Concorde Paris crash, questions, facts, opinions
Christiaan,
I was positing a diesel explosion to explain the tank damage, not the subsequent ignition of the leaked fuel. But you're right -- such an explosion would be much more likely to damage the top of the tank.
I was positing a diesel explosion to explain the tank damage, not the subsequent ignition of the leaked fuel. But you're right -- such an explosion would be much more likely to damage the top of the tank.
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FeathersMcGraw
I did some digging a few months back. It was not a photo as I first thought, but the verbal testimony of a former colleague who was assisting at the crash site in Gonez. He told me that that the Tank 5 inlet valve over-ride switch WAS broken, but the stub appeared to be locked in the OVER-RIDE OPEN position. (It was a DOWTY lever-locked type of switch; once engaged in the detent only a firm outwards motion could release it).
Either way I don't think that there is any real doubt about the final hydro-dynamics of the section of wing lower skin being 'blown out', the tests and investigations here do seem to have been extremely thorough.
I did some digging a few months back. It was not a photo as I first thought, but the verbal testimony of a former colleague who was assisting at the crash site in Gonez. He told me that that the Tank 5 inlet valve over-ride switch WAS broken, but the stub appeared to be locked in the OVER-RIDE OPEN position. (It was a DOWTY lever-locked type of switch; once engaged in the detent only a firm outwards motion could release it).
Either way I don't think that there is any real doubt about the final hydro-dynamics of the section of wing lower skin being 'blown out', the tests and investigations here do seem to have been extremely thorough.
Even less air in tank 5 than the 6% "at dispatch", due to transfer during the taxy, simply makes the hydro-dynamics of the event even more likely.
Interestingly, according to the BEA report, the tests done on tank dummies were done with them filled to 100%, so they were already thinking along the same lines.
ChristiaanJ
Point taken my friend, but the damage could still be attributed in my view, at least partially, with the ingress of the runway light and its fittings; we just cannot discount this totally.
Point taken my friend, but the damage could still be attributed in my view, at least partially, with the ingress of the runway light and its fittings; we just cannot discount this totally.
As far as the rest of this tragic event goes, well I'd rather not comment any further here; this is for once a generally well informed (and civilised) thread.
Dude
Dude
But if this thread helps a few people to get a better view of what happened, I would say it will have fulfilled its function.
Maybe I should add one thing here....
When I first heard about the crash, my first reaction as an engineer was "Oh no... what did we do wrong...?"
Since then, I've tried to learn as much as possible about what happened, and sometimes (like here) tried to pass it on.
And yes, like M2dude, I've mostly refrained from commenting on my opinion of the "why", and will at least try to continue to do so.
As I said, it was partly the reaction of an engineer....
On Dec. 29, 1972, a Lockheed 1011 TriStar (Eastern flight 401) crashed in the Florida Everglades.
Within the next few months, and well before the final report came out, we had information about one of the contributary factors to the crash, an incoherent display of the autopilot mode.
And yes, when we started looking at the Concorde system, we found the same possible fault was hidden in the system.
We did the necessary modifications within weeks (and this was long before the aircraft went into service).
In 2000, I was no longer working on Concorde.
But I had the same gut reaction... "what did we do wrong?" .... "what are we going to do, so it never happens again?".
Sure, I was no longer involved... but somehow it was still "my aircraft".
CJ
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concorde eads old-europe
Puisque vous êtes de France, je reste en français.
Le 10 juillet EADS a commencé de mettre en bourse ses titres, à cet effet il a dû déposer à la COB (Comission des Opérations en Bourse) une "documentation générale" enregistrée le 12 mai 2000 sous le numéro R 00-223.
Ce document est très complet, afin d'éclairer l'éventuel acquéreur d'actions des chances et des risques pris financièrement.
Tous (...) les avions et hélicoptères d'EADS y sont décrits... ou presque !
Un seul avion manque : CONCORDE !!! qui se crashe quinze jours après, après avoir décollé EN FEU devant l'avion de Chirac, et devant le bureau de Spinatta.
Dès que l'enquête est ouverte, c'est bien "EADS" qui se révèle être en charge de Concorde !!!
Les accords entre Aérospatiale et Matra signés, sous la houlette de Dominique Strauss-Kahn, en vue de la création d'EADS ont été signés en juin 1999... en même temps qu'Anne Sinclair, son épouse ,
récupère enfin une cinquantaine d'oeuvres de son grand-père que les Allemands ne voulaient pas restituer ! (dont les célèbres Nymphéas de Monet).
Ne cherchez pas plus loin si vous avez mal fait quelque chose !
Concorde ne devait plus voler, c'est tout. Le crime était les 300 000 travailleurs forcés de Daimler-Benz qui se mariaient avec l'aéronautique française... et on imposait la loi du silence sur la collaboration.
Le 13 juillet 2000 j'ai déposé une protestation pour non-sincérité de la "documentation générale" à la DGCCRF.
"Troll" ? realy ?
Le 10 juillet EADS a commencé de mettre en bourse ses titres, à cet effet il a dû déposer à la COB (Comission des Opérations en Bourse) une "documentation générale" enregistrée le 12 mai 2000 sous le numéro R 00-223.
Ce document est très complet, afin d'éclairer l'éventuel acquéreur d'actions des chances et des risques pris financièrement.
Tous (...) les avions et hélicoptères d'EADS y sont décrits... ou presque !
Un seul avion manque : CONCORDE !!! qui se crashe quinze jours après, après avoir décollé EN FEU devant l'avion de Chirac, et devant le bureau de Spinatta.
Dès que l'enquête est ouverte, c'est bien "EADS" qui se révèle être en charge de Concorde !!!
Les accords entre Aérospatiale et Matra signés, sous la houlette de Dominique Strauss-Kahn, en vue de la création d'EADS ont été signés en juin 1999... en même temps qu'Anne Sinclair, son épouse ,
récupère enfin une cinquantaine d'oeuvres de son grand-père que les Allemands ne voulaient pas restituer ! (dont les célèbres Nymphéas de Monet).
Ne cherchez pas plus loin si vous avez mal fait quelque chose !
Concorde ne devait plus voler, c'est tout. Le crime était les 300 000 travailleurs forcés de Daimler-Benz qui se mariaient avec l'aéronautique française... et on imposait la loi du silence sur la collaboration.
Le 13 juillet 2000 j'ai déposé une protestation pour non-sincérité de la "documentation générale" à la DGCCRF.
"Troll" ? realy ?
Last edited by roulishollandais; 1st Oct 2011 at 14:22.
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What I always was wondering about and what is related to the "magical outcome scenario #1": Why does Concorde reach V1 (or the "point of no return") already after less than 1/3 of the available runway ? I would always believe that the brakes (assuming they are intact) can decelerate the aircraft much more efficciently (especially on a dry runway with grooves) than 4 olympus engines with reheat (one of them limited in power) could accelerate it. I would always expect v1 to be reached after using half of the runway length.
Taking into account that the crew was aware of problems well before half of the runway and even less than 1/3 from massive obstacles ahead, why would they not be able to stop the plane in due distance?
(I fully agree with the former post, that stopping a fully fueled aircraft on fire with its long leg landing gear would have probably not saved more than a handfull of lives of those in the forward cabin, if at all. Especially if you compare it to the size of the fuel leak in the Air China 737 accident in Okinawa and the impressive fire destroying the aicraft)
Taking into account that the crew was aware of problems well before half of the runway and even less than 1/3 from massive obstacles ahead, why would they not be able to stop the plane in due distance?
(I fully agree with the former post, that stopping a fully fueled aircraft on fire with its long leg landing gear would have probably not saved more than a handfull of lives of those in the forward cabin, if at all. Especially if you compare it to the size of the fuel leak in the Air China 737 accident in Okinawa and the impressive fire destroying the aicraft)
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What I always was wondering about: Why does Concorde reach V1 (or the "point of no return") already after less than 1/3 of the available runway ? I would always believe that the brakes (assuming they are intact) can decelerate the aircraft much more efficciently (especially on a dry runway with grooves) than 4 olympus engines with reheat (one of them limited in power) could accelerate it. I would always expect v1 to be reached after using half of the runway length.
I'd have to pull up the BEA report, get out the performance manual, and do some back-of-the-envelope figuring ... did you already do that?
One minor detail (and probably not relevant) when comparing 'engines' and 'brakes', is that it was not possible to 'hold' the aircraft 'on the brakes' at full power plus reheat.
CJ
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Where did you get your figures from ?
it was not possible to 'hold' the aircraft 'on the brakes' at full power plus reheat.
