Frying Dutchman

Hi all,

What will you do after a RTO, if there's no damage, will you vacate the rwy first and do the EICAS/Ecam or stay on the rwy and do the checklist till you have shutdown the 'dead' engine? Is there an ICAO recommendation somewhere about RTO?
Tried to search in the forum to no avail, appreciate any reply or links to the above topic.

Cheers
FD

Blinkz

I'd tell the passengers to stay in their seats before one of them gets 'jumpy' and pops a slide with the engines running!

After that then if it is safe and simple to vacate the runway then I'd do that, as long as its been established that there is no major safety issue.

Takeoff53

1. Do the by heart items on the runway, leave the runway, do the check list items
2. No by heart items to do, leave the runway, do the check list items

Sorry, this answer is not taking any regs in account.

Wizofoz

Following any high-speed RTO, the runway will be closed for an inspection, so there is no screaming hurry to vacate.

If it was for an engine problem, yes I'd reccomend completing the NNCL in order to secure the engine in case something is leaking.

PT6A

What was the reason for the RTO?

A priority is effective communication with the back to keep them in the loop "Attention crew on station" then work out what the problem was, is the aircraft safe, will the aircraft remain safe?

If so, then you may come off the runway.. It depends on a lot of factors such as the reason for the initial RTO, speed at which it was initiated (brake temps) etc.

The runway is a better place to evacuate if it is needed, as the emergency services have un restricted access to the aircraft.

Busserday

Do your SOPs not cover this? A reject is an uncommon event and will have many consequences that you have not probably experienced previously, time should be taken to consider what you will do in an event like this before you touch the keys.

Microburst2002

First check tyre damage and brake temp

IGh

Question posed:

"... What ... do after a RTO, if there's no damage ... vacate the rwy[?] ... or stay on the rwy and do the checklist[?] ... recommendation somewhere about RTO?

There were many fatal RTO's, & tombstones generated numerous RTO-studies. Each of the fatal RTO's were discussed in training during the 1980's & 90's; so back then, pilots became aware of reasons to STOP the aircraft!! STAY ON the wider Rwy for easier inspection (often mishap-pilots inside cockpit were poorly positioned & unaware of fire), while pax easily saw the fire; emergency equipment became sunk in mud near taxiway.

-- international takeoff safety task force;
-- Takeoff Safety Training Aid (TOSTA);
-- FAA Advisory Circular 120-62 provides direction and
guidelines for airlines;

Aero 11 - Rejected Takeoff Studies

AC 120-62

Pacific Western Flt 501 / 22Mar84 , B737-200 C-GQPW, Calgary Alberta; aborted takeoff after engine failure at 75 Kts; Uncontained failure of the left engine's 13th stage compressor disc. Wing fuel cell penetrated by debris, major fuel-fed fire, pilot delayed evacuation even after confirmation of fire. Passengers initiated evacuation, all 119 sob's evac'd & survived.
-- T/O @ 0742 MST Rwy 34 from C-1.
-- About 20 seconds into T/O roll pilots heard loud "bang" then aircraft had slight veer left.
--RTO. Pilots thought tire had burst.
-- Slowed, taxied clear of rwy @ C-4; Pilots noted left N1 = 0%, and left generator failure. [Time from disc failure to evacuation finished was 4 or 5 minutes. ]
-- 23 Seconds after RTO initiated, F/O called to Tower "Clear of Rwy."
-- 45 Seconds after RTO initiated, Cockpit Door was opened in response to knocks, F/A entered and asked if they had blown a tire, and then F/A stated ". . . fire at rear of aircraft . . . back of left wing."
-- CVR recorded brief sound of fire-warning bell, and Chimes from F/A to Cockpit Call System;
-- F/O called Tower and asked confirmation of fire.
-- At One Minute +Two Seconds Twr called back confirming fire;
-- F/A-Purser told pilots "whole left back-side [wing] is burning."
-- At One Minute +11 Seconds Captain told F/A to "prepare" for evacuation; discharged fire bottle to Left Engine; told Twr to send emergency equipment;
-- Tower replied that crew best stop the aircraft at their present location.
-- At One Minute +33 Seconds Tower told crew that there were flames on the left side.
-- At One Minute +36 Seconds Fire Bell sounds continuous;
-- F/A reports "bad at the back."
-- Capt discharged second fire bottle, told F/A to again "prep" for evacuation.
-- At One Minute +40 Seconds Captain finally STOPPED the aircraft, pilots executed steps in their Evacuation checklist.
-- At One Minute +55 Seconds F/A's initiated evacuation;
-- fire melted windows along left side and heat and smoke entered aircraft; smoke in aft cabin worst. Fire consumed substantial portion of aircraft. Left Engine fire damaged, Engine Case and Nacelle perforated at the One O'clock (as viewed from rear) upper I/B position. Lower Wing perforated (I/B & in-line with hole in nacelle & 13th stage compressor), skin penetrated, fuel cell broken (Hole in under-surface of wing tank). A segment of engine's disc, 3" by 17", missing; found on Rwy 1300' from start of T/O roll. [Improper stator repair, not IAW PW overhaul manual; disc failure included fatigue cracking.]
-- Pieces of aircraft structure and left engine were later found on Rwy and Twy; TRAIL of raw and burnt fuel residues, & globules of melted aluminium had fallen from left wing; trail continued to final resting position of aircraft. "3-D Fire": elevated fuel source, a running (falling) fire, and ground pooling.
-- Problems with Emergency Equipment: nacelle and wing blocked access of foam cannons (positioned atop fire vehicles) to fire source (under I/B wing).
-- AGARD Discussion: (CWK explained) Manchester , Calgary, and Ryhad mishaps included an aircraft on fire which the pilots taxied off runway onto a taxiway, with detrimental results; delayed Pax evac, and reduced maneuvering space for emergency equipment (Calgary fire trucks stuck in mud just off taxiway). Hidden fires: external or internal (CVG). ["The Final Call" S BARLAY; 157. AGARD's "Aircraft Fire Safety".]

British Airtours / 22Aug85, B737-236 G-BGLJ named "River Orrin" Exterior flammable liquid (Fuel) Fire. During T/O Rwy 24 at Manchester UK crew heard "thud" like tire burst or a bird strike, captain aborted takeoff. #1 Eng Fire Warning sounded nine seconds after sound of "thud", Tower controller transmitted "a lot of fire" on port side. [Uncontained failure of left engine; fragment of ejected Burner Can ruptured an access panel on the lower surface of the left wing; Wing Tank Fuel leak near burning #1 Engine.] Pilot did abort T/O, but he decelerated gently, then elected to taxi clear of runway (which delayed evacuation by about 20 seconds more)….

oxenos

Taxying clear of the runway also put the fire upwind of the fuselage, so that the flames were blown on to the fuselage side. In the aftermath of that it was recommended that IF it would not cause delay, the aircraft should be brought to a halt on the runway with the failed engine downwind of the fuselage.