737-800 High Altitude Stall Recovery Techniques
Thread Starter
737-800 High Altitude Stall Recovery Techniques
Hi,
I recently had my six month simulator check ride and the Instructor gave some very practical advice during the briefing prior to getting in the sim.
When discussing the high altitude stalls we would do, after all the usual stuff he said that in his experience, -4 degrees pitch worked well and by waiting until 230kts IAS before beginning the recovery secondary stalls are averted.
When it was time to do stalls I had two simple targets in my head which helped me feel much more confident about the exercise. In the past I have always done an ok job of the high altitude stalling. I've always just 'flown the aircraft' and and been marked as at or above company standard, but by giving such practical instruction I feel like I am now a slightly better 737 pilot.
Do any of you have similar 'targets' in mind when completing other manoeuvres that would be food for thought to us all?
Cheers.
I recently had my six month simulator check ride and the Instructor gave some very practical advice during the briefing prior to getting in the sim.
When discussing the high altitude stalls we would do, after all the usual stuff he said that in his experience, -4 degrees pitch worked well and by waiting until 230kts IAS before beginning the recovery secondary stalls are averted.
When it was time to do stalls I had two simple targets in my head which helped me feel much more confident about the exercise. In the past I have always done an ok job of the high altitude stalling. I've always just 'flown the aircraft' and and been marked as at or above company standard, but by giving such practical instruction I feel like I am now a slightly better 737 pilot.
Do any of you have similar 'targets' in mind when completing other manoeuvres that would be food for thought to us all?
Cheers.
Copied from Instructor and Examiners Forum.
The problems we all know about were because minimising height loss was put first above good stall recovery practice, not because it was considered.
While the subject is centred around light training aircraft, it is instructive to compare stall recovery technique in a transport jet type such as a 737 (ie not FBW) at high altitude and at low altitude. I am talking about what should be taught in a full flight simulator.
At high altitude cruise (say 37,000 ft) the approach to the stall is preceded by heavy buffet and I mean really strong buffet. You cannot miss it. The recovery should be started then and not wait until the stick-shaker.
Assuming however for the purpose of the training exercise the recovery is started at the stick shaker.
From the Boeing 737 FCTM: Quote:
"High Altitude Recovery. At higher altitudes above 20,000 feet, the airplane becomes increasingly thrust limited. If an approach to stall indication is experienced, nose down elevator and stabiliser trim is required to initiate a descent. This is because when the airplane is thrust limited, altitude needs to be traded for airspeed. Therefore a recovery at high altitude results in a greater altitude loss than a recovery at low altitudes". Unquote.
The nose should be kept just below the horizon while accelerating to a safe recovery speed with the aim to recover to a safe speed before levelling out. As thrust is increased forward elevator and stabiliser trim is needed to keep the nose on or just below the horizon. A typical example of a safe speed to attain before stopping the descent is the published high altitude holding speed which approximates full flap landing speed plus 100 knots. Typically around 230 knots IAS at high altitude. Expect an altitude loss of 3-4000 feet before this speed is attained.
It is a different recovery technique altogether when practicing a low altitude stall since it very much depends on the aircraft configuration at the time the stall occurs. Readers may recall the Turkish Airlines Boeing 737 accident at Amsterdam where a defective radio altimeter caused the autothrottles to retard prematurely during a ILS coupled approach.
When this happened, the autopilot attempted to maintain the iLS glide slope by raising the nose. With both thrust levers at idle, the speed reduced until the stick shaker operated at around Vref minus 30 knots (roughly 105 knots IAS). By then the altitude was about 1000 feet agl. The autopilot stabiliser trim wound steadily back while all this was happening as the autopilot attempted to maintain the glide slope. At the point of stick shaker the stabiliser trim was nearly fully aft. A successful go-around could have been made but the pilot was too slow to react and the aircraft stalled wings level into a field.
The recovery technique used in the simulator for this type of event is to disconnect the autopilot and autothrottles and apply full manual power. At the same time, reduce the angle of attack by lowering the nose sufficiently to unstall the wings. Lowering the nose too much at that altitude will cause significant height loss with no room to recover. Adjusting the nose attitude to around 5-8 degrees nose up once the stall is broken, permits a slight rate of climb while accelerating towards first flap retraction which occurs after reaching Vref.
The pitch up moment is very strong with full thrust. At full thrust settings and very low airspeeds, the elevator, working in opposition to the stabiliser, has limited control to reduce the pitch attitude. This must be countered by forward elevator and immediate forward stabiliser trim otherwise there will be insufficient elevator control to prevent the nose from pitching up under the influence of high thrust. In the simulator example described above, where the autopilot steadily applied almost full back stabiliser in its attempt to maintain the ILS glide slope, it was found that up to eight seconds of continuous forward stabiliser movement may be needed to retain normal elevator control. If full forward elevator combined with continuous forward stabiliser trim does not prevent further pitch up, and loss of control is imminent, consideration should be given to reducing thrust to help lower the nose. If that has only limited effect, the following extract is applicable from the Boeing 737 Flight Crew Training Manual:
Quote:
" If normal pitch controls do not stop an increasing pitch rate, rolling the aircraft to a bank angle that starts the nose down should work. Bank angles of about 45 degrees, up to a maximum of 60 degrees, could be needed. Unloading the wing by maintaining continuous nose-down elevator pressure keeps the wings angle of attack as low as possible, making normal roll controls - up to full deflection of ailerons and spoilers - may be used. The rolling manoeuvre changes the pitch rate into a turning manoeuvre, allowing the pitch to decrease. The reduced pitch attitude allows airspeed to increase, thereby improving elevator and aileron effectiveness . After the pitch attitude and airspeed return to a desired range, the pilot can reduce angle of attack with normal lateral flight controls and return the aircraft to normal flight". Unquote.
In fact, this technique is applicable to most light training aircraft, where, with full flap extended on final approach, application of full throttle in a low level, low airspeed go-around may cause a marked pitch up that could progress to a stalled condition unless immediate action is taken prevent the pitch up.
Obviously in the case of the Boeing 737 under discussion, the aim is not only to recover from the stalled condition with minimum loss of height but to accelerate from Vref minus 30 knots at the point of stick shaker, to a safe airspeed where the first flap retraction sequence is started. Normally that would be at Vref speed, typically around 140 knots in the 737 Classics where a normal go-around procedure then follows. Flown correctly from the point of stick shaker to a safe recovery results in a height loss of around 300 feet.
The problems we all know about were because minimising height loss was put first above good stall recovery practice, not because it was considered.
While the subject is centred around light training aircraft, it is instructive to compare stall recovery technique in a transport jet type such as a 737 (ie not FBW) at high altitude and at low altitude. I am talking about what should be taught in a full flight simulator.
At high altitude cruise (say 37,000 ft) the approach to the stall is preceded by heavy buffet and I mean really strong buffet. You cannot miss it. The recovery should be started then and not wait until the stick-shaker.
Assuming however for the purpose of the training exercise the recovery is started at the stick shaker.
From the Boeing 737 FCTM: Quote:
"High Altitude Recovery. At higher altitudes above 20,000 feet, the airplane becomes increasingly thrust limited. If an approach to stall indication is experienced, nose down elevator and stabiliser trim is required to initiate a descent. This is because when the airplane is thrust limited, altitude needs to be traded for airspeed. Therefore a recovery at high altitude results in a greater altitude loss than a recovery at low altitudes". Unquote.
The nose should be kept just below the horizon while accelerating to a safe recovery speed with the aim to recover to a safe speed before levelling out. As thrust is increased forward elevator and stabiliser trim is needed to keep the nose on or just below the horizon. A typical example of a safe speed to attain before stopping the descent is the published high altitude holding speed which approximates full flap landing speed plus 100 knots. Typically around 230 knots IAS at high altitude. Expect an altitude loss of 3-4000 feet before this speed is attained.
It is a different recovery technique altogether when practicing a low altitude stall since it very much depends on the aircraft configuration at the time the stall occurs. Readers may recall the Turkish Airlines Boeing 737 accident at Amsterdam where a defective radio altimeter caused the autothrottles to retard prematurely during a ILS coupled approach.
When this happened, the autopilot attempted to maintain the iLS glide slope by raising the nose. With both thrust levers at idle, the speed reduced until the stick shaker operated at around Vref minus 30 knots (roughly 105 knots IAS). By then the altitude was about 1000 feet agl. The autopilot stabiliser trim wound steadily back while all this was happening as the autopilot attempted to maintain the glide slope. At the point of stick shaker the stabiliser trim was nearly fully aft. A successful go-around could have been made but the pilot was too slow to react and the aircraft stalled wings level into a field.
The recovery technique used in the simulator for this type of event is to disconnect the autopilot and autothrottles and apply full manual power. At the same time, reduce the angle of attack by lowering the nose sufficiently to unstall the wings. Lowering the nose too much at that altitude will cause significant height loss with no room to recover. Adjusting the nose attitude to around 5-8 degrees nose up once the stall is broken, permits a slight rate of climb while accelerating towards first flap retraction which occurs after reaching Vref.
The pitch up moment is very strong with full thrust. At full thrust settings and very low airspeeds, the elevator, working in opposition to the stabiliser, has limited control to reduce the pitch attitude. This must be countered by forward elevator and immediate forward stabiliser trim otherwise there will be insufficient elevator control to prevent the nose from pitching up under the influence of high thrust. In the simulator example described above, where the autopilot steadily applied almost full back stabiliser in its attempt to maintain the ILS glide slope, it was found that up to eight seconds of continuous forward stabiliser movement may be needed to retain normal elevator control. If full forward elevator combined with continuous forward stabiliser trim does not prevent further pitch up, and loss of control is imminent, consideration should be given to reducing thrust to help lower the nose. If that has only limited effect, the following extract is applicable from the Boeing 737 Flight Crew Training Manual:
Quote:
" If normal pitch controls do not stop an increasing pitch rate, rolling the aircraft to a bank angle that starts the nose down should work. Bank angles of about 45 degrees, up to a maximum of 60 degrees, could be needed. Unloading the wing by maintaining continuous nose-down elevator pressure keeps the wings angle of attack as low as possible, making normal roll controls - up to full deflection of ailerons and spoilers - may be used. The rolling manoeuvre changes the pitch rate into a turning manoeuvre, allowing the pitch to decrease. The reduced pitch attitude allows airspeed to increase, thereby improving elevator and aileron effectiveness . After the pitch attitude and airspeed return to a desired range, the pilot can reduce angle of attack with normal lateral flight controls and return the aircraft to normal flight". Unquote.
In fact, this technique is applicable to most light training aircraft, where, with full flap extended on final approach, application of full throttle in a low level, low airspeed go-around may cause a marked pitch up that could progress to a stalled condition unless immediate action is taken prevent the pitch up.
Obviously in the case of the Boeing 737 under discussion, the aim is not only to recover from the stalled condition with minimum loss of height but to accelerate from Vref minus 30 knots at the point of stick shaker, to a safe airspeed where the first flap retraction sequence is started. Normally that would be at Vref speed, typically around 140 knots in the 737 Classics where a normal go-around procedure then follows. Flown correctly from the point of stick shaker to a safe recovery results in a height loss of around 300 feet.
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Interesting discussion: If you reduce attitude and accelerate to the top of the lower amber band you have full manoeuvrability. This is achieved with gravity and power. You can then slowly & gently increase attitude, to maintain just above amber band, with VSI still descending. As you continue to increase attitude eventually the VSI will become +ve and thus you can freeze the attitude and accelerate while climbing: then when at UP bug or 230kts you can slowly increase attitude some more to increase ROC to return to previous level. This loses 2500'. It does require firm accurate pitch control.
It recovers from stall to manoeuvre speed with minimum height loss in RVSM and recovers to previous FL ASAP. It works in the sim.
Opinions?
It recovers from stall to manoeuvre speed with minimum height loss in RVSM and recovers to previous FL ASAP. It works in the sim.
Opinions?
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Simulator training. A/c had an AOA indicator. Instructor, with no AOA experience and new on type, had come up his own rules of thumb. During the subsquent high altitude upset event he insisted I reduce the dive angle to the technique he had figured. So I reduced the pitch attitude...and promptly experienced a brief(I knew it would happen) secondary stall. How'd I know? I was using the AOA gauge. His technique wasn't good enough for the event we encounterd.
There are a lot of variables. Stick with Boeing's guidance which isn't 'black and white' because they acknowledge that airmanship needs to be applied to each event.
In the event I was given 4 degrees nose down wouldn't have been enough. It was a nose high event above MAX ALT, similar to the AF 447 accident. So the 'target' you were given might not work in the real life event you experience. Fly the plane, use procedures and SOP's as required, but realize that many techniques might not be appropriate for the event you're experiencing.
Training instructors had many 'rules of thumb' that were based off of low altitude flying. Completely inappropriate for high altitude events. But they didn't teach them as low altitude techniques. They taught them as appropriate for all altitudes AND the checklist led guys to believe the techniques applied at altitude. Months of head banging, and pointing out inappropriate techniqes that were being passed on and suddenly the checklists, and training, were changed on all fleets. And recently Boeing changed their loss of airspeed checklists. I'd guess that it's a reaction to the AF 447 accident.
There are a lot of variables. Stick with Boeing's guidance which isn't 'black and white' because they acknowledge that airmanship needs to be applied to each event.
In the event I was given 4 degrees nose down wouldn't have been enough. It was a nose high event above MAX ALT, similar to the AF 447 accident. So the 'target' you were given might not work in the real life event you experience. Fly the plane, use procedures and SOP's as required, but realize that many techniques might not be appropriate for the event you're experiencing.
Training instructors had many 'rules of thumb' that were based off of low altitude flying. Completely inappropriate for high altitude events. But they didn't teach them as low altitude techniques. They taught them as appropriate for all altitudes AND the checklist led guys to believe the techniques applied at altitude. Months of head banging, and pointing out inappropriate techniqes that were being passed on and suddenly the checklists, and training, were changed on all fleets. And recently Boeing changed their loss of airspeed checklists. I'd guess that it's a reaction to the AF 447 accident.
Last edited by misd-agin; 22nd Jun 2015 at 13:54. Reason: added 'simulator training', typo
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Instructor, with no AOA experience and new on type, had come up his own rules of thumb.
Training instructors had many 'rules of thumb' that were based off of low altitude flying. They taught them as appropriate for all altitudes AND the checklist led guys to believe the techniques applied at altitude.
Training instructors had many 'rules of thumb' that were based off of low altitude flying. They taught them as appropriate for all altitudes AND the checklist led guys to believe the techniques applied at altitude.
This issue is one of the reasons (but, unfortunately, only one of the reasons) that I continue to “beat the drum” for developing an internationally based, on-going effort to standardize the training program content for pilots, instructors, AND evaluators. Of course, there will be differences from airline to airline, and certainly from airplane type to airplane type … but it is imperative that the “basics” of what must be taught and how those basics should be taught MUST be based on an understanding of the capabilities and the limitations of the equipment being used ... and this understanding simply MUST be integral to any and all instructing that takes place.
You’ll not find a more vocal advocate of the use of properly researched, designed, constructed, tested, and approved flight simulators for training and testing of pilots than “yours truly;” BUT the use of those devices MUST be under the direction and the guidance of a properly trained instructor/evaluator who knows how to use this very important equipment – and each of these instructors and evaluators must be able to communicate the necessary information in a manner that is understood, and assimilated, by the respective students.
I have, at times, heard of some who make the analogy between flight simulators and firearms – where both are valuable pieces of equipment that can provide a necessary and important physical performance when engaged in the activities for which these pieces of equipment may be used. I’m not sure that this analogy is completely accurate, BUT, it does point up the reality of just how, and why, it is important that these very different types of equipment must be used appropriately, correctly, and with respect for what they each are capable of doing.
When using either of these pieces of equipment, any unacceptable or incorrect application of a skill or a misinterpretation of a function cannot be dismissed with an “OOPS!” We simply MUST ensure that any student leaving such training takes away the proper and correct understanding of any/all task(s) and a practiced ability, a demonstrated ability, to apply that understanding to the business in which that knowledge and those skills will be applied.
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Do I understand that your ideal would be that all instructors/evaluators worldwide should be to an equal & similar standard? Thus, all pilots, on their respective a/c, would be to the same equal & similar standard? If so I will be on the ramparts blowing my trumpet as loudly as yours.
Whose standard? Ah, there in lies the rub. Vested interested and political egos. But still I will applaud and support the cause.
Whose standard? Ah, there in lies the rub. Vested interested and political egos. But still I will applaud and support the cause.
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RA REACTION THE OLD WAY
"Do any of you have similar 'targets' in mind when completing other manoeuvres that would be food for thought to us all?"
Other manoeuvre-TCAS RA pitch change.
As soon as you get the TA, look at your TAS if displayed, rapidly mentally divide 1000 by that value and use that as a target pitch change.
400kts=2.5 degrees 220kts=5degrees give/take.
Allegedly it guarantees the required 1500'/min which used to be the technique before/in the absence of high-tech displays with nice red sectors to stay outside of.
Try in the sim next time you have a spare minute.
Other manoeuvre-TCAS RA pitch change.
As soon as you get the TA, look at your TAS if displayed, rapidly mentally divide 1000 by that value and use that as a target pitch change.
400kts=2.5 degrees 220kts=5degrees give/take.
Allegedly it guarantees the required 1500'/min which used to be the technique before/in the absence of high-tech displays with nice red sectors to stay outside of.
Try in the sim next time you have a spare minute.
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Perfect example of a low altitute technique not being limited to that area of the flight envelope.
220 KIAS, with a 5 degree pitch change, at higher cruise altitudes is probably closer to 3500 FPM.
Basic rule of thumb is mach x pitch attitude change = FPM. Eg, .8 x 3 degree change = 2400 FPM.
I cringe when guys say they stalled the XYZ in the simulator and it was fairly benign. That's not necessarily how the plane performs. It's just how the SOFTWARE performs. The industry has stated numerous times that current sim modeling does not replicate actual aircraft performance in high altitude, low speed, high AOA events. AB and Boeing have agreed on a generic model for n/b a/c that we should get to experience in the next couple of years. N/B only, apparently w/b's react differently??
220 KIAS, with a 5 degree pitch change, at higher cruise altitudes is probably closer to 3500 FPM.
Basic rule of thumb is mach x pitch attitude change = FPM. Eg, .8 x 3 degree change = 2400 FPM.
I cringe when guys say they stalled the XYZ in the simulator and it was fairly benign. That's not necessarily how the plane performs. It's just how the SOFTWARE performs. The industry has stated numerous times that current sim modeling does not replicate actual aircraft performance in high altitude, low speed, high AOA events. AB and Boeing have agreed on a generic model for n/b a/c that we should get to experience in the next couple of years. N/B only, apparently w/b's react differently??
Of course the marketing department doesn't want the hands on operators to know what a true deep stall would be like with 170+ passengers. We wouldn't ever go near Max altitude and this would highly upset the pencil pushing cubicle dweller bean counters.
I agree Intruder, I must be a bit thick because thats how I fly a TCAS RA.
With the stall I just pitched down to stop the rattle of the stick shaker and then gently pitched back towards the Pitch Limit Indicator.
Appeared to work on the B737, B767 and B777!
With the stall I just pitched down to stop the rattle of the stick shaker and then gently pitched back towards the Pitch Limit Indicator.
Appeared to work on the B737, B767 and B777!
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A high-altitude (30,000'+) stall will require a prolonged nose-down period to accelerate. The pitch attitude and time required will depend on the gross weight and depth of the stall. A quick, too-hard pull into stick shaker (accelerated stall) won't require much pitch down or time to recover, but if airspeed is allowed to bleed to 1 G stall speed, expect several thousand feet of altitude loss and 15-30 seconds to accelerate with 2-5 deg pitch down...
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There are several publications and presentations from the CAA on this matter, and generally the manufacturers FCTM sets the guidelines for the most appropriate recovery methods to cover the majority of scenarios.
Of course, if the stall is due to to external influences, such as temperature inversions resulting in loss of performance or degraded performance margins when flying close to or at the maximum altitudes, not all the guidelines will be effective. Flying over the top of CB activity near maximum with just 1000 or 2000 feet margin to the tops can present a real dilemma to crews as a reduction in altitude may make the situation more complicated. High altitude stall training has been an on-going discussion in the corridors of power, for several years and the CAA published a presentation on this in 2014, although generally, there are so few events that it is not considered a productive exercise with sim costs so high. On the other hand commercial pressure on crew to fly with reduced margins as a result of inaccurate OFPs is on the increase. The update to FMC software showing now ( T) thrust limited or ( B) buffet limited Maximum altitudes on the CRZ pages provides some memory jogging, however, crews often think the 1.3 G margin will automatically be preserved by the FMC, . not so.
An analysis of our company " events" showed the majority were due to operating above the Optimum and then using HDG select without reduced bank angle selected, resulting in loss of performance. All the events were recovered before the stall condition developed but after the " buffet alert" appeared, showing operation less than the target margins. FODA analysis showed just 100-300 feet altitude loss was all that was required to bring the aircraft back to the operating margins, Without doubt, had the full stall condition developed the altitude trade off would have been significantly higher as per other documented events available. Jet upset recovery training is an integral part of the syllabus now and has well documented procedures available.
Of course, if the stall is due to to external influences, such as temperature inversions resulting in loss of performance or degraded performance margins when flying close to or at the maximum altitudes, not all the guidelines will be effective. Flying over the top of CB activity near maximum with just 1000 or 2000 feet margin to the tops can present a real dilemma to crews as a reduction in altitude may make the situation more complicated. High altitude stall training has been an on-going discussion in the corridors of power, for several years and the CAA published a presentation on this in 2014, although generally, there are so few events that it is not considered a productive exercise with sim costs so high. On the other hand commercial pressure on crew to fly with reduced margins as a result of inaccurate OFPs is on the increase. The update to FMC software showing now ( T) thrust limited or ( B) buffet limited Maximum altitudes on the CRZ pages provides some memory jogging, however, crews often think the 1.3 G margin will automatically be preserved by the FMC, . not so.
An analysis of our company " events" showed the majority were due to operating above the Optimum and then using HDG select without reduced bank angle selected, resulting in loss of performance. All the events were recovered before the stall condition developed but after the " buffet alert" appeared, showing operation less than the target margins. FODA analysis showed just 100-300 feet altitude loss was all that was required to bring the aircraft back to the operating margins, Without doubt, had the full stall condition developed the altitude trade off would have been significantly higher as per other documented events available. Jet upset recovery training is an integral part of the syllabus now and has well documented procedures available.
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What that instructor has done is to give you a very limited set of rules to deal with a single set of events. Poor instructional technique that is an industry wide problem.
What he should have done was to give you the knowledge and understanding to deal with the majority of situations rather than a limited set of rules which work in the sun for that single event. They may not be representative of the real aircraft.
What he should have done was to give you the knowledge and understanding to deal with the majority of situations rather than a limited set of rules which work in the sun for that single event. They may not be representative of the real aircraft.
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-4 deg? You guys are talking about initial stall?
I remember reading that a fully develloped stall as it happened with AF447 would require up to 15 nose down to break it off.
I remember reading that a fully develloped stall as it happened with AF447 would require up to 15 nose down to break it off.
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You do what is necessary. "Well m'lud, I set -4 degrees and we still smashed into the ground flatly. What else was I supposed to do? I was only obeying orders."
Take him down to the cells of purgatory!
Take him down to the cells of purgatory!
Thread Starter
In defence of the Instructor he did make the point that breaking the stall is the highest priority and that greater pitch changes may be required Depending on circumstances. His comments were seperate from the Jet Upset training, just the high altitude stall. He presented it as an observation that on many occasions he had seen pilots pitch to just under the pitch limit indicators and that secondary stalls were often seen as a result. The training was quite specific to altitudes and weights that we most often cruise at and shortly after we conducted an exercise of stalling with gear down flap 15 at 3000ft and obviously the briefing regarding priorities and pitch/thrust for that exercise was quite different.
All in all I felt like it was some of the best instruction I have received on the aircraft type in the last eight years. It made me aware of common tendencies toward less than ideal technique for that very specific situation and gave me a way of avoiding the same error by giving me a ball park starting figure.
The instructor most likely knew that I had successfully demonstrated the manoeuvre many times over the years without any specific ' reference ' points ( maybe that's a better word than target) and as such would just see more of the same without adding something, giving me something extra to think about.
Either way, thanks all for your input, very enlightening.
73qanda
All in all I felt like it was some of the best instruction I have received on the aircraft type in the last eight years. It made me aware of common tendencies toward less than ideal technique for that very specific situation and gave me a way of avoiding the same error by giving me a ball park starting figure.
The instructor most likely knew that I had successfully demonstrated the manoeuvre many times over the years without any specific ' reference ' points ( maybe that's a better word than target) and as such would just see more of the same without adding something, giving me something extra to think about.
Either way, thanks all for your input, very enlightening.
73qanda
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Originally Posted by RAT 5
Do I understand that your ideal would be that all instructors/evaluators worldwide should be to an equal & similar standard? Thus, all pilots, on their respective a/c, would be to the same equal & similar standard? If so I will be on the ramparts blowing my trumpet as loudly as yours.
Whose standard? Ah, there in lies the rub. Vested interested and political egos. But still I will applaud and support the cause.
Whose standard? Ah, there in lies the rub. Vested interested and political egos. But still I will applaud and support the cause.
There was a proposal made several years ago at a UK Royal Aeronautical Society meeting where the suggestion was made to do essentially these same things … focusing on simulation – that effort translated into what was necessary for a particular “level” of simulator to have – how that feature had to be included, where the data had to originate, etc. – to be used for particular training or checking tasks. That document was eventually published by ICAO and is available today as ICAO Document 9625.
What I’ve proposed is a similar approach to what is necessary for instructors and evaluators to know, and how they must be trained to use that knowledge. I’ve said for years that in the aviation industry there are usually only 2 things that make it into the training program for airlines … 1) the things that airline management believes to be cost reducing and/or profit increasing and 2) the things mandated by the regulator.
I sincerely believe that an international set of standards for training and competency can, and should, be developed for not only the pilots, but for the instructors and the evaluators. Of course, there will be differences from airline to airline and from airplane type to airplane type – but that doesn’t mean that the basics of what must be taught, learned, and demonstrated has to be compromised. AND I don't mean merely listing what subjects must be taught. I'm talking about what and how the training for these folks has to be conducted - what tasks are representative of the kinds of knowledge and competency that must be present in those who conduct training or evaluations - what standards have to be met - and when ever and where ever possible, specific numbers should be used in those standards. Difficult to do? Of Course! Almost anything, almost everything that is important to achieve is not likely to be easy. So, yes, it will be difficult ... but if it was terribly easy we would have had it long ago. I, for one, am really tired of waiting for someone else to sit up and smell the coffee!
An equally competent group of internationally recognized and accepted specialists, experienced instructors and evaluators, representatives of National Regulatory Authorities, representatives of individual airlines, representatives of pilots, instructors, and evaluators … including the organizations that “represent” these groups … should be able to leave the prejudices at the door and sit down meaningfully to develop a set of logical and achievable standards of competence and capability for pilots, instructors, and evaluators.
I suspect that ICAO would be more than willing to publish such a set of “standards” and that would leave each regulatory authority around the globe with the decision to adopt, or explain why they did not adopt, such an internationally accepted set of standards for these “lynch-pin” positions in the airline industry.
