You mention "Linked sidesticks" but that's not what it is.
Thank you for the correction CONF iture. I see I must have misinterpreted the following statement's meaning:
Quote:
...."mechanically-linked sidestick controlled all-axis closed-loop fly-by-wire for the aircraft's elevator, rudder, aileron and spoiler; a first for an aircraft of its size."
Well, there have been more than one deadly upset events with one system and up to today none with the other.
Tells a story, at least to me.
What story does the string of 737 LOCs tell ?
What types are you comparing with what and with what normalisation (flight hours, departures, none(!)) ?
330 vs 777 is about equal on hull losses and hull loss rate, and both have had non-fatal in-flight LOC due to ADIRU failure. 777 has been a lot luckier on fatalities (especially BA38 - engines choked a few seconds earlier and that would have been a lot nastier however good the crew).
340 ? Luckier still on fatalities but more hull losses. Comparable to 777 - not sure appropraite - should twins be compared to quads, should it compare to 747 ?
320/21/18/19 - much different type and usage to 777, compare to 737 against which competes, and hull loss rate is about equal - provided you exclude the older 737s.
The big story is comparing 320 onwards against the old conventional controlled A300/310, and older 737s etc. - the type represents a massive improvement in safety, close to an order of magnitude lower hull loss rates.
If there's a major safety problem with Airbus FBW, it just doesn't show up in the stats - if there is a signal it's hidden by other much larger factors.
Linked sidesticks, C* law but with softer protections in some areas, an AOA limiter, back driven autothrottles, and a different way of doing some things. Looks to be a very pragmatic approach.
Thanks for that link - very informative. Does indeed look like somewhere between A & B approach, proper moving throttles, but bus-style sidesticks. Ugly chimera or best of both - time will tell. Someone in marketing probably needs firing for naming it "Legacy" mind you...
This has me a bit confused:
Embraer emphasized that the Legacy 500 and 450 are speed stable by design
I think that must refer to failure / direct mode, as the videos look to me to show it controlled like a path-stable airbus (not like 777).
Hi everybody, i agree with most of you, is the lackness of training and too much complacency on the automatism that create a false sense of security among the pilots. I currently fly one of these A 330 and i see people been slaves of the machine. Even simple tasks like disengage the ATHR is considered a strange thing. My background is a solid stick and rudder flying but with time everybody become lazy and don't want to give away the luxory of the automatism. Yes if you don't touch anything probably the plane still fly by itself but is not easy to not become emotional and nervous in a situation like that
The story of an previously unknown abnormal state of the rudder actuator under specific temperature conditions? Is this comparable?
-Member of The Gretchenfrage Fan Club
I was thinking of the 737 LOCs that were actually "lost control", or failure to take control (after automatics fail) of otherwise flyable a/c, not "controls failed".
I think I've eliminated cfit and mechanical failure as direct cause from that list.
But the point is not the list, the point is that pilots lose control of 737s as well as A320s, in neither case does it necessarily mean the plane has a bad control system. Pilots have been losing control of planes for as long as there have been planes, and probably will carry on doing so for as long as there are pilots. And then autopilots will lose control instead (no, I'm not a fan of pilotless either).
Comparing accident rates type to type, competing or old to new, simply does not show fbw as making things worse.
I don't think it shows it making it any better either (newer a/c tend to have better record, fbw or not) - despite all the protections. I don't think that shows anything more than that as a species we're really good at finding new ways to screw up when old ones are closed off...
Before I make my unsolicited comments please keep in mind that the only aircraft I've ever "flown", or piloted, are the type which one uses a radio transmitter with i.e., I know nothing about that which goes on in the cockpit.
After reading this thread since day 1 I've come to the conclusion that many of the comments here, taken together, are a damning indictment of the cockpit crew of this ill-fated flight. After poring over the data, reading the transcripts as provided by BEA, and reading all of the pertinent BEA-provided reports I suppose some of this damning indictment is appropriate.
But I'd like to take this one step further. Isn't the apparent lack of training, as far as the PF is concerned, the lack of CRM, the lack of communication between the flight crew members a further indictment of our modern world? Is not this one specific flight crew a microcosm of our greater world? Is not the underlying reason for the PF's apparent lack of real training yet further proof that "the bottom line" is really the precursor for all that comes after?
I'm involved in the I.T. field and have been for well over 25 years. I fondly remember "the old days" when the latest innovation in technology was a "big thing". Nowadays I am astounded, shocked and dismayed at that which is coming out of our schools these days. It seems to me the "younger generation" really doesn't have a clue nor do they seem to want one. Apathy, lack of motivation to learn, inattentiveness, self-centeredness etc. These dubious traits seem ingrained in so many these days. Is not what happened with AF447, unfortunately, not another "small" example of all of the above?
"Nowadays I am astounded, shocked and dismayed at that which is coming out of our schools these days. It seems to me the "younger generation" really doesn't have a clue nor do they seem to want one. Apathy, lack of motivation to learn, inattentiveness, self-centeredness"
Brock, I guess you're referring to American and European kids. Say thay to millions of families in Asia and they won't understand what you're talking about. Have no doubt, there's a transfer of power going on from west to east.
I liked very much your Naval confidence with Iceman50 (you are the winner).
You said "Whenever I see an area that needs improvement, I try to point it out". That is a noble and generous project.
It seems Iceman50 wants only to avoid a unfavorable AF447 trial in France : This requires that the FRENCH Court has different possibilities : 1. several persons are charged and not only one (for instance AIRBUS, pilots and AF, certification autority, etc. are possible guilty persons) , 2. The Court is not sure the charged is guilty, 3. The alone charged person did not knew nore understood the danger of his actions, and wanted to kill the passengers and crew from the AF447.
The first way is the easiest with the famous fatal chain, used since years and years by the french lawyers.
Last edited by roulishollandais; 18th Feb 2012 at 16:11.
I've come to the conclusion that many of the comments here, taken together, are a damning indictment of the cockpit crew of this ill-fated flight.
rgbrock1, I fully realize that you went on to clarify and amend the above comment, but I see a number of "damning conclusions," at least the ones that I myself make, from the comfort of my armchair.
1. Air France, for not changing the substandard pitot tubes fast enough 2. The regulatory agencies responsible for rule-making in reference to the above. 3. Air France training 4. The entire industry, again for the failure to provide proper upset training 5. The pilots themselves, both their, uh, flying skills, and their poor decision to fly into that storm 6. Deficiencies in the Airbus design in terms of lack of tactile feedback in the controls (all of the defifiencies posited by contributors to this thread). 7. Deficiencies in the Airbus instrumentation and control design in terms of stall warning behavior, angle-of-attack display, auto-trim, and the list is long.....
As someone who has NO industry axe to grind, I strongly believe that ALL of the above were dangerous holes in the Swiss cheese, and if any one of the above factors had been not present, the crash might not have happened. I love posting opinions that cannot be proved wrong!
1. Air France, for not changing the substandard pitot tubes fast enough 2. The regulatory agencies responsible for rule-making in reference to the above. 3. Air France training 4. The entire industry, again for the failure to provide proper upset training 5. The pilots themselves, both their, uh, flying skills, and their poor decision to fly into that storm 6. Deficiencies in the Airbus design in terms of lack of tactile feedback in the controls (all of the defifiencies posited by contributors to this thread). 7. Deficiencies in the Airbus instrumentation and control design in terms of stall warning behavior, angle-of-attack display, auto-trim, and the list is long.....
Some additions maybe:
1.1 AF for (possibly) failing to evaluate adequacy of training and procedure for a known risk (pitot fail) they chose to run as a result of (1). Allegedly when they did in the sim post-447, their crews crashed.
So the FAA, seemingly without noticing, had authorised a line training technique different than the one they required for type certification.
...and opinions:
6. Mmm, no fbw should ever be certified then - back to the regulators who approved it. Fbw means only artificial feedback possible, and then can't have proper control feedback in the absence of airspeed info, since proper feedback is dependent on airspeed.
7. AoA: separate display is designed and implemented by airbus, blame the airlines (inc. AF) who ask for it not to be fitted. And the regulators who have ignored (several) past accident reports recommending it be made mandatory.
SW: same logic might turn out to be common throughout the industry - comments on these threads have alleged that it is there on boeing at least. Just that no one on other types has managed to get measured airspeed below the threshold whilst stalled. Based on info posted here, I think the Airbus BUSS option already "fixes" this issue - unless you get the speed so low the AoA vanes physically stop working. AF of course decided that their crews didn't need no backup speed tape...
1. Air France, for not changing the substandard pitot tubes fast enough 2. The regulatory agencies responsible for rule-making in reference to the above.
As someone who has NO industry axe to grind, I strongly believe that ALL of the above were dangerous holes in the Swiss cheese, and if any one of the above factors had been not present, the crash might not have happened.
Yet another way of looking at it is;
With so many barriers present (layers of cheese) it would be extremely improbable that all, or enough of them would fail resulting in an accident.
Obviously some of these were not actual barriers but intead were latent failures already in place (holes drilled in a line though multiple layers of cheese) because nobody had bothered to validate some of these barriers as being effective much of the time.
My strong convictions are that we can't expect all layers to work all the time, but that we must demand that controls and evaluations are in place to at least qualify that a layer of defense is active and not a dream on a piece of paper assuming that the other guy has it covered.
That's why we have regulators, to make sure that the process is active
jcjeant, AF447 did not encounter the icing conditions (SLD) the NTSB recommendation is addressing.
And
Quote:
That's why we have regulators, to make sure that the process is active
Maybe you're right about that (SLD) .. however it shows the lack of responsiveness of the European regulatory body 1996 -2010 ... 14 years of inaction ...
No I have no idea HazelNuts39 can you explain all this work done during those 14 years (and more) by EASA about this problem as obviously you have this information
Roulishollandais, you may have mis-perceived this interchange.
Basically When Iceman50 stated he was a Naval Aviator, I knew exactly what his training background was before his airline career, and he knew mine.
It means that if you were flying hundreds of miles from your ship in lousy weather and your navigation system packs up followed by your communications and some of your critical systems, you can still fly his wing back to your ship or a divert field after you pass your HEFOE signals, even if he is a brand new Ensign.
He was saying that his Airbus is easy to fly (for him) which I believe fully. It also points at inappropriate fundamental ATPL training standards as an additional causative factor for AF447.
Last edited by Machinbird; 17th Feb 2012 at 18:11.
Reason: spelling
Not to bad mouth a dead man but the first mistake I see in this entire tragedy was when the Captain pushed back from the gate. Mistake two was when he chose to go to the back and go to sleep. IMHO
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Naval confidence
