A320 ADR 1+2 fault , landing gear gravity ext
ADR 2 faults have this note in the MEL-
When the ADR 2 pb-sw is set to OFF, and if the aircraft is in CONF 1+F, the SFCS n°2 Flap channel is unable to crosscheck the airspeed coming from the ADR 1 with the ADR 2 airspeed coming from the SFCS n°2 Slat channel. This may lead to an uncommanded flap retraction during the takeoff. As a consequence, takeoff in CONF 1+F is not permitted when the ADR 2 pb-sw is set to OFF.
When the ADR 2 pb-sw is set to OFF, and if the aircraft is in CONF 1+F, the SFCS n°2 Flap channel is unable to crosscheck the airspeed coming from the ADR 1 with the ADR 2 airspeed coming from the SFCS n°2 Slat channel. This may lead to an uncommanded flap retraction during the takeoff. As a consequence, takeoff in CONF 1+F is not permitted when the ADR 2 pb-sw is set to OFF.
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Right Way Up
Strange! nothing's mentioned in FCOM. As tubby mentioned it can cause unwanted retraction. So it is important. I will check in the sim next time. Thanks anyway.
Strange! nothing's mentioned in FCOM. As tubby mentioned it can cause unwanted retraction. So it is important. I will check in the sim next time. Thanks anyway.
Nothing is mentioned in the FCOMs anymore....so frustrating!
I think your reasoning about the UAS is sound, even for the dual ADR fault no speed is sensed so thinks it is below 100 hence 1+f is selected.
I think your reasoning about the UAS is sound, even for the dual ADR fault no speed is sensed so thinks it is below 100 hence 1+f is selected.
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It looks something like this:
- L/G.............GRVTY EXTN
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Is there any reason to default that valve to "closed" when ADR1+3 fail? The gear is not something critical for such an scenario or that can be easily selected accidentally and it does create a bit more of workload. If the valve would be defaulted to open, would it drop the gear? Or would it need additional inputs (i.e. selecting gear down)?
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The ADR 1+3 doesn't close the safety valve but it is closed any time speed goes beyond 260kt. It cannot be opened without ADR 1 or 3 input. The valve itself will not lower the gear. To remove the protection should not be a problem but for such low possibility event why remove a protection which prevents accidental lowering beyond design speed which may happen more under pressure than double ADR failure.
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Maintenance replaced the gear safety valve among a few other things.
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Captain Mongo
Previously the procedure was to recycle the lever once. It was not necessary to wait for actual retraction because the purpose was to change to other LGCIU which happens with lever recycle. Some operators reported slow operation of the main landing gear (MLG) door opening/closing sequence, leading to the generation of ECAM warnings during the landing gear retraction or extension sequence. An EASA directive was issued for maintenance and repetitive inspections of the components involved. That led operational procedure change to the present one as you rightly did. You can read the directive at:
http://www2.lba.de/dokumente/lta/ad1003135.pdf
Previously the procedure was to recycle the lever once. It was not necessary to wait for actual retraction because the purpose was to change to other LGCIU which happens with lever recycle. Some operators reported slow operation of the main landing gear (MLG) door opening/closing sequence, leading to the generation of ECAM warnings during the landing gear retraction or extension sequence. An EASA directive was issued for maintenance and repetitive inspections of the components involved. That led operational procedure change to the present one as you rightly did. You can read the directive at:
http://www2.lba.de/dokumente/lta/ad1003135.pdf
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Does this procedure applies for specific MSNs or is it for all MSNs? I just checked my FCOM (for A319s up to 23XX and A320s up to 52XX) and apparently it has the "old" procedure of recycling the gear (though it doesn't say how many times, so I'd assume it's just one), waiting for uplock and doors closed before moving the lever down. If unsuccessful, it immediately refers you to gravity gear extension after the 120s "dwell time"
I read the AD and it's specifically says "up to 5 times" as Mongo said and then if unsuccessful, wait 120s and do the gravity extension.
Is the difference because we may have different PN on the whole system which doesn't require the 5 attempts method or is it just that my company has outdated manuals/procedures?
Thanks for the link to the AD, Vilas
I read the AD and it's specifically says "up to 5 times" as Mongo said and then if unsuccessful, wait 120s and do the gravity extension.
Is the difference because we may have different PN on the whole system which doesn't require the 5 attempts method or is it just that my company has outdated manuals/procedures?
Thanks for the link to the AD, Vilas
