Odd story appeared in Seattle Times
"Airbuses suffer cockpit power failure, await fixes"
Airbus A320s suffer cockpit power failure, await fixes | Business & Technology | The Seattle Times
DAVID PORTER, AP, Wednesday, August 22, 2012
Since the A320 incidents discussed in that story happened years ago, the motive for this Aug'2012 newspaper story inspires curiosity.
It is now Aug'2012==> More than four years later, NTSB still offers no "final" report on:
NTSB ... DCA08IA033 ... UNITED .... occurred Friday,January 25, 2008 in Newark, NJ ... A320 ... N462UA
This is preliminary ... On January 25, 2008, a United Airbus A320 ... N462UA, experienced multiple avionics and electrical failures, including loss of all communications, shortly after rotation while departing Newark ... flight returned for landing at EWR and electrical power was restored to the cockpit after landing when the flight crew selected the AC Essential Bus button....
as of Aug'2012, NTSB's "docket":
Flight Data Recorder 10 - Factual Report of Group Chairman 6
Flight Data Recorder 10 - Attachment 1 FDR Tabular --
Airworthiness Factual Report of Group Chairman 91
Pilot Statements 4
[note, most of the "Airworthiness Factual" is a reprint of a prior AAIB rpt. Also interesting is that now the ntsb calls it their "Airworthiness" Group (same engineer who wrote prior "Systems Group" reports for earlier mishaps).]
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Similar _investigation_ of ELECTRICAL failure-interactons is alluded in NTSB AAR0903, an MD80 case, see review in slot #36
Engine fire, St-Louis, plane evacuated,
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Airbus A321-231, G-MEDJ At FL360 over northern Sudan
Date & Time (UTC): 24 August 2010 at 0225 hrs
AAIB Special Bulletin: S2/2010
significant symptoms included the intermittent failure of the captain and co-pilot’s electronic displays and the uncommanded application of left rudder trim; the flight crew also reported that the aircraft did not seem to respond as expected to control inputs. A large number of ECAM1 messages and cautions were presented. The uncommanded rudder trim caused the aircraft to adopt a left-wing-low attitude and deviate to the left of the planned track. Normal functions were restored after the flight crew selected the No 1 generator to OFF in response to an ECAM ‘ELEC GEN 1 FAULT’ message.
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AAIB Air Accident Report: 4/2009
A319-111, registration G-EZAC
near Nantes, France on 15 September 2006 ... EW/C2006/09/04
[This AAIB rpt is included in NTSB-AirworthinessGp Factual Rpt, for UA's mishap (2008)]
... G-EZAC departed Alicante at 0926 hrs ... EZY6074, with the commander as the Pilot Flying (PF). The APU was running in accordance with the MEL requirements. The crew noted that the two discrete annunciation lights on the flight deck overhead panel associated with the APU operation were both on and that the GEN 1 OFF light was illuminated.
At 1052 hrs ... cruise at FL320 in the region of Nantes ... pilotsheard a loud ‘clunk’ and a number of systems and services, including thoselisted below, became inoperative:
- Captain’s Primary Flight Display (PFD) and Navigation Display (ND), the upper ECAM display and the Multi-purpose Control and Display Unit (MCDU)The commander’s initial assumption was that either the APU had shut down or the APU generator had failed. He saw that his own electronic instrument displays had blanked and so, after checking that the co-pilot’s instrumentswere available, handed over control. The co-pilot flew the aircraft manually,using manual thrust and without the flight director, which had disappeared. ...
commander carried out the ECAM actions but when he reached the ‘AC ESS FEED’ switch to ‘ALTN’ action, he reported that the FAULT caption in the push‑button selector was not illuminated. He also noted that there were now no lights showing on the overhead panel, except for the ON BATT caption light on the Air Data and Inertial Reference System (ADIRS) panel ...
... The commander reported that he selected the AC ESS FEED push-button to ALTN, but this appeared to have no effect; the push-button selector switch caption remained unlit and the electrical system failed to reconfigure. He stated that he was unable to verify the selection made on the switch (ALTN or NORMAL), because the button does not remain depressed after making a selection....
- Autopilot; the associated aural Master Warning tone sounded
- Autothrust; the associated aural Master Caution tone sounded
- Most of the caption and integral illumination lights on the overhead panel
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AAIB Report No: 2/2008.
, registration G-EUOB
, during the climb after departure
from London Heathrow Airport on 22 October 2005
Preliminary information on the progress of the investigation was published in AAIB Special Bulletins S2/2005 and S3/2006, in November 2005 and April 2006
. Four Safety Recommendations were made in Special Bulletin S3/2006.
"... not possible to determine the cause of the incident due to a lack of available evidence ..."
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Here's the Airbus Training video, show's an easy process (if the alternate-action Switch/annunciators remain powered):
[ten minute video]
Links to the A340 cases???
?? So how is that "2-Pilot Cockpit" concept working-out?
No need for any F/E, due to those modern reliable automated-switching safety features?? [That is the question that the NTSB's investigator should have addressed in earlier investigations.]