversion, pax problems on board = divert yes/no et.c etc. Now of these have a QRH, MEL or DDG. You have no coms back to base. You are at the front line and in charge. Do most 4 year experienced 28year olds have what is all necessary?
A discussion point.
I did some command training, in a foreign country from our own airline, while operating a charter contract for a local airline. It was fascinating. Over a week, everyday, something needed a captain's decision which was not in any manual. The answer was based on knowledge of the environment, common sense, multi-tasking and problem solving using all agencies and resources available while pleasing the customer. It was excellent and the candidate was good enough to make some himself and learn from suggestions & hints. He was a mature (age) pilot with 7 years as F/O including some long-haul and quite a few sub-charter ops. He'd seen quite a lot, but unfortunately had been lumbered with captains who did not teach and demonstrate ( e.g. what would you do?) but just gave orders with no explanation. He rose to the challenge. I wonder how much of today's rapid command process can really prepare the newbie for what they will will have to handle. Handling the a/c is one thing, managing the whole operation, out of sight, is another.
This is even more relevant with the 'management' of an intercontinental wide-body operation. No you can throw in the night-stop issue that will breed unforeseen problems. If the rapid command criteria were applied to those flights, and LOCo's branch into intercontinental ops, you could see quite young low houred captains. Would that be healthy or should there be higher thresholds?
A cross-channel ferry is one thing, a world cruise is another.
Hypothesis
It is a curious adverse affect that the constant/continuous use of the modern flight deck seems to have on pilot behavior and awareness of the airplane's state. For the most part, the increasing application of automation has yielded the desired and intended improvement of nominal performance and operational efficiency. I can't prove that with data but I'm sure there are marketing types around with plenty of evidence for that.
But the automation brings attention to itself, its set up, its management and its own unique indications - of how the automation is doing, not how or what the airplane is doing. The pilot has gradually become a systems manager in spite of the title "pilot" and by habitual practice fostered by the modern flight deck become less attentive to and aware of the airplane state, leading to a lower state of readiness to recognize, interpret and react to hazardous non-normal conditions.
The automation performs so well in normal conditions and is so reliable that "normal" conditions are predominant. The airplane's state, while not deliberately neglected, is normally so benign that perceived need to monitor it closely is diminished. Other more apparent needs for the pilot's attention, whatever they might be, can seem to be safely attended to without any obvious consequence - normally. Like a constant dripping of water, the modern flight deck is, in effect, retraining the pilot, changing the pilot's routine behavior. The water is slowly but continuously getting warmer without notice, until it comes to a boil and things quickly become messy.
The non-normal condition occurs, the pilot keeps expecting normal system behavior, but it's not normal and the pilot is confused, not quite believing the indications. Not used to connecting the dots because the modern systems have been doing that for the pilot, the ability and likelihood that the dots can be reconnected in the midst of missing and disparate indications is unsurprisingly low.
The unintended consequences of flight deck modernization due to a failure to consider the effects on the human component of the system, that component which all the safety analyses assume will be there to put humpty-dumpty back together again, but just isn't up to the task - too little experience dealing with THIS situation.
Consider the Schipol 737 accident, the Buffalo Dash-8 accident, AF447, even Cali 20 years ago, and so many others. I do not presume that there are any silver bullet solutions to the many factors that feed this unfortunate state of affairs. I really don't believe that the typical response - to add another alert to compensate for inattention and lack of awareness - really addresses the problem. Why? Because it is not sufficient to presumably bring the pilot's awareness to its necessary level only when the situation has become hazardous and when an immediate, correct intervention is necessary. There are too many examples of disbelief, confusion, and delay for such unanticipated conditions.
The solution(s) must address the real problem - lack of routine, continuous, and deliberate awareness of the state of the airplane and associated systems - EVEN WHEN things are normal and the automation is actually handling the airplane. We need a "post-Modern" flight deck - designed to draw the pilot's attention regularly and continuously to where it belongs and where our system safety analyses have been assuming it was. The pilot should have timely awareness of even small unintended deviations from the normal desired conditions, that in their own right are not hazardous, but if left to grow unchecked could become hazardous. Such "minor" deviations should be corrected sooner, before they become major. A pilot (or flight crew) that has successfully maintained continuous awareness of the airplane is best prepared to do this.
What can system design do to help achieve this? Like I said, I have no silver bullets. I do think that more could be done to more positively distinguish normal, within desired tolerances, conditions from those where minor but certainly unintended deviations occur. Distinguished well enough that a quick glance will at least draw a double take and lead to heightened vigilance. The need for correction is not urgent, and means of correction need not be heroic. The vigilant pilot (flight crew) can assess the situation and take timely action, without the airplane ever reaching a condition in which safety was jeopardized. Whatever the cause of the deviations, including unexpected automation behavior, the pilot (flight crew) is aware and has been intervening (or at least thinking about it) before they ever reach an unsafe level.
I suspect, but have no hard data, that such "near normal" deviations occur more frequently than we think. That the pilots becoming aware of these will naturally become more vigilant - because their expectations will have changed. The result? The "post-Modern" flight deck will train pilots in the opposite direction that the modern flight deck has - toward more vigilance and awareness, not less. And THAT is addressing the problem. Building hours on the modern flight deck is not giving them the experience and wisdom we want from airline pilots. Building hours on the post-modern flight deck will have the opposite and desired effect.
But the automation brings attention to itself, its set up, its management and its own unique indications - of how the automation is doing, not how or what the airplane is doing. The pilot has gradually become a systems manager in spite of the title "pilot" and by habitual practice fostered by the modern flight deck become less attentive to and aware of the airplane state, leading to a lower state of readiness to recognize, interpret and react to hazardous non-normal conditions.
The automation performs so well in normal conditions and is so reliable that "normal" conditions are predominant. The airplane's state, while not deliberately neglected, is normally so benign that perceived need to monitor it closely is diminished. Other more apparent needs for the pilot's attention, whatever they might be, can seem to be safely attended to without any obvious consequence - normally. Like a constant dripping of water, the modern flight deck is, in effect, retraining the pilot, changing the pilot's routine behavior. The water is slowly but continuously getting warmer without notice, until it comes to a boil and things quickly become messy.
The non-normal condition occurs, the pilot keeps expecting normal system behavior, but it's not normal and the pilot is confused, not quite believing the indications. Not used to connecting the dots because the modern systems have been doing that for the pilot, the ability and likelihood that the dots can be reconnected in the midst of missing and disparate indications is unsurprisingly low.
The unintended consequences of flight deck modernization due to a failure to consider the effects on the human component of the system, that component which all the safety analyses assume will be there to put humpty-dumpty back together again, but just isn't up to the task - too little experience dealing with THIS situation.
Consider the Schipol 737 accident, the Buffalo Dash-8 accident, AF447, even Cali 20 years ago, and so many others. I do not presume that there are any silver bullet solutions to the many factors that feed this unfortunate state of affairs. I really don't believe that the typical response - to add another alert to compensate for inattention and lack of awareness - really addresses the problem. Why? Because it is not sufficient to presumably bring the pilot's awareness to its necessary level only when the situation has become hazardous and when an immediate, correct intervention is necessary. There are too many examples of disbelief, confusion, and delay for such unanticipated conditions.
The solution(s) must address the real problem - lack of routine, continuous, and deliberate awareness of the state of the airplane and associated systems - EVEN WHEN things are normal and the automation is actually handling the airplane. We need a "post-Modern" flight deck - designed to draw the pilot's attention regularly and continuously to where it belongs and where our system safety analyses have been assuming it was. The pilot should have timely awareness of even small unintended deviations from the normal desired conditions, that in their own right are not hazardous, but if left to grow unchecked could become hazardous. Such "minor" deviations should be corrected sooner, before they become major. A pilot (or flight crew) that has successfully maintained continuous awareness of the airplane is best prepared to do this.
What can system design do to help achieve this? Like I said, I have no silver bullets. I do think that more could be done to more positively distinguish normal, within desired tolerances, conditions from those where minor but certainly unintended deviations occur. Distinguished well enough that a quick glance will at least draw a double take and lead to heightened vigilance. The need for correction is not urgent, and means of correction need not be heroic. The vigilant pilot (flight crew) can assess the situation and take timely action, without the airplane ever reaching a condition in which safety was jeopardized. Whatever the cause of the deviations, including unexpected automation behavior, the pilot (flight crew) is aware and has been intervening (or at least thinking about it) before they ever reach an unsafe level.
I suspect, but have no hard data, that such "near normal" deviations occur more frequently than we think. That the pilots becoming aware of these will naturally become more vigilant - because their expectations will have changed. The result? The "post-Modern" flight deck will train pilots in the opposite direction that the modern flight deck has - toward more vigilance and awareness, not less. And THAT is addressing the problem. Building hours on the modern flight deck is not giving them the experience and wisdom we want from airline pilots. Building hours on the post-modern flight deck will have the opposite and desired effect.
We all know the combination of various automation policies and human nature has the potential to de skill a pilot just as soon as look sideways however a bit of personal responsibility doesn't go astray.
Buy a cheap flight sim and nerd burger it out for a couple of approaches with all automatics off in whatever conditions you like, take the extra time in the sim after the session's over, arm chair fly a few made up non-normals and practice your management model, the bastards can't stop you doing that.
I am paid to be ready for the day when the s&$! hits the stage one compressor, the rest is just data entry, bad coffee and good conversation.
Buy a cheap flight sim and nerd burger it out for a couple of approaches with all automatics off in whatever conditions you like, take the extra time in the sim after the session's over, arm chair fly a few made up non-normals and practice your management model, the bastards can't stop you doing that.
I am paid to be ready for the day when the s&$! hits the stage one compressor, the rest is just data entry, bad coffee and good conversation.
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Globalnav: I like some of your thinking & comments, especially about being aware and staying alert to what the a/c is doing. Many years I found it very disappointing to be a new train sign captain in a fledgling airline. It had just transitioned from a needles & dials +FE a/c to the latest EFIS/EICAS LNAV/VNAV new toy.
The instructors developed the mantra of "fly the FD", and the idea that it was not necessary to keep a scan of the overhead panel, or anywhere else, as "EICAS would tell you when there is a problem". My philosophy of being alert to trends and being proactive was not appreciated. They thought EICAS had replaced the hairy old fart who used to sit behind them and monitor trends. EICAS only tells you when a limit is reached. You might now be faced with a worse scenario than 30 mins earlier. IMHO these 2 mantra's led to a false sense of security and low awareness; both can be disastrous.
I think you are with me in questioning the technocrats + accountants idea that error can be reduced by more automation and more back up redundancy just in case.
Can someone please tell us how much line pilot input is there into modern a/c development. I don't mean manufacturer's test pilots, I mean day in day out line training captains. At a Boeing visit to our home base we were invited to discuss issues as we had more operating experience than they did. It was interesting how much detail we had to include to gain a full understanding by the Boeing pilots. Sometimes it was something they had not appreciated. It didn't always lead to a change, and we don't know if it was carried forward in the development process, but we tried.
FDM11: Also some very interesting points. Your comments ref. SOP's in the new age is relevant. I once heard 2 very different philosophies about SOP's. One was the old idea that it allowed many different pilots to fly together in a manner that the DFO & CP had deemed safe & efficient. The other was that they were a legal safe-guard. If it went wrong, but you had followed SOP's then you were vindicated; not your fault. Ouch!
When training & checking I focused more on the overall operation within an SOP framework rather than the SOP minutiae. Was it acceptable, safe, good airmanship? The grading process indicated that X SOP errors = A grade, Y errors = B grade, Z errors = C grade etc. I had a more subjective view. This of course brings in personal attitudes of trainer/checkers and subjective assessments. I still prefer that to the nit-picking black & white trappers.
Of course a certain profile had a crew coordination process and a correct use of the automatics to achieve a safe result. That is correct as it is a crew procedure and both expect the other to act in a certain way & certain times. No confusion. Solid SOP required. Pass/fail?
What many forget is that it is an SOP to deviate from SOP's when safety dictates. What that requires is the realisation that something is going awry, why the normal SOP will not be the best, and what other FCTM technique is a solution. IMHO this is what is missing in basic TR, and more critically in command training. It can be that SOP focus is even more intense in that phase.
One then hears real life stories which leave the question "why did they do that & not the other?" You will often find that they were outside their comfort zone, knew no other way of doing something, even though they suspected it might not be the best; but they could not be blamed for following SOP's. It would not be their fault. Ouch.
This is where the training process has let them down. It was a common comment from cadet based F/O's that they liked flying with the old farts from a varied background rather than the newbie captains. When presented with a situation they got on with it and used all resources to achieve the task required; no hesitation. Smooth, efficient and well managed with good CRM, while complying as best as possible with SOP's but not afraid to deviate as required. The newbies first thought was "what's written down." Then doubt crept in and moments of indecision delayed action.
FDM11 questions the true and best status for SOP's. Should they be 'obedience of fools & guidance of wise men,' or something which fits into the auditing process of right/wrong black/white?
The instructors developed the mantra of "fly the FD", and the idea that it was not necessary to keep a scan of the overhead panel, or anywhere else, as "EICAS would tell you when there is a problem". My philosophy of being alert to trends and being proactive was not appreciated. They thought EICAS had replaced the hairy old fart who used to sit behind them and monitor trends. EICAS only tells you when a limit is reached. You might now be faced with a worse scenario than 30 mins earlier. IMHO these 2 mantra's led to a false sense of security and low awareness; both can be disastrous.
I think you are with me in questioning the technocrats + accountants idea that error can be reduced by more automation and more back up redundancy just in case.
Can someone please tell us how much line pilot input is there into modern a/c development. I don't mean manufacturer's test pilots, I mean day in day out line training captains. At a Boeing visit to our home base we were invited to discuss issues as we had more operating experience than they did. It was interesting how much detail we had to include to gain a full understanding by the Boeing pilots. Sometimes it was something they had not appreciated. It didn't always lead to a change, and we don't know if it was carried forward in the development process, but we tried.
FDM11: Also some very interesting points. Your comments ref. SOP's in the new age is relevant. I once heard 2 very different philosophies about SOP's. One was the old idea that it allowed many different pilots to fly together in a manner that the DFO & CP had deemed safe & efficient. The other was that they were a legal safe-guard. If it went wrong, but you had followed SOP's then you were vindicated; not your fault. Ouch!
When training & checking I focused more on the overall operation within an SOP framework rather than the SOP minutiae. Was it acceptable, safe, good airmanship? The grading process indicated that X SOP errors = A grade, Y errors = B grade, Z errors = C grade etc. I had a more subjective view. This of course brings in personal attitudes of trainer/checkers and subjective assessments. I still prefer that to the nit-picking black & white trappers.
Of course a certain profile had a crew coordination process and a correct use of the automatics to achieve a safe result. That is correct as it is a crew procedure and both expect the other to act in a certain way & certain times. No confusion. Solid SOP required. Pass/fail?
What many forget is that it is an SOP to deviate from SOP's when safety dictates. What that requires is the realisation that something is going awry, why the normal SOP will not be the best, and what other FCTM technique is a solution. IMHO this is what is missing in basic TR, and more critically in command training. It can be that SOP focus is even more intense in that phase.
One then hears real life stories which leave the question "why did they do that & not the other?" You will often find that they were outside their comfort zone, knew no other way of doing something, even though they suspected it might not be the best; but they could not be blamed for following SOP's. It would not be their fault. Ouch.
This is where the training process has let them down. It was a common comment from cadet based F/O's that they liked flying with the old farts from a varied background rather than the newbie captains. When presented with a situation they got on with it and used all resources to achieve the task required; no hesitation. Smooth, efficient and well managed with good CRM, while complying as best as possible with SOP's but not afraid to deviate as required. The newbies first thought was "what's written down." Then doubt crept in and moments of indecision delayed action.
FDM11 questions the true and best status for SOP's. Should they be 'obedience of fools & guidance of wise men,' or something which fits into the auditing process of right/wrong black/white?
Last edited by RAT 5; 5th Jan 2016 at 12:34.
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RAT 5, re:
I like that series of observations. I think it captures what is meant by "guidance of wise men,...", etc. I particularly agree with you where automation and SOPs is concerned, (Solid SOP required), and I would add the same comment where the activation of protections (for both Boeing & Airbus) are concerned; Follow the book!
That said, I recall ignoring the ECAM Abnormal drill on an A330 flight, for what I considered to be very good reasons, a decision which proved to be the correct one but only after all was said and done. That's what the captain is for. And, glancing at the thread's thesis for a moment, almost certainly any software/autonomous/pilotless aircraft would have made the wrong decision and placed the aircraft and its payload in a high-risk condition. This is because software cannot parse what the belly senses, nor is there is a way that a mere abundance of "data" could replace experience and render a "correct" decision.
The "audit" item I brought into the dialog as only lately has this added notion entered into the discourse on human factors accidents when SMS began to take hold. I like SMS and think it is far better approach to risks and occurrences than blame/discipline/enforcement models. But the difficulty with the audit process is that it is a vertical, bureaucratic model (vice lateral process), which requires satisfaction of superiors in the up-and-down structure of command-and-control, without permitting variability in standards, (lest one open oneself to liabilities, blame and ouch).
I think that is a potential failing of the audit process should it not be designed or handled well, and can cause precisely what such process is intended to avoid/prevent.
Of course a certain profile had a crew coordination process and a correct use of the automatics to achieve a safe result. That is correct as it is a crew procedure and both expect the other to act in a certain way & certain times. No confusion. Solid SOP required. Pass/fail?
What many forget is that it is an SOP to deviate from SOP's when safety dictates. What that requires is the realisation that something is going awry, why the normal SOP will not be the best, and what other FCTM technique is a solution. IMHO this is what is missing in basic TR, and more critically in command training. It can be that SOP focus is even more intense in that phase.
What many forget is that it is an SOP to deviate from SOP's when safety dictates. What that requires is the realisation that something is going awry, why the normal SOP will not be the best, and what other FCTM technique is a solution. IMHO this is what is missing in basic TR, and more critically in command training. It can be that SOP focus is even more intense in that phase.
I like that series of observations. I think it captures what is meant by "guidance of wise men,...", etc. I particularly agree with you where automation and SOPs is concerned, (Solid SOP required), and I would add the same comment where the activation of protections (for both Boeing & Airbus) are concerned; Follow the book! That said, I recall ignoring the ECAM Abnormal drill on an A330 flight, for what I considered to be very good reasons, a decision which proved to be the correct one but only after all was said and done. That's what the captain is for. And, glancing at the thread's thesis for a moment, almost certainly any software/autonomous/pilotless aircraft would have made the wrong decision and placed the aircraft and its payload in a high-risk condition. This is because software cannot parse what the belly senses, nor is there is a way that a mere abundance of "data" could replace experience and render a "correct" decision.
The "audit" item I brought into the dialog as only lately has this added notion entered into the discourse on human factors accidents when SMS began to take hold. I like SMS and think it is far better approach to risks and occurrences than blame/discipline/enforcement models. But the difficulty with the audit process is that it is a vertical, bureaucratic model (vice lateral process), which requires satisfaction of superiors in the up-and-down structure of command-and-control, without permitting variability in standards, (lest one open oneself to liabilities, blame and ouch).
I think that is a potential failing of the audit process should it not be designed or handled well, and can cause precisely what such process is intended to avoid/prevent.
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This is because software cannot parse what the belly senses, nor is there is a way that a mere abundance of "data" could replace experience and render a "correct" decision.
And computers don't have hairs on the back of their necks, or sweaty armpits before a limit is reached. I'm not sure they will have planned at least 1 or more escape route before they enter into any void. I wonder how many have Plan B & C programmed in.
That to me is one of the essential parameters of command; few last minute surprises from foreseeable problems. There will always be the odd one, but then that really will be a surprise.
And computers don't have hairs on the back of their necks, or sweaty armpits before a limit is reached. I'm not sure they will have planned at least 1 or more escape route before they enter into any void. I wonder how many have Plan B & C programmed in.
That to me is one of the essential parameters of command; few last minute surprises from foreseeable problems. There will always be the odd one, but then that really will be a surprise.
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...hairs on the back of their necks...
Yes, for sure.
And to your point, computers/software are not and cannot be anticipatory. They are forever and always reactive to present input, even as that input and reaction to the "present" may be a billionth-of-a-second. As you observe, the mere appearance (as in, "mimics or looks like, but isn't"), of anticipatory behaviour is not truly anticipatory.
In terms of software engineering and the above, the question must be asked, "What is behaviour?"
To be humanly anticpatory is a philosophy-of-mind* notion and until one understands and comprehends this, autonomous flight will always and first, be dependent in some way, trapped in "the present" and therefore reliant.
It is these questions which we have not even seen posed in the discourse on autonomous flight, let alone a set of proposed solutions/answers which address such matters.
This doesn't mean that autonomous flight can't be done in the ways proposed, nor are these qualifying questions which, when apparently solved, autonomous flight may occur. We don't know what the qualifying conditions are yet.
It just means that such questions that involve an understanding of the mind must be satisfactorily anticipated and addressed.
*Conditions for Fully Autonomous Anticipation
The paper, by John Collier, may be useful in understanding what is meant by this sentence. There are a few typos in the PDF, likely through OCR errors.
And to your point, computers/software are not and cannot be anticipatory. They are forever and always reactive to present input, even as that input and reaction to the "present" may be a billionth-of-a-second. As you observe, the mere appearance (as in, "mimics or looks like, but isn't"), of anticipatory behaviour is not truly anticipatory.
In terms of software engineering and the above, the question must be asked, "What is behaviour?"
To be humanly anticpatory is a philosophy-of-mind* notion and until one understands and comprehends this, autonomous flight will always and first, be dependent in some way, trapped in "the present" and therefore reliant.
It is these questions which we have not even seen posed in the discourse on autonomous flight, let alone a set of proposed solutions/answers which address such matters.
This doesn't mean that autonomous flight can't be done in the ways proposed, nor are these qualifying questions which, when apparently solved, autonomous flight may occur. We don't know what the qualifying conditions are yet.
It just means that such questions that involve an understanding of the mind must be satisfactorily anticipated and addressed.
*Conditions for Fully Autonomous Anticipation
The paper, by John Collier, may be useful in understanding what is meant by this sentence. There are a few typos in the PDF, likely through OCR errors.
Last edited by FDMII; 5th Jan 2016 at 18:31.
"And computers don't have hairs on the back of their necks, or sweaty armpits before a limit is reached. "
Granted, and neither do pilots not paying attention or unaware of proximity to the limit.
"And to your point, computers/software are not and cannot be anticipatory. "
Granted, likewise, and neither do pilots not paying attention or unaware.
We may be tempted to criticize pilots not paying attention or unaware as unprofessional and not doing their jobs. But criticism, deserved or not, is insufficient. The modern automated flight deck is creating such pilots. At best they, while becoming less anticipatory, are becoming reactionary. But as a whole I'm not convinced they are even that as well as we need.
Please don't misunderstand, I am not praising software and automated systems nor desiring them as the superior replacement for the human component. We need to design the flight deck better to account for the nature of the human component and rightly take advantage of all its strengths.
Granted, and neither do pilots not paying attention or unaware of proximity to the limit.
"And to your point, computers/software are not and cannot be anticipatory. "
Granted, likewise, and neither do pilots not paying attention or unaware.
We may be tempted to criticize pilots not paying attention or unaware as unprofessional and not doing their jobs. But criticism, deserved or not, is insufficient. The modern automated flight deck is creating such pilots. At best they, while becoming less anticipatory, are becoming reactionary. But as a whole I'm not convinced they are even that as well as we need.
Please don't misunderstand, I am not praising software and automated systems nor desiring them as the superior replacement for the human component. We need to design the flight deck better to account for the nature of the human component and rightly take advantage of all its strengths.
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It has been a fascinating debate/discussion. I feel we can end up in a never ending circle. What we are seeking is a solution to a perceived problem. That seems to be distant and we 'old f*@ts are becoming frustrated that no-one is taking action.
I'd like to widen the discussion to the very people we are discussing, i.e. the enthusiastic newbies, be they cadets or low hour captains. The topic we have been discussing is how these new-tech modern cockpit jockeys cope with the job. How do they feel about it? What do they think about their training? Do they feel sufficiently empowered with knowledge & authority every day?
I remember my first jet command; not first command, but the first 'wide-eyed finally, at last' moment. My first solo sector I had a flap problem at 10 mile finals on my 1st ILS as PF captain. It was completely no big deal. The foundations were solid. It was classic text book QRH/CRM stuff. Later, I had more spurious problems with those less tangible items that required management. Again, no big deal: common sense forged by the apprenticeship served.
So what do the newbies think about their apprenticeship? 148 hrs and a shiny jet? Newbie captains, 3000hrs and it's your responsibility? Are we correct in our nervousness or are we making mountains from molehills due to the spectacular screw ups? For every spectacular headline there are 10,000's of smooth flights.
Thoughts?
I'd like to widen the discussion to the very people we are discussing, i.e. the enthusiastic newbies, be they cadets or low hour captains. The topic we have been discussing is how these new-tech modern cockpit jockeys cope with the job. How do they feel about it? What do they think about their training? Do they feel sufficiently empowered with knowledge & authority every day?
I remember my first jet command; not first command, but the first 'wide-eyed finally, at last' moment. My first solo sector I had a flap problem at 10 mile finals on my 1st ILS as PF captain. It was completely no big deal. The foundations were solid. It was classic text book QRH/CRM stuff. Later, I had more spurious problems with those less tangible items that required management. Again, no big deal: common sense forged by the apprenticeship served.
So what do the newbies think about their apprenticeship? 148 hrs and a shiny jet? Newbie captains, 3000hrs and it's your responsibility? Are we correct in our nervousness or are we making mountains from molehills due to the spectacular screw ups? For every spectacular headline there are 10,000's of smooth flights.
Thoughts?
Good point Rat 5
I am one of those relatively new captains that you speak of. I've got over 3000 hours in the left seat of the 320/321.
Davies was spot on, by talking of enthusiasm being one of the best resources for the job and thankfully, I still carry this in spades.
Let me make this clear: Failure is a much better teacher than success.
From my perspective the problem will always be, you don't know what you don't know and having a few hours 'without incident' can very much lead you down the path of complacency.
The first thing that woke me up was failing a sim session for the first time ever, I was absolutely mortified. I had studied, I knew what to expect and then, on the day, the major failure occurred and although I got the thing on the ground safely, there had been a couple of altitude busts during initial descent (around 300 feet each time) and I had interrupted the FO at critical times during his ECAM actions without really giving my timing much thought.
What was clear to me was not that I couldn't hand fly the aircraft but rather I didn't have the various stress tested blocks of flight management process in place for example, what to do before even starting the ECAM, when to interject or review and how to observe my offsider sanctions effectively.
As a result of course, I spent most of the exercise second guessing each decision that I had already made, which then led to tunnel vision, etc, etc.
The company was a lot easier on me than I was on myself and and after picking myself up off the floor I then started speaking to other skippers about their various management models, I took a little from here and there and came up with some very specific and clear processes that could be transposed on to any situation with regard to aviation, navigating and communicating in that order.
The second thing was AF447: Holy s#!t, three 'qualified' guys couldn't figure it out and I was flying with guys almost every day with less experience than the least experienced guy on that flight deck.
I had always had a great deal of interest in reading the crash comics as I understood that I didn't have time to make all the mistakes myself and rather, had to learn from others including the crew of AF447. Since then I have spent plenty of time reading up and transposing my own blocks on to various other situations to stress test them and all I can say for sure is that I am much more experienced than I was before.
Failure in the sim sucks but if it happens to you, lap it, take notes, learn well and move on with greater confidence and be thankful for the chance to fail in a safe place.
Great discussion.
I am one of those relatively new captains that you speak of. I've got over 3000 hours in the left seat of the 320/321.
Davies was spot on, by talking of enthusiasm being one of the best resources for the job and thankfully, I still carry this in spades.
Let me make this clear: Failure is a much better teacher than success.
From my perspective the problem will always be, you don't know what you don't know and having a few hours 'without incident' can very much lead you down the path of complacency.
The first thing that woke me up was failing a sim session for the first time ever, I was absolutely mortified. I had studied, I knew what to expect and then, on the day, the major failure occurred and although I got the thing on the ground safely, there had been a couple of altitude busts during initial descent (around 300 feet each time) and I had interrupted the FO at critical times during his ECAM actions without really giving my timing much thought.
What was clear to me was not that I couldn't hand fly the aircraft but rather I didn't have the various stress tested blocks of flight management process in place for example, what to do before even starting the ECAM, when to interject or review and how to observe my offsider sanctions effectively.
As a result of course, I spent most of the exercise second guessing each decision that I had already made, which then led to tunnel vision, etc, etc.
The company was a lot easier on me than I was on myself and and after picking myself up off the floor I then started speaking to other skippers about their various management models, I took a little from here and there and came up with some very specific and clear processes that could be transposed on to any situation with regard to aviation, navigating and communicating in that order.
The second thing was AF447: Holy s#!t, three 'qualified' guys couldn't figure it out and I was flying with guys almost every day with less experience than the least experienced guy on that flight deck.
I had always had a great deal of interest in reading the crash comics as I understood that I didn't have time to make all the mistakes myself and rather, had to learn from others including the crew of AF447. Since then I have spent plenty of time reading up and transposing my own blocks on to various other situations to stress test them and all I can say for sure is that I am much more experienced than I was before.
Failure in the sim sucks but if it happens to you, lap it, take notes, learn well and move on with greater confidence and be thankful for the chance to fail in a safe place.
Great discussion.
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I'll add my experience to the mix. I'm an ex-cadet. I joined my first airline from a three letter flying school with 200 hours or thereabouts, straight onto the 320/1. The airline I joined didn't actively ban manual flying, but I wouldn't exactly say that it was encouraged by either trainers or the majority of line captains, although there were notable exceptions. In three years there, I probably flew fewer than five approaches with the auto thrust off. It was something that I simply wasn't very comfortable doing.
I made the decision to move to my current (large loco) airline after three years, and found myself in a different type of environment. In my base, manual flying seemed to be the norm. The company states in the OMs that manual flying is encouraged and should be regularly practiced. Manual flying was even a line training item during the company OCC. I forced myself to move out of my comfort zone, followed the lead of my captains and started flying more and more approaches with raw data, and with all of the automation switched off. The result is that now, four years later and a captain myself, I'm arguably more comfortable flying an approach with everything switched off than with all the magic working. Indeed, I sometimes choose to fly an approach to minimum with all the automation engaged to practice using the automation!
There are still some pilots who are very nervous about manual flying, thinking that they are going to get hauled over the coals for making a mistake while hand flying. Certainly in my current company, I'm not sure where the attitude comes from. I have personally never heard from the FDM team, and don't know anyone who has for an FDM occurrence related to hand flying. If you screw up an approach (which we can all do), you go around, file an ASR, and that's the last that you will hear of it. Nobody will be blamed for messing up an approach and going around, regardless of the level of automation they were using.
To touch on a point raised regarding 'excellence' vs. seniority: here, command is something that you have to apply for. It's not a case of waiting for your number to come up and being granted a course. I applied and took my command way out of seniority. The failure rate is very high at each stage of the five stage process, and suitability for the role is recognised and valued. Everyone talks; everyone knows who the good (and bad) FOs are, and management and training actively solicit the opinions of line captains when considering someone for command. Merely 'adequete' training records are definitely not enough; to move beyond the very first stage of the assessment process, a release from the training department is required, and the decision whether to grant the release or not is contingent on your training records being above standard.
I made the decision to move to my current (large loco) airline after three years, and found myself in a different type of environment. In my base, manual flying seemed to be the norm. The company states in the OMs that manual flying is encouraged and should be regularly practiced. Manual flying was even a line training item during the company OCC. I forced myself to move out of my comfort zone, followed the lead of my captains and started flying more and more approaches with raw data, and with all of the automation switched off. The result is that now, four years later and a captain myself, I'm arguably more comfortable flying an approach with everything switched off than with all the magic working. Indeed, I sometimes choose to fly an approach to minimum with all the automation engaged to practice using the automation!
There are still some pilots who are very nervous about manual flying, thinking that they are going to get hauled over the coals for making a mistake while hand flying. Certainly in my current company, I'm not sure where the attitude comes from. I have personally never heard from the FDM team, and don't know anyone who has for an FDM occurrence related to hand flying. If you screw up an approach (which we can all do), you go around, file an ASR, and that's the last that you will hear of it. Nobody will be blamed for messing up an approach and going around, regardless of the level of automation they were using.
To touch on a point raised regarding 'excellence' vs. seniority: here, command is something that you have to apply for. It's not a case of waiting for your number to come up and being granted a course. I applied and took my command way out of seniority. The failure rate is very high at each stage of the five stage process, and suitability for the role is recognised and valued. Everyone talks; everyone knows who the good (and bad) FOs are, and management and training actively solicit the opinions of line captains when considering someone for command. Merely 'adequete' training records are definitely not enough; to move beyond the very first stage of the assessment process, a release from the training department is required, and the decision whether to grant the release or not is contingent on your training records being above standard.