A321 & A346:Lemons Of Our Times?
The A342/3 were very good aircraft in their time. Airbus gambled that airlines would be uncomfortable with a wholly twin engine long haul fleet so gave airlines a choice of 2 or 4 engines with a high degree of commonality and a common crew rating. As it turned out safety issues with twins became less and less of an issue. The A330 had a limited range but excellent economics if you didn't need sectors of over 12 hrs. They are still selling well and a re-engine version is likely to be around for a good while.
Airbus made a mistake with the 345/6. The weight is a third more than the 343 and the fuel cost per seat mile is no better (an expert might be able to give precise data). The inflexibility of larger aircraft should be offset by cheaper costs per seat mile (or km). Airbus assumed cheap fuel. SIN - EWR nonstop worked with oil at $30 / barrel. The 77W had far superior economics and sales reflected this.
Was the A330/340 programme a success? Definitely yes. Was the 345/6 development a success? Probably the biggest turkey Airbus have produced. (Lets say the jury is out on the 380.)
The A321 is lighter than the 757 so cheaper to operate but with a shorter range. This is being remedied to some extent by the neo. It has strong competition from the 737-900 but don't overlook the advantages of a wider cabin. I read somewhere, I think anna-aero, that it is becoming the most popular member of the 320 family. As misd-agin says, the order book speaks for itself.
My two penny worth from a commercial viewpoint. I'll leave piloting and cabin crew comments to the experts.
Airbus made a mistake with the 345/6. The weight is a third more than the 343 and the fuel cost per seat mile is no better (an expert might be able to give precise data). The inflexibility of larger aircraft should be offset by cheaper costs per seat mile (or km). Airbus assumed cheap fuel. SIN - EWR nonstop worked with oil at $30 / barrel. The 77W had far superior economics and sales reflected this.
Was the A330/340 programme a success? Definitely yes. Was the 345/6 development a success? Probably the biggest turkey Airbus have produced. (Lets say the jury is out on the 380.)
The A321 is lighter than the 757 so cheaper to operate but with a shorter range. This is being remedied to some extent by the neo. It has strong competition from the 737-900 but don't overlook the advantages of a wider cabin. I read somewhere, I think anna-aero, that it is becoming the most popular member of the 320 family. As misd-agin says, the order book speaks for itself.
My two penny worth from a commercial viewpoint. I'll leave piloting and cabin crew comments to the experts.
Last edited by Peter47; 16th Aug 2014 at 19:09.
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07-APR-2007
Correction: the real lemons were A345/6 not A321!
Carriers ponder compensation claims against Airbus for overweight aircraft
Airlines are considering suing Airbus after the aircraft manufacturer warned them that the front-end of the A346 was dangerously overweight.
The problem is caused by heavier than expected first and business-class areas and airlines have been told to reduce the amount of cargo they carry to rebalance the aircraft.
The first and business class sections on some A346s are so heavy that they are pushing the jet’s nose down during flight, which can play havoc with the aerodynamics and potentially endanger passengers and crew.
Flying nose down also increases drag off the wings and forces the aircraft to burn more fuel.
Airbus has recommended that airlines carry about five tonnes less cargo in the front of the plane to compensate, a reduction of nearly 10 per cent in its total cargo capacity.
Airbus says that the airlines are to blame for fitting premium cabins with full-sized beds, heavy furniture and weighty entertainment systems.
However, aviation sources statedthat a number of airlines are insisting that it is Airbus’s error.
The airlines believe Airbus has incorrectly stated the maximum weight for front-end cabins and they are considering suing for lost cargo income.
Recent estimates show that a commercial airliner flying one tonne overweight costs the equivalent of 12 passengers everyday.
Assuming that the A346s are flying five tonnes overweight, each jet is losing income equivalent to 21,900 passengers a year.
If the airlines can prove their case, they could claim hundreds of millions of dollars in compensation from Airbus.
The A346is flown by numerous airlines with Virgin Atlantic, Lufthansa and Iberia operating the largest fleets.
These airlines were unavailable for comment yesterday.
An Airbus spokesman said: “As premium cabin interiors become more customised, the added weight of customisation must also be taken into account as a factor in the overall loading of the aircraft. A heavier cabin in the front section where premium cabin products are normally placed therefore could reduce the cargo loading capacity in that section.”
The A346, at 75 metres, is longer even than the A388, and typically seats 380.
Doug McVitie, the director of Arran Aerospace, said: “The A346 is a piece of spaghetti with wings. Anything heavy at the front will therefore throw off the centre of gravity and that causes all sorts of problems.”
Carriers ponder compensation claims against Airbus for overweight aircraft
Airlines are considering suing Airbus after the aircraft manufacturer warned them that the front-end of the A346 was dangerously overweight.
The problem is caused by heavier than expected first and business-class areas and airlines have been told to reduce the amount of cargo they carry to rebalance the aircraft.
The first and business class sections on some A346s are so heavy that they are pushing the jet’s nose down during flight, which can play havoc with the aerodynamics and potentially endanger passengers and crew.
Flying nose down also increases drag off the wings and forces the aircraft to burn more fuel.
Airbus has recommended that airlines carry about five tonnes less cargo in the front of the plane to compensate, a reduction of nearly 10 per cent in its total cargo capacity.
Airbus says that the airlines are to blame for fitting premium cabins with full-sized beds, heavy furniture and weighty entertainment systems.
However, aviation sources statedthat a number of airlines are insisting that it is Airbus’s error.
The airlines believe Airbus has incorrectly stated the maximum weight for front-end cabins and they are considering suing for lost cargo income.
Recent estimates show that a commercial airliner flying one tonne overweight costs the equivalent of 12 passengers everyday.
Assuming that the A346s are flying five tonnes overweight, each jet is losing income equivalent to 21,900 passengers a year.
If the airlines can prove their case, they could claim hundreds of millions of dollars in compensation from Airbus.
The A346is flown by numerous airlines with Virgin Atlantic, Lufthansa and Iberia operating the largest fleets.
These airlines were unavailable for comment yesterday.
An Airbus spokesman said: “As premium cabin interiors become more customised, the added weight of customisation must also be taken into account as a factor in the overall loading of the aircraft. A heavier cabin in the front section where premium cabin products are normally placed therefore could reduce the cargo loading capacity in that section.”
The A346, at 75 metres, is longer even than the A388, and typically seats 380.
Doug McVitie, the director of Arran Aerospace, said: “The A346 is a piece of spaghetti with wings. Anything heavy at the front will therefore throw off the centre of gravity and that causes all sorts of problems.”
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Originally Posted by Winnerhofer
The first and business class sections on some A346s are so heavy that they are pushing the jet’s nose down during flight, which can play havoc with the aerodynamics and potentially endanger passengers and crew.
Flying nose down also increases drag off the wings and forces the aircraft to burn more fuel.
Flying nose down also increases drag off the wings and forces the aircraft to burn more fuel.
.I haven't read such stupidity in a while.
If an aircraft is flying nose down, it is descending rapidly.
An overweight aircraft flying nose down is descending even more rapidly.
A positive angle of attack is required for level flight.
An aircraft carrying a high weight needs an even higher nose attitude than a lightly loaded one.
Flying nose down indeed..
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Originally Posted by Winnerhofer
Correction: the real lemons were A345/6 not A321!
The first and business class sections on some A346s are so heavy that they are pushing the jet’s nose down during flight, which can play havoc with the aerodynamics and potentially endanger passengers and crew.
This requires a higher angle of attack and therefore generates more drag which has to be overcome by engine power, requiring more fuel.
A rearward C of G requires up force from the tailplane which adds to the total lift, reducing what the wings need to produce and lowering fuel consumption.
As long as the loading is carried out within the certified limits no one is in any danger. A nose down pitching tendency is preferable to a nose up one which lowers airspeed and can lead to a stall.
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He Flew Thinking It Was An A320...
Hard Landing Not Reported
Airbus A321-211. Substantial damage. No injuries.
The copilot was undergoing his first two sectors of line training during flights between Manchester, England, and Ibiza, Spain, on July 18, 2008. The commander, a training captain, reviewed the copilot’s file before departing from Manchester and found that the copilot, who had received base training in the A320, was having difficulty landing the A321, said the report by the U.K. Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB).
During the flight, the commander briefed the copilot on the differences between landing the A321 and the A320, which is smaller and lighter. “The commander instructed the copilot that he would ‘talk him through’ the landing and specifically that he would instruct him to check the rate of descent with a nose-up sidestick input at 20 ft above touchdown,” the report said. The copilot had been taught to flare the A320 at 30 ft.
The copilot flared the A321 too late at Ibiza, and the landing was described as “firm.” The commander decided to fly the return leg to Manchester and transfer control to the copilot for the approach and landing.
The copilot conducted the approach to Manchester with the autopilot disengaged and the autothrottle engaged. “The commander gave a coaching narrative during the final moments before touchdown but, as the copilot closed the thrust levers, realized that the landing was ‘going to go wrong,’” the report said. “The aircraft touched down firmly and bounced. The commander stated that he considered taking control but noted that the copilot appeared to be holding the aircraft’s attitude and that intervention was not necessary.”
The copilot later told investigators that he had become confused by the commander’s coaching. The report noted that despite the commander’s perception of differences in landing technique, the procedure established for the A320 also is applicable to the A321.
After parking the aircraft on stand, the commander and copilot discussed the landing and agreed that it had not been a “hard” landing. However, the commander also asked company line engineers who had flown as passengers if they thought it had been a hard landing. “They replied that if no ‘load 15 report’ had been produced on the flight deck printer and the commander did not consider the landing to have been heavy, then in their opinion no action needed to be taken,” the report said.
A load 15 report is generated when certain parameters — including descent rate, vertical acceleration and gross weight — are exceeded on landing. A load 15 report and/or a commander’s report of a hard landing typically requires a follow-up engineering inspection for structural damage. Although a load 15 report had been generated after the landing in Manchester, the aircraft’s data management unit had not been programmed to automatically print the report. The commander was unaware that a load 15 report was available only by manual interrogation of the unit.
Two more flights were conducted in the A321 before the load 15 report was found during an unrelated engineering inspection of the landing gear. The report showed a vertical acceleration of 2.7 g during the touchdown at Manchester. Further examination of the aircraft revealed that the hard landing — categorized by engineers as “severe hard,” according to the report — had caused a crack in the forward lug of the left main landing gear support rib.
Airbus A321-211. Substantial damage. No injuries.
The copilot was undergoing his first two sectors of line training during flights between Manchester, England, and Ibiza, Spain, on July 18, 2008. The commander, a training captain, reviewed the copilot’s file before departing from Manchester and found that the copilot, who had received base training in the A320, was having difficulty landing the A321, said the report by the U.K. Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB).
During the flight, the commander briefed the copilot on the differences between landing the A321 and the A320, which is smaller and lighter. “The commander instructed the copilot that he would ‘talk him through’ the landing and specifically that he would instruct him to check the rate of descent with a nose-up sidestick input at 20 ft above touchdown,” the report said. The copilot had been taught to flare the A320 at 30 ft.
The copilot flared the A321 too late at Ibiza, and the landing was described as “firm.” The commander decided to fly the return leg to Manchester and transfer control to the copilot for the approach and landing.
The copilot conducted the approach to Manchester with the autopilot disengaged and the autothrottle engaged. “The commander gave a coaching narrative during the final moments before touchdown but, as the copilot closed the thrust levers, realized that the landing was ‘going to go wrong,’” the report said. “The aircraft touched down firmly and bounced. The commander stated that he considered taking control but noted that the copilot appeared to be holding the aircraft’s attitude and that intervention was not necessary.”
The copilot later told investigators that he had become confused by the commander’s coaching. The report noted that despite the commander’s perception of differences in landing technique, the procedure established for the A320 also is applicable to the A321.
After parking the aircraft on stand, the commander and copilot discussed the landing and agreed that it had not been a “hard” landing. However, the commander also asked company line engineers who had flown as passengers if they thought it had been a hard landing. “They replied that if no ‘load 15 report’ had been produced on the flight deck printer and the commander did not consider the landing to have been heavy, then in their opinion no action needed to be taken,” the report said.
A load 15 report is generated when certain parameters — including descent rate, vertical acceleration and gross weight — are exceeded on landing. A load 15 report and/or a commander’s report of a hard landing typically requires a follow-up engineering inspection for structural damage. Although a load 15 report had been generated after the landing in Manchester, the aircraft’s data management unit had not been programmed to automatically print the report. The commander was unaware that a load 15 report was available only by manual interrogation of the unit.
Two more flights were conducted in the A321 before the load 15 report was found during an unrelated engineering inspection of the landing gear. The report showed a vertical acceleration of 2.7 g during the touchdown at Manchester. Further examination of the aircraft revealed that the hard landing — categorized by engineers as “severe hard,” according to the report — had caused a crack in the forward lug of the left main landing gear support rib.
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Tail Strike During Go-Around
Airbus A321-211. Minor damage. No injuries.
The A321 was en route the evening of Dec. 23, 2011, from Austria with 182 passengers and six crewmembers to Manchester, England, which was reporting surface winds from 320 degrees at 16 to 27 kt, scattered clouds and light rain showers. The aircraft encountered turbulence as it descended through 1,500 ft above ground level (AGL) during the instrument landing system (ILS) approach to Manchester’s Runway 23R.
“The copilot [the pilot flying] disengaged the autothrust system as briefed, and, with turbulence increasing as the aircraft descended, the commander increased the approach speed target by 5 kt,” said the report by the U.K. Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB). “Slightly below 1,000 ft, the copilot disengaged the autopilot.”
Aircraft control became increasingly difficult as the A321 descended below 400 ft, and the copilot had to make nearly continuous roll inputs, occasionally with full sidestick deflection. “By about 100 ft, the situation had become worse, and shortly afterwards, he initiated a go-around,” the report said, noting that recorded flight data showed a wind shear from a 4-kt tailwind component to an 8-kt headwind component.
The crew set TOGA (takeoff/go-around) thrust, and the copilot rotated the aircraft to a 10-degree nose-up pitch attitude. “Almost simultaneously, the crew sensed a severe downdraft which caused the aircraft to sink and the main gear to make contact with the runway,” the report said. Flight data showed that the 8-kt headwind component had sheared to an 8-kt tailwind component as the go-around was initiated.
The crew completed the go-around and then added 10 kt to the target airspeed for the second approach. The aircraft again encountered wind shear, which caused a 10- to 15-kt airspeed loss close to the runway, but the copilot landed the Airbus without further incident.
“During the commander’s external inspection after arriving on stand, he discovered damage to the lower rear fuselage skin and suspected that the aircraft had suffered a tail strike during the go-around manoeuvre,” the report said. “An engineering inspection confirmed that the aircraft would be unable to operate the return sector pending further maintenance action.”
Airbus A321-211. Minor damage. No injuries.
The A321 was en route the evening of Dec. 23, 2011, from Austria with 182 passengers and six crewmembers to Manchester, England, which was reporting surface winds from 320 degrees at 16 to 27 kt, scattered clouds and light rain showers. The aircraft encountered turbulence as it descended through 1,500 ft above ground level (AGL) during the instrument landing system (ILS) approach to Manchester’s Runway 23R.
“The copilot [the pilot flying] disengaged the autothrust system as briefed, and, with turbulence increasing as the aircraft descended, the commander increased the approach speed target by 5 kt,” said the report by the U.K. Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB). “Slightly below 1,000 ft, the copilot disengaged the autopilot.”
Aircraft control became increasingly difficult as the A321 descended below 400 ft, and the copilot had to make nearly continuous roll inputs, occasionally with full sidestick deflection. “By about 100 ft, the situation had become worse, and shortly afterwards, he initiated a go-around,” the report said, noting that recorded flight data showed a wind shear from a 4-kt tailwind component to an 8-kt headwind component.
The crew set TOGA (takeoff/go-around) thrust, and the copilot rotated the aircraft to a 10-degree nose-up pitch attitude. “Almost simultaneously, the crew sensed a severe downdraft which caused the aircraft to sink and the main gear to make contact with the runway,” the report said. Flight data showed that the 8-kt headwind component had sheared to an 8-kt tailwind component as the go-around was initiated.
The crew completed the go-around and then added 10 kt to the target airspeed for the second approach. The aircraft again encountered wind shear, which caused a 10- to 15-kt airspeed loss close to the runway, but the copilot landed the Airbus without further incident.
“During the commander’s external inspection after arriving on stand, he discovered damage to the lower rear fuselage skin and suspected that the aircraft had suffered a tail strike during the go-around manoeuvre,” the report said. “An engineering inspection confirmed that the aircraft would be unable to operate the return sector pending further maintenance action.”
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Juggling Act
Another Data-Entry Error
Airbus A321-211. No damage. No injuries.
While departing from Manchester, England, the morning of April 29, 2011, for a flight to Crete with 223 passengers and eight crewmembers aboard, the commander noticed that the sidestick controller “felt heavy” on rotation. After the A321 lifted off the runway, he noticed an indication on his PFD that VLS, the lowest selectable speed providing an appropriate margin to the stall speed, was increasing abnormally.
“He reduced the pitch attitude and covered the thrust levers in case more power was required,” said the report by the U.K. Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB). “The aircraft accelerated and climbed, but at a slower-than-normal rate.”
En route to Crete, the flight crew checked their takeoff performance calculations and found that they were incorrect. The commander filed an incident report, and investigators found that the commander inadvertently had read aloud the zero fuel weight, 69,638 kg (153,526 lb), from the load sheet, rather than the actual takeoff weight, 86,527 kg (190,759 lb).
Both pilots entered the incorrect takeoff weight and other data in their laptop computers, which calculated V1 as 131 kt, VR as 134 kt and V2 as 135 kt; the correct speeds were 155 kt for both V1 and VR, and 156 kt for V2. The data-entry error also resulted in a calculated power setting that was too low for the planned reduced-thrust, or flex, takeoff.
The report said that the crew did not thoroughly cross-check the takeoff performance calculations by the laptops against those by the FMS, which would have shown discrepancies in the takeoff weight and the “green dot speed,” the speed to be used if a takeoff is continued after an engine failure.
“There have been a significant number of reported incidents and several accidents resulting from errors in takeoff performance calculations around the world in recent years,” the report said (see, “Safety in Numbers”). “Industry awareness of the frequency of these errors has been raised, but a solution has yet to be found.”
Airbus A321-211. No damage. No injuries.
While departing from Manchester, England, the morning of April 29, 2011, for a flight to Crete with 223 passengers and eight crewmembers aboard, the commander noticed that the sidestick controller “felt heavy” on rotation. After the A321 lifted off the runway, he noticed an indication on his PFD that VLS, the lowest selectable speed providing an appropriate margin to the stall speed, was increasing abnormally.
“He reduced the pitch attitude and covered the thrust levers in case more power was required,” said the report by the U.K. Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB). “The aircraft accelerated and climbed, but at a slower-than-normal rate.”
En route to Crete, the flight crew checked their takeoff performance calculations and found that they were incorrect. The commander filed an incident report, and investigators found that the commander inadvertently had read aloud the zero fuel weight, 69,638 kg (153,526 lb), from the load sheet, rather than the actual takeoff weight, 86,527 kg (190,759 lb).
Both pilots entered the incorrect takeoff weight and other data in their laptop computers, which calculated V1 as 131 kt, VR as 134 kt and V2 as 135 kt; the correct speeds were 155 kt for both V1 and VR, and 156 kt for V2. The data-entry error also resulted in a calculated power setting that was too low for the planned reduced-thrust, or flex, takeoff.
The report said that the crew did not thoroughly cross-check the takeoff performance calculations by the laptops against those by the FMS, which would have shown discrepancies in the takeoff weight and the “green dot speed,” the speed to be used if a takeoff is continued after an engine failure.
“There have been a significant number of reported incidents and several accidents resulting from errors in takeoff performance calculations around the world in recent years,” the report said (see, “Safety in Numbers”). “Industry awareness of the frequency of these errors has been raised, but a solution has yet to be found.”
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Whatever happened to the custom and practice of "Gross Error Checks" in connection with performance?
Or have the techno-obsessed management and training departments of modern airlines permanently excised this aspect of 'airmanship'?
Oops, have I just used some foul language and now merit a ban......?
Or have the techno-obsessed management and training departments of modern airlines permanently excised this aspect of 'airmanship'?
Oops, have I just used some foul language and now merit a ban......?
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Originally Posted by Winnerhofer
“The commander instructed the copilot that he would ‘talk him through’ the landing and specifically that he would instruct him to check the rate of descent with a nose-up sidestick input at 20 ft above touchdown,” the report said. The copilot had been taught to flare the A320 at 30 ft.
