AF 447 Thread No. 12
@machinbird
"At present, the most critical element in an aircraft is the man/woman in control. How he perceives, how he analyzes, what he does, is under control of a brain that has been hard-wired to handle fear since before we became men. Some of the things that are hard wired in stressful, fear-inducing conditions are contrary to common sense and survival while in control of an aircraft."
'Twas ever so....
I need to post one last comment..... Air Indonesia, MetroJet, AF.
Different types, but All Airbus.
1. Normal cruise established, or normal climb (Metro)
2. Abnormal, leading to loss of a/p (and Normal Law) (pitch remains in normal law)
3. Crazy Climb, not consistent with pilot's limited Pitch authority: g load factor.
4. Loss of control.
5. Loss of aircraft.
Each climb was beyond "robust" and imo, exceeding pilots limited stick due Normal Law pitch prohibitions at elevator.
In AF447. Climb reached 7000fpm, and "maximum" g load of +1.75
In Perpignan, we know also the airframe limited pilot's authority. (Is gload available in report?)
I submit that even if duBois was present at the beginning of the abnormal (a/p loss) and 'Commanded' Bonin to climb at the demonstrated rate, he could not.
The Airbus will not allow the pilot to climb in that fashion.
Unfortunately, that may introduce another look at the aircraft?
"At present, the most critical element in an aircraft is the man/woman in control. How he perceives, how he analyzes, what he does, is under control of a brain that has been hard-wired to handle fear since before we became men. Some of the things that are hard wired in stressful, fear-inducing conditions are contrary to common sense and survival while in control of an aircraft."
'Twas ever so....
I need to post one last comment..... Air Indonesia, MetroJet, AF.
Different types, but All Airbus.
1. Normal cruise established, or normal climb (Metro)
2. Abnormal, leading to loss of a/p (and Normal Law) (pitch remains in normal law)
3. Crazy Climb, not consistent with pilot's limited Pitch authority: g load factor.
4. Loss of control.
5. Loss of aircraft.
Each climb was beyond "robust" and imo, exceeding pilots limited stick due Normal Law pitch prohibitions at elevator.
In AF447. Climb reached 7000fpm, and "maximum" g load of +1.75
In Perpignan, we know also the airframe limited pilot's authority. (Is gload available in report?)
I submit that even if duBois was present at the beginning of the abnormal (a/p loss) and 'Commanded' Bonin to climb at the demonstrated rate, he could not.
The Airbus will not allow the pilot to climb in that fashion.
Unfortunately, that may introduce another look at the aircraft?
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3. I do not think so... Full back stick will give you +2.5G in normal law, that's more than enough to "satellize" you in a very short time.
Are you implying that Airbus makes aircraft that climb without being asked ? or that climb more than they're asked ?
And the pilot IS able to command +2.5G or alpha max, in normal law : he just has to maintain his full back stick input.
Are you implying that Airbus makes aircraft that climb without being asked ? or that climb more than they're asked ?
And the pilot IS able to command +2.5G or alpha max, in normal law : he just has to maintain his full back stick input.
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Mach, #1241, 
fearful, surprise.
http://www.icao.int/Meetings/LOCI/Pr...Strategies.pdf
http://www98.griffith.edu.au/dspace/...pdf?sequence=1
N.B. Fear-potential startle.
Many aspects of the industry's response to accidents, and seen in this thread, is that the focus of safety activity is based on the outcome of events.
' The aircraft was out of control and crashed because the pilots could not recover ' and with all of the suppositions in that line of thought the focus is on recovery.
By considering why the crew manoeuvred into the upset condition would provide and alternative view which would focus on how to avoid these conditions.
A wider view still would include all of the 'inappropriate control actions' **. Similarly why these accidents also report poor or no CRM. All of these are features of surprise, the inability to understand, communicate, and 'acute stress response' activity.
** remember the safety initiative " Engine malfunction and inappropriate crew response " many years ago. There were many LoC outcomes, primarily because the crew failed to understand the situation and / or the control actions were inconsistent for the condition.
fearful, surprise.
http://www.icao.int/Meetings/LOCI/Pr...Strategies.pdf
http://www98.griffith.edu.au/dspace/...pdf?sequence=1
N.B. Fear-potential startle.
Many aspects of the industry's response to accidents, and seen in this thread, is that the focus of safety activity is based on the outcome of events.
' The aircraft was out of control and crashed because the pilots could not recover ' and with all of the suppositions in that line of thought the focus is on recovery.
By considering why the crew manoeuvred into the upset condition would provide and alternative view which would focus on how to avoid these conditions.
A wider view still would include all of the 'inappropriate control actions' **. Similarly why these accidents also report poor or no CRM. All of these are features of surprise, the inability to understand, communicate, and 'acute stress response' activity.
** remember the safety initiative " Engine malfunction and inappropriate crew response " many years ago. There were many LoC outcomes, primarily because the crew failed to understand the situation and / or the control actions were inconsistent for the condition.
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I have read somewhere that Fear is the leprosy of aviation. How does training handle it ? Will Uprt-Loc training adress it ?
Example: All attitude jet unusual attitude recovery using nothing more than needle ball and airspeed and altimeter while flying under "the bag". (There was no peeking out from under the bag.)
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However I do believe that military pilots who have to handle fear on a daily basis are much better equipped than us civilians to manage emergencies.
fear
jmo....
Fear is not a disease. Fear is a naturally occurring emotion that has kept the species alive lo these thousands of generations.
Courage is not fearlessness. If one's fear is so unmanageable that it turns often into panic, one should not risk another's life on his mental state.
Fear can be healthy. Panic is never positive. Panic is our makers last resort to keep us alive. Freeze, and maybe be unseen by the monster....
Cultivating the only defense against fear is a lifelong goal. That defense is Confidence, based on experience, alluded to by Mr. Machinbird...Phantom?
Fear is not a disease. Fear is a naturally occurring emotion that has kept the species alive lo these thousands of generations.
Courage is not fearlessness. If one's fear is so unmanageable that it turns often into panic, one should not risk another's life on his mental state.
Fear can be healthy. Panic is never positive. Panic is our makers last resort to keep us alive. Freeze, and maybe be unseen by the monster....
Cultivating the only defense against fear is a lifelong goal. That defense is Confidence, based on experience, alluded to by Mr. Machinbird...Phantom?
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Fear is the one thing that will make you pull on your stick even though you rationally know it is not by pulling that you will get the optimum glide.
Hence you should manage it.
Hence you should manage it.
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The difference between a fear inducing situation and a demanding one is the recognition that you have the tools and knowledge to manage the situation.
You may possess the tools and knowledge to handle a hairy situation, but if you do not recognize that fact you are in trouble.
Some personalities move early on to panic when confronted with adversity. If you are one of those, then it would probably be best if you do not occupy the pointy end of an aircraft. I do suspect that with deliberate effort, some could overcome an early panic tendency, but it would not be easy.
I am not a psychologist but as a former military flight instructor, I have seen students freeze up at inopportune times.
Their ears stop working, their minds are overloaded, and they keep right on doing the thing that would kill us in a few seconds if I let it go on. As I said, you have to take people out of their comfort zone, then give them the tools to succeed. But first, you have to get their attention.
You may possess the tools and knowledge to handle a hairy situation, but if you do not recognize that fact you are in trouble.
Some personalities move early on to panic when confronted with adversity. If you are one of those, then it would probably be best if you do not occupy the pointy end of an aircraft. I do suspect that with deliberate effort, some could overcome an early panic tendency, but it would not be easy.
I am not a psychologist but as a former military flight instructor, I have seen students freeze up at inopportune times.
Their ears stop working, their minds are overloaded, and they keep right on doing the thing that would kill us in a few seconds if I let it go on. As I said, you have to take people out of their comfort zone, then give them the tools to succeed. But first, you have to get their attention.
fear
@Machinbird
" The difference between a fear inducing situation and a demanding one is the recognition that you have the tools and knowledge to manage the situation. "
At the risk of focusing too much on vocabulary, fear is and should be expected to be demanding.
My very first flight instructor was an ex carrier Corsair pilot. He was an aviator of consummate skill, and evoked reverence and respect in any group.
One could say he was fearless. One night he was flying home from a business meeting in LA to an airport in Northern Calif.
At night, in mist, he executed two missed approaches to the correct runway, and on his third, (fearlessly?) he flew onto the roof of a shopping center. His light twin, with his buddy in the right seat, exploded in flames. Many died. He mistook the parking lot lights for approach lights. Bad gamble.
A wise and prudent man uses his instincts and training to inform his actions. Knowing when one should allow sufficient fear to inform his actions is the mark of a professional?
447 and fear? The CVR transcript doesn't report fear. Impatience? Confusion? Anger? All these. Even at 10,000 feet Bonin makes a bad joke: "Climb? Let's hope so, we are passing ten thousand...."
The expectation of all ATPL airmen should be "if you panic, you need to find another job"........ No?
" The difference between a fear inducing situation and a demanding one is the recognition that you have the tools and knowledge to manage the situation. "
At the risk of focusing too much on vocabulary, fear is and should be expected to be demanding.
My very first flight instructor was an ex carrier Corsair pilot. He was an aviator of consummate skill, and evoked reverence and respect in any group.
One could say he was fearless. One night he was flying home from a business meeting in LA to an airport in Northern Calif.
At night, in mist, he executed two missed approaches to the correct runway, and on his third, (fearlessly?) he flew onto the roof of a shopping center. His light twin, with his buddy in the right seat, exploded in flames. Many died. He mistook the parking lot lights for approach lights. Bad gamble.
A wise and prudent man uses his instincts and training to inform his actions. Knowing when one should allow sufficient fear to inform his actions is the mark of a professional?
447 and fear? The CVR transcript doesn't report fear. Impatience? Confusion? Anger? All these. Even at 10,000 feet Bonin makes a bad joke: "Climb? Let's hope so, we are passing ten thousand...."
The expectation of all ATPL airmen should be "if you panic, you need to find another job"........ No?
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Concours77
Sorry about the loss of your flight instructor in what seems to be a needless accident.
As one who has operated in the aircraft carrier environment, I can guarantee you that he was not fearless. Instead, it is more likely that many situations that would frighten less experienced pilots were familiar to him and thus not particularly frightening to him.
But he was still a human, and humans make mistakes. They allow themselves to be influenced by others, they mis-perceive situations, and they even become complacent. One of these human failings likely caught up with him and caused his demise.
Regarding AF447, there is plentiful evidence of fear in Bonin starting with the unnecessary ham handed use of the flight controls, task saturation, audio channel saturation, probable tunnel vision, and gross violation of procedures. Bonin's "joke" could also be considered gallows humor in a person who knows he is beaten by a situation he does not understand.
Sorry about the loss of your flight instructor in what seems to be a needless accident.
One could say he was fearless.
But he was still a human, and humans make mistakes. They allow themselves to be influenced by others, they mis-perceive situations, and they even become complacent. One of these human failings likely caught up with him and caused his demise.
Regarding AF447, there is plentiful evidence of fear in Bonin starting with the unnecessary ham handed use of the flight controls, task saturation, audio channel saturation, probable tunnel vision, and gross violation of procedures. Bonin's "joke" could also be considered gallows humor in a person who knows he is beaten by a situation he does not understand.
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I have not found this bad joke at 10 000' (maybe 4000), but the rhs copilot did say "i've been keeping full nose up this whole time" (translation translates very well here, no ambiguity), which is "funny" because the key to the accident was just here.
fear, muscle memory
Hi,
Without audio, (447 CVR) it is impossible to make any theory about "emotion".
With the Corsair pilot's death, I reverted to having only one God....and I have had but one since.
My personal theory about the (Corsair pilot) crash involves muscle memory, and rapid control movement, fed by "get home itis."
When pilot saw he was not over the runway threshold, he reverted to muscle memory, an unfortunate one. "Pull the stick, firewall the throttle." But he was not flying a Corsair, he was flying a Beech twin....
The aircraft made a small hole in the roof, not a long gash. He should have pulled the stick, and firewalled the throttles......arse about.
As to 447, the reason this discussion is eight years on, and twelve threads in, is because we yak about the part of the flight path that is fundamentally irrelevant. What was the status and attitude of the aircraft at the most important moment in the flight? As the A/P quit, and the a/c was four hundred feet low, Nose Down, and the Stall Warn was active? Oh, and rolled right?
It is the interface, Machinbird, as you say. The human is being evolved out of the equation, replaced by ever more "dependable" automation. Emotion and intuition are poison, data and speed are paramount.
One of the reasons it takes me too long to write this is my IPad's "autocorrect" I spend too much time correcting autocorrect: "What's it doing now?"
Thank God the I pad doesn't fly......wait a minute.......
Without audio, (447 CVR) it is impossible to make any theory about "emotion".
With the Corsair pilot's death, I reverted to having only one God....and I have had but one since.
My personal theory about the (Corsair pilot) crash involves muscle memory, and rapid control movement, fed by "get home itis."
When pilot saw he was not over the runway threshold, he reverted to muscle memory, an unfortunate one. "Pull the stick, firewall the throttle." But he was not flying a Corsair, he was flying a Beech twin....
The aircraft made a small hole in the roof, not a long gash. He should have pulled the stick, and firewalled the throttles......arse about.
As to 447, the reason this discussion is eight years on, and twelve threads in, is because we yak about the part of the flight path that is fundamentally irrelevant. What was the status and attitude of the aircraft at the most important moment in the flight? As the A/P quit, and the a/c was four hundred feet low, Nose Down, and the Stall Warn was active? Oh, and rolled right?
It is the interface, Machinbird, as you say. The human is being evolved out of the equation, replaced by ever more "dependable" automation. Emotion and intuition are poison, data and speed are paramount.
One of the reasons it takes me too long to write this is my IPad's "autocorrect" I spend too much time correcting autocorrect: "What's it doing now?"
Thank God the I pad doesn't fly......wait a minute.......
Last edited by Concours77; 17th Jan 2017 at 15:26.
Surprise represents the difference between expectations and reality.
Fear is a natural response to perceived danger, which usually depends on prior knowledge.
'Startle response' is an unconscious reaction to a sudden or threatening situation (fight or flight). Startle involves automatic (subconscious) reaction and reduced cognitive ability; the focus of attention is towards the perceived threat leading to tunnel vision and the need to act. The startle response could continue if the actions do not effect a recovery, deepening the startle and reinforcing the chosen action, even if, in hindsight, this is wrong.
Startle could be reduced by avoiding surprising situations, by understanding and enhancing the recognition of startle, and being prepared (experienced) to manage an undesired state. Like error, startle cannot be irradiated, thus avoidance, detection, recovery and mitigation aspects apply.
Self-confidence and experience are important defences, particularly those which improve the perception of surprising situations and time available for actions.
Self-confidence could be improved with exposure to surprising' situations, but this may require 'real surprise'. Are simulators (instructors) able to generate sufficient realism to induce startle or fear.
Avoidance would involve improving system reliability - avoid grandfather rights, and reconsider the assumptions in certification. System failures are a probability; we tend forget that extremely improbably events can and do occur, and we often assume too much about pilot capability in extreme situations.
With increasing levels of safety the industry needs to adjust its view. Instead of attempting to identify all threats and regulate people, accept that in rare circumstances the outcomes are only a probability. Pilots should be encouraged to be adaptable, helped to judge situations and be allowed to deviate from the norm, and even encouraged to make (small, inconsequential) errors. Training has to enable pilots to manage the uncertainties in flying, not just the few 'certainties' in procedures.
Greater depth of basic knowledge could help pilots form a more accurate perception of startling events to help reduce the effect, the magnitude and/or duration..
Experience as in 'know-how' could be improved by re considering basic procedures:
e.g. operators claim to have good CRM practices by involving crew in decisions. However, which view offers greater learning:
Capt - "re weather ahead, we should deviate left 15 deg?" ( a tick in the CRM box) or
Capt - "re weather ahead, what would you suggest we do?". The latter exercises the crews' mind and decision process; it adds experience of actually doing something in a real situation.
Perhaps this aspect in some small way applied to the AF447 accident; I recall a telling graphic of the track deviation of other aircraft at the time, compared with the smaller deviation of AF447.
Instead of active recovery training, the focus should be more on awareness and the need to change the course of action. e.g. disciplined behaviour to use what little cognitive resource remains to reconsider why the situation may not be improving:- "am I using the correct action", or "do I really understand the situation".
Stop, rethink, break tunnel vision; but that may require realistic startling events.
Think slow, but faster.
http://www.skybrary.aero/index.php/U...ing_(OGHFA_BN)
Fear is a natural response to perceived danger, which usually depends on prior knowledge.
'Startle response' is an unconscious reaction to a sudden or threatening situation (fight or flight). Startle involves automatic (subconscious) reaction and reduced cognitive ability; the focus of attention is towards the perceived threat leading to tunnel vision and the need to act. The startle response could continue if the actions do not effect a recovery, deepening the startle and reinforcing the chosen action, even if, in hindsight, this is wrong.
Startle could be reduced by avoiding surprising situations, by understanding and enhancing the recognition of startle, and being prepared (experienced) to manage an undesired state. Like error, startle cannot be irradiated, thus avoidance, detection, recovery and mitigation aspects apply.
Self-confidence and experience are important defences, particularly those which improve the perception of surprising situations and time available for actions.
Self-confidence could be improved with exposure to surprising' situations, but this may require 'real surprise'. Are simulators (instructors) able to generate sufficient realism to induce startle or fear.
Avoidance would involve improving system reliability - avoid grandfather rights, and reconsider the assumptions in certification. System failures are a probability; we tend forget that extremely improbably events can and do occur, and we often assume too much about pilot capability in extreme situations.
With increasing levels of safety the industry needs to adjust its view. Instead of attempting to identify all threats and regulate people, accept that in rare circumstances the outcomes are only a probability. Pilots should be encouraged to be adaptable, helped to judge situations and be allowed to deviate from the norm, and even encouraged to make (small, inconsequential) errors. Training has to enable pilots to manage the uncertainties in flying, not just the few 'certainties' in procedures.
Greater depth of basic knowledge could help pilots form a more accurate perception of startling events to help reduce the effect, the magnitude and/or duration..
Experience as in 'know-how' could be improved by re considering basic procedures:
e.g. operators claim to have good CRM practices by involving crew in decisions. However, which view offers greater learning:
Capt - "re weather ahead, we should deviate left 15 deg?" ( a tick in the CRM box) or
Capt - "re weather ahead, what would you suggest we do?". The latter exercises the crews' mind and decision process; it adds experience of actually doing something in a real situation.
Perhaps this aspect in some small way applied to the AF447 accident; I recall a telling graphic of the track deviation of other aircraft at the time, compared with the smaller deviation of AF447.
Instead of active recovery training, the focus should be more on awareness and the need to change the course of action. e.g. disciplined behaviour to use what little cognitive resource remains to reconsider why the situation may not be improving:- "am I using the correct action", or "do I really understand the situation".
Stop, rethink, break tunnel vision; but that may require realistic startling events.
Think slow, but faster.
http://www.skybrary.aero/index.php/U...ing_(OGHFA_BN)
Stimulation: Visual(PFD). Aural(alerts, warnings, airstream, buffet) voice(CRM) G
Observation: intensity, (rated normality, comparison, rejections)
Recognition: level of threat, immediacy, communication, optionals,
Task: timing, action, review.
SORT
These are all categories of the Executive function of the brain, imo.
Once ingrained, and trained, it remains to test how far each candidate can "compress" these categories into the correct action.
A computer can do all these. But a human can do them better. What remains impossible for computers to get, (at present) is what starts to look like "intuitive" work. It is not intuitive, it is the extreme skill that results from intense training. It has been called "luck", or "genius", even the "zone".
When the current crop of over valued computational machines grok "intuition" what will follow will be the inevitable presence of pilotless aircraft. Till then, occasionally we need to compute "risk/benefit" and whistle through the cemetery.
Observation: intensity, (rated normality, comparison, rejections)
Recognition: level of threat, immediacy, communication, optionals,
Task: timing, action, review.
SORT
These are all categories of the Executive function of the brain, imo.
Once ingrained, and trained, it remains to test how far each candidate can "compress" these categories into the correct action.
A computer can do all these. But a human can do them better. What remains impossible for computers to get, (at present) is what starts to look like "intuitive" work. It is not intuitive, it is the extreme skill that results from intense training. It has been called "luck", or "genius", even the "zone".
When the current crop of over valued computational machines grok "intuition" what will follow will be the inevitable presence of pilotless aircraft. Till then, occasionally we need to compute "risk/benefit" and whistle through the cemetery.
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I sure hope there is still enough time to make a career in aviation..
We could debate this in other parts of the forum. Is there already a topic for us to discuss about that ?
We could debate this in other parts of the forum. Is there already a topic for us to discuss about that ?