Flight control check a320
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Hi Speedwinner,
Try https://itunes.apple.com/gb/app/airb...839632065?mt=8
where can I get the safety first magazines of Airbus?
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JS
The silent procedure is against Airbus procedure not mine or yours. I am familiar with 15 different airline procedures including Airbus and I have trained at least 12 of them and none of them follow this silent procedure. When under pressure pilots do fail to check FMA and if both of them are silent then I don't know how any one can be sure that it is checked. And you don't simply say checked you actually read the changes
The silent procedure is against Airbus procedure not mine or yours. I am familiar with 15 different airline procedures including Airbus and I have trained at least 12 of them and none of them follow this silent procedure. When under pressure pilots do fail to check FMA and if both of them are silent then I don't know how any one can be sure that it is checked. And you don't simply say checked you actually read the changes
The PFD order symbol is completely irrelevant for the flight control check and should not be checked. The only screen that's relevant is the flight control SD page.
Same is done for a rigging check, check the upper/lower ECAM.
I am familiar with 15 different airline procedures including Airbus and I have trained at least 12 of them and none of them follow this silent procedure.
This is to keep the PF heads up while taxing.
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Hi Speedwinner, besides the link to the App store that was posted you can also download and save pdf backissues. I find them very informative with pictures 
Try this link
Airbus Safety First Magazine
Try this link
Airbus Safety First Magazine
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tubby linton
According to airbus pilot silently applies full side deflection and checks that the PNF calls are in accordance with the side stick orders and PFD has nothing to do with it. PF does not indicate left or right to avoid a conditioned response. How ever since the airline has paid for the aircraft if they want to disagree nothing can be done. Although time and again airbus has insisted that they should be consulted prior to any changes are envisaged, which I agree because manufacturer is in touch with all operators, airlines only know their own operation they don't have access to hardware, software that goes into the machine. Three years ago two airlines started in Japan from the same base and their procedures were 180 degrees apart. As far as accidents are concerned nothing has happened so far is not much valued philosophy.
According to airbus pilot silently applies full side deflection and checks that the PNF calls are in accordance with the side stick orders and PFD has nothing to do with it. PF does not indicate left or right to avoid a conditioned response. How ever since the airline has paid for the aircraft if they want to disagree nothing can be done. Although time and again airbus has insisted that they should be consulted prior to any changes are envisaged, which I agree because manufacturer is in touch with all operators, airlines only know their own operation they don't have access to hardware, software that goes into the machine. Three years ago two airlines started in Japan from the same base and their procedures were 180 degrees apart. As far as accidents are concerned nothing has happened so far is not much valued philosophy.
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Hello Ladies and Gents,
In the world of man/machine interface there is often a "best" way to accomplish objectives. I would tend to agree with the notion that having done something the same way for a quarter century in no way translates as a "best way" to accomplish an objective.
Flight controls in airbus have been cross controlled and the only way to guard against a second occurrence is to scan the Maltese cross or glance over at the PF's SS which is even more taxing to your scan. Sure the odds are you will never encounter a cross controlled situation but if you do and the PF is experiencing fatigue on that leg you better hope he catches the fact that he's holding SS opposite your call out.
Also, for those flight departments mixing it up with the flight control sequence in hopes of keeping everybody on their toes, you lose a lot for such a gimmicky reason. By testing the same sequence every time you are more likely to catch the cross controlled situation mentioned above if you know what's coming first.
Lets assume two things shall we?
First, that the PM is actually able to tell the difference between full left vs full right and full up vs full down on the SD.
Second, that every pilot in either seat actually performs the checks and doesn't just respond in cadence alone.
Were adults paid to do one thing, lets bring it safely from point A to B.
Last, if you look over at the other guy when he's supposed to say "check" to a call out you'll know what kind of professional you are working with.
I will sometimes look out of the corner of my eye and I noticed that most guys look before responding, a very few guys actually look at the FMA or SD but sometimes after they have already replied "check" and fewer still will not look at all. They are rare and a well know few at my airline.
In the world of man/machine interface there is often a "best" way to accomplish objectives. I would tend to agree with the notion that having done something the same way for a quarter century in no way translates as a "best way" to accomplish an objective.
Flight controls in airbus have been cross controlled and the only way to guard against a second occurrence is to scan the Maltese cross or glance over at the PF's SS which is even more taxing to your scan. Sure the odds are you will never encounter a cross controlled situation but if you do and the PF is experiencing fatigue on that leg you better hope he catches the fact that he's holding SS opposite your call out.
Also, for those flight departments mixing it up with the flight control sequence in hopes of keeping everybody on their toes, you lose a lot for such a gimmicky reason. By testing the same sequence every time you are more likely to catch the cross controlled situation mentioned above if you know what's coming first.
Lets assume two things shall we?
First, that the PM is actually able to tell the difference between full left vs full right and full up vs full down on the SD.
Second, that every pilot in either seat actually performs the checks and doesn't just respond in cadence alone.
Were adults paid to do one thing, lets bring it safely from point A to B.
Last, if you look over at the other guy when he's supposed to say "check" to a call out you'll know what kind of professional you are working with.
I will sometimes look out of the corner of my eye and I noticed that most guys look before responding, a very few guys actually look at the FMA or SD but sometimes after they have already replied "check" and fewer still will not look at all. They are rare and a well know few at my airline.
Early on in my Airbus flying I was cautioned to be more gentle when doing the control check on the rudder as this was a large heavy piece of metal swinging around at the back of the aircraft.
Now I cringe if the other pilot stamps on the pedals too hard.
Now I cringe if the other pilot stamps on the pedals too hard.
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The LH incident happened because the crew only checked full deflection but not for the correct direction of deflection. After the inquiry recommended a more detailed check procedure, the present procedure was introduced. The PNF announces amount and direction of travel and the PF checks that it coincides to the side he has moved the stick.It does not include PFD nor is it required.
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As a slight 'aside', I have often wondered why this 'crosswired' malfunction is not available in the sims I work in (CAE and Thomson/Thales/L3). I did suggest it to the trg mgmt, but......
mcdhu
mcdhu
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JS , first let me preface this by saying that as with many OPs here , the questioning of an Airlines SOP's should be directed to the relevant Airlines FOP's department as we all operate Airbus under various degrees of differences and generally the Aircraft don't fall out of the sky because of these idiosyncrasies . We operate as our particular airline dictates .
The FCTM seems to indicate at least the Rudder check IS to be accomplished in a particular sequence, maybe some could infer that the other flight controls checks follow the same sequence ? Semantics?
The FCOM states that the Maltese cross must not be used for making the check , it doesn't state that it cannot be used to supplement it ? The stipulation is that the SD is the only verification method. If memory serves , (it may have been a "company procedure " long ago) , the Maltese cross was included as an Airbus SOP some time ago ,so perhaps some have kept it in their scan ? Maybe it gives some like Tubby more awareness ?
The FCTM also states under "NO-10 General", "cross cockpit communications" , that modifications to the Flight path , FMGS and changes in speed/Mach MUST be notified by the CM making the mod and MUST be acknowledged by the other CM . I guess some companies have found a way to do this without the "chatter", but most seem to figure that the FMA calls are a good simple way to go .
LH do it their way , it works for them . That Airbus may have issued an NTO doesn't necessarily indicate that they are happy , but merely as it states " they have no tech objection' . That Airbus has kept their procedure intact seems to imply that LH have assumed any responsibility for any incident arising outside of the Manufacturer's recommended procedures .
The "MUSTS v/s MUST NOT's , should and should not's go on and on in Airbus . One example ,is it a must to have Perf TO and Flt Pln pages set to PF/PNF(PM) for take off ? What would you tell your F/O, Capt , Training Capt?
Simple answer to the OP is : check what your Airline wants , not PPrune .
The FCTM seems to indicate at least the Rudder check IS to be accomplished in a particular sequence, maybe some could infer that the other flight controls checks follow the same sequence ? Semantics?
The FCOM states that the Maltese cross must not be used for making the check , it doesn't state that it cannot be used to supplement it ? The stipulation is that the SD is the only verification method. If memory serves , (it may have been a "company procedure " long ago) , the Maltese cross was included as an Airbus SOP some time ago ,so perhaps some have kept it in their scan ? Maybe it gives some like Tubby more awareness ?
The FCTM also states under "NO-10 General", "cross cockpit communications" , that modifications to the Flight path , FMGS and changes in speed/Mach MUST be notified by the CM making the mod and MUST be acknowledged by the other CM . I guess some companies have found a way to do this without the "chatter", but most seem to figure that the FMA calls are a good simple way to go .
LH do it their way , it works for them . That Airbus may have issued an NTO doesn't necessarily indicate that they are happy , but merely as it states " they have no tech objection' . That Airbus has kept their procedure intact seems to imply that LH have assumed any responsibility for any incident arising outside of the Manufacturer's recommended procedures .
The "MUSTS v/s MUST NOT's , should and should not's go on and on in Airbus . One example ,is it a must to have Perf TO and Flt Pln pages set to PF/PNF(PM) for take off ? What would you tell your F/O, Capt , Training Capt?
Simple answer to the OP is : check what your Airline wants , not PPrune .
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Stone_cold
There is no dispute that one will have to be loyal to his pay cheque. I said it differently in post 32. Procedures may differ but English language is not different. How something that must not be done is to be interpreted as can be done? In Rudder check PNF also follows the movement so it is not same as other controls check and importantly rudder is not FBW. Airlines when chooses a procedure that is against the recommendation of the manufacturer they must at least refer it to them to know there are no other complications.
There is no dispute that one will have to be loyal to his pay cheque. I said it differently in post 32. Procedures may differ but English language is not different. How something that must not be done is to be interpreted as can be done? In Rudder check PNF also follows the movement so it is not same as other controls check and importantly rudder is not FBW. Airlines when chooses a procedure that is against the recommendation of the manufacturer they must at least refer it to them to know there are no other complications.
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What do you do if during the aileron check the deflection is just outside the limit? The deflection is too little and on the SD page it does not quite make it all the way up in the box. Suggestions please
Well, I have learnt something. Our company tells us to hold each control demand for 3 seconds to "allow the control surfaces to reach full deflection", which has always seemed a bit nebulous to me, since I can see the full deflection on the SD after about 1 second. They did not tell us that the system performs a self check at full deflection and might therefore flag up a fault if one is found.
For what it's worth, I personally watch the Maltese cross move, then look at the SD and confirm verbally 'full left, full right, neutral' etc, checking also that the Maltese cross and the controls are moving in the same direction. This is not SOP, but given that pilots sometimes just say the words without looking, I personally feel this is a check worth doing. NOTE: I don't use the Maltese cross to confirm full deflection, just the direction of control input.
One only has to watch footage of horrendous, preventable crashes where control locks have not been removed before flight, or a full and free control check has obviously not been done, to realise that a control check is a most vital thing to do before every take-off, and should never be rushed or waived.
For what it's worth, I personally watch the Maltese cross move, then look at the SD and confirm verbally 'full left, full right, neutral' etc, checking also that the Maltese cross and the controls are moving in the same direction. This is not SOP, but given that pilots sometimes just say the words without looking, I personally feel this is a check worth doing. NOTE: I don't use the Maltese cross to confirm full deflection, just the direction of control input.
One only has to watch footage of horrendous, preventable crashes where control locks have not been removed before flight, or a full and free control check has obviously not been done, to realise that a control check is a most vital thing to do before every take-off, and should never be rushed or waived.
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Uplinker
If you follow Airbus you will notice they have given the job of detection of improper operation of FLT CTLS only to the PF, PNF only calls what he sees on SD without knowing what is the correct call. The purpose of this is to avoid a conditioned reflex reaction from the PNF. If you take a cue from Maltese Cross or look at PF's hand it is same as PF announcing the side he is moving the stick . It defeats the purpose. But if your company wants it you will have to do it. One should not make personal additions. Three seconds is no more required as after a modification it detects a fault in half a second.
If you follow Airbus you will notice they have given the job of detection of improper operation of FLT CTLS only to the PF, PNF only calls what he sees on SD without knowing what is the correct call. The purpose of this is to avoid a conditioned reflex reaction from the PNF. If you take a cue from Maltese Cross or look at PF's hand it is same as PF announcing the side he is moving the stick . It defeats the purpose. But if your company wants it you will have to do it. One should not make personal additions. Three seconds is no more required as after a modification it detects a fault in half a second.
Last edited by vilas; 17th Mar 2015 at 09:22.
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Vilas ,
Not sure which "must " you refer to , but I agree it says the maltese cross must not be used for the check . Maybe english language , but it doesn't say that I can't scan it . I interpret it that I can scan whatever I want , as long as I use the indications on the SD as validation . Denti said he looks outside on the surfaces , and is said to operate for a highly recommended operator , I see nothing wrong either as long as they use the SD for validation .
As you say , don't make up things , so for me Airbus( & my company) says call the FMA and use the SD .
I think if the LH guys had not made up things with the AOA issue , we would have had a different outcome . There is nothing wrong with adding to ones situational awareness whilst staying within the ambit of the SOP's .
I said that they state a particular sequence is mentioned ( for the Rudders) and it may lead some flight departments to follow the same for all surfaces . There is nothing to indicate that because the Rudders are not FBW that a rigid sequence is required or vice versa . You are trying to interpret why ? Why is not in the FCOM/FCTM . It just states left then right .
Genuine question here , do the operators who allow "flexible" flight control checks also randomize the rudders ( LH,Easy )???
Giving the NTO obviously gives technical ( no complications) approval , but my point , if you missed it was ,it still goes against the Manufacturer's recommended SOP's . They do not change Airbus SOP's while issuing an NTO whenever a company applies for one ( I do know the process ) . Which indicates that were an incident to occur , Airbus will state that while they had no technical reasons to object to the application , it was against their recommended practices . LH are strong enough to go with that .
If one has such a great issue mitigating conditioned reflex , then perhaps one doesn't belong on the flight deck as our profession IS largely conditioned ,trained and very repetitive in nature . Yes , all of us do make the odd error , but at the same time , a lot of us "add " things and develop methods outside of the music of the SOP's to keep things safe .
Not sure which "must " you refer to , but I agree it says the maltese cross must not be used for the check . Maybe english language , but it doesn't say that I can't scan it . I interpret it that I can scan whatever I want , as long as I use the indications on the SD as validation . Denti said he looks outside on the surfaces , and is said to operate for a highly recommended operator , I see nothing wrong either as long as they use the SD for validation .
As you say , don't make up things , so for me Airbus( & my company) says call the FMA and use the SD .
I think if the LH guys had not made up things with the AOA issue , we would have had a different outcome . There is nothing wrong with adding to ones situational awareness whilst staying within the ambit of the SOP's .
I said that they state a particular sequence is mentioned ( for the Rudders) and it may lead some flight departments to follow the same for all surfaces . There is nothing to indicate that because the Rudders are not FBW that a rigid sequence is required or vice versa . You are trying to interpret why ? Why is not in the FCOM/FCTM . It just states left then right .
Genuine question here , do the operators who allow "flexible" flight control checks also randomize the rudders ( LH,Easy )???
Giving the NTO obviously gives technical ( no complications) approval , but my point , if you missed it was ,it still goes against the Manufacturer's recommended SOP's . They do not change Airbus SOP's while issuing an NTO whenever a company applies for one ( I do know the process ) . Which indicates that were an incident to occur , Airbus will state that while they had no technical reasons to object to the application , it was against their recommended practices . LH are strong enough to go with that .
If one has such a great issue mitigating conditioned reflex , then perhaps one doesn't belong on the flight deck as our profession IS largely conditioned ,trained and very repetitive in nature . Yes , all of us do make the odd error , but at the same time , a lot of us "add " things and develop methods outside of the music of the SOP's to keep things safe .
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Stone_cold
I understand your views but it is not that simple. You can do anything to save your life, sure like AOA issue but not everything you do in the air qualifies as an emergency. If everybody added a little his own then what is the meaning of SOP. Is every co-pilot supposed to keep track of his captain's habits? If company decides to do is different but every pilot adding his own is quiet another. When a company deviates from airbus SOP it has to keep track of all the modifications that take place because the company procedure may need change accordingly which is really the manufacturer's job. Also you are wrong about conditioned reflex it is very much kept in mind while developing procedures. That is why in Airbus procedure there no 70KTS call in reject take off to prevent the pilot from habitually bringing reverse to idle when RW length is critical. For the same reason pilots are not permitted to fly two different type of aircraft because it led to a fatal accident and some incidents.
I understand your views but it is not that simple. You can do anything to save your life, sure like AOA issue but not everything you do in the air qualifies as an emergency. If everybody added a little his own then what is the meaning of SOP. Is every co-pilot supposed to keep track of his captain's habits? If company decides to do is different but every pilot adding his own is quiet another. When a company deviates from airbus SOP it has to keep track of all the modifications that take place because the company procedure may need change accordingly which is really the manufacturer's job. Also you are wrong about conditioned reflex it is very much kept in mind while developing procedures. That is why in Airbus procedure there no 70KTS call in reject take off to prevent the pilot from habitually bringing reverse to idle when RW length is critical. For the same reason pilots are not permitted to fly two different type of aircraft because it led to a fatal accident and some incidents.
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For those who think that airlines know what they are doing when they change their procedures:
http://www.flightglobal.com/news/art...d-a320-339110/
This is Jet Star Australia but this incident has happened to three different airlines. So just because it hasn't happened proves nothing. Procedures have to take into consideration human behaviour, airplane design and operating environment.
http://www.flightglobal.com/news/art...d-a320-339110/
This is Jet Star Australia but this incident has happened to three different airlines. So just because it hasn't happened proves nothing. Procedures have to take into consideration human behaviour, airplane design and operating environment.
Last edited by vilas; 18th Mar 2015 at 03:51.
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Hm! Perhaps Merits for Both?
Pre-T.O. flight control checks are not unique to Ab/B types; any responsible pilot will examine the full range of control surface motion before TO, to 'feel' for unusual resistance (although the tactile feedback may not be available on all airplanes). In addition to flight deck 'feel,' some operating environments provide a ground observer who can see control surfaces that cannot be seen from the driver's seats. That case argues for the in-order sequence, such that the observer knows what to look for.
I'm not clear about why an operator would want them done in random order, but I'm sure someone will clarify for me.
That pre-departure control checks MUST be done is evidenced by countless losses of otherwise healthy airplanes, large and small, that attempted TO with their physical gust-lock restraints still in place. Clearly, they are preventable accidents. When one reaches Vr with an elevator lock still in place, the options are few and, in some cases of limited value. (Hollering, "Oh
," wont' stop the airplane, nor make it fly properly.)
I guess I'd also add that if the aircraft is CVR equipped, having a reliable record that the control surface checks WERE accomplished with satisfactory results, may help to eliminate some of the "Pilot Error" reports that would be more accurately labeled as "Unknown."
Very much like aircraft maintenance procedures (and countless medical procedures,) if the complete, step-by-step routine is not documented (in this case recorded on the CVR), we correctly assume that It Was Not Done. If you do (whatever procedure is required), record or document it as appropriate for the task. As much a we may dislike having to fly by too many rules that seem to override the individual pilot's in-air rights, that is our world. If you perform a given, you'd better have some way to prove it. At the end of the day, boys and girls, if we expect to keep our certificates and job until mandatory retirement.
I'm not clear about why an operator would want them done in random order, but I'm sure someone will clarify for me.
That pre-departure control checks MUST be done is evidenced by countless losses of otherwise healthy airplanes, large and small, that attempted TO with their physical gust-lock restraints still in place. Clearly, they are preventable accidents. When one reaches Vr with an elevator lock still in place, the options are few and, in some cases of limited value. (Hollering, "Oh
," wont' stop the airplane, nor make it fly properly.) I guess I'd also add that if the aircraft is CVR equipped, having a reliable record that the control surface checks WERE accomplished with satisfactory results, may help to eliminate some of the "Pilot Error" reports that would be more accurately labeled as "Unknown."
Very much like aircraft maintenance procedures (and countless medical procedures,) if the complete, step-by-step routine is not documented (in this case recorded on the CVR), we correctly assume that It Was Not Done. If you do (whatever procedure is required), record or document it as appropriate for the task. As much a we may dislike having to fly by too many rules that seem to override the individual pilot's in-air rights, that is our world. If you perform a given, you'd better have some way to prove it. At the end of the day, boys and girls, if we expect to keep our certificates and job until mandatory retirement.
