The automatics make life easier but the failure states on a BUS are far more complicated and less intuitive than on a Boeing.
Going back to stick and rudded as the 'cure all' is naive at best.
better training (not the cheapest) more redundancy (not necessarily the most modern systems) and mandatory loft training for pilots based on ACTUAL fatal event like this and how to cope should be the minimum going forward.
having flown most of the big manufacturers I'd still prefer the BUS for failures like EFATO and approach failures and day to day ops - but the Boeing for crosswinds, turbulence and 'significant multiple failures.
At 2 in the morning at that altitude, in that weather faced with a rapid sequence of failures (if thats what happened) i'm not sure how any aircraft would have come out of it better. luck aswell as skill has a disproportionate influence.
Hi guys, I am an airbus captain with about 3000 hours on type. I have never been tought unusual attitude recovery in the sim. I was told, that you don't have to have this training, because the airbus has so many protections, that you don't need this skill (sounds very similar about the reasoning behind Titanic, but lets forget about this). Are you, Boeing guys, tought unusual attitude recovery from upsets in the sims?
In a lot of respects a more "hands on" type of plane is better, not least that the pilot actually has to fly the thing!
However, you can't stand in the way of progress and increased automation is the way it will go..
Whilst it's conceivable that "fly by wire" automation *may* have contributed to this accident, how many crashes has it prevented in the past? How many planes would have crashed were it not for the 'puter saying "You ca n't do that, mate"..?
"If you look at the three or four days surrounding the accident, there was more intense development before and after than on the night of the flight itself," he says, adding that at 02:15UTC the growth phase of the local cumulonimbus had already passed and the clouds were in the "lower end" of their cycle.
"We cannot conclude that this situation was exceptional," he says. "There was no unusual intensity or strength."
On all the Boeing type rating courses I did, we went through unusual attitudes and recovery. This was not part of the Airbus Toulouse curriculum as I recall, but the instructor I had offered a good set of unusual attitudes in direct law.
'empty and stupid' - if taken out of context; he said -
"We cannot conclude that this situation was exceptional," he says. "There was no unusual intensity or strength."
As the head of a met offcie one has to assume he knows about usual and unusual in the context of weather.
OTOH, he is only looking at the data after the event; it is always probable that the momentary situation was different.
As has been said many times on this thread and other related threads, we are in a low/no information zone; the comment on the met situation is at least based on an analysis of the situation at the time and place.
It seems more and more likely that the AF crew on that fateful night were routinely picking their way around CB cells in the ITCZ, like all airline pilots do on a regular basis, when they unknowingly flew through an air mass that contained enough ice particles to disable all pitot probes. The resulting effects of such failure at high altitude, as documented earlier in the thread, are quite dramatic on the flight instruments and may have led to a rapid loss of control of the aeroplane. Since the crew primary task then, is to try to regain control before anything else gets done, it is not surprising that distress calls were never made.
Question: What happens if the weight (ZFW) entered in the FMC is lower than the actual weight of the airplane? Wouldn't there be a difference then between real and calculated "coffin corner"? (I'm not a pilot)
Brazil's air force recovered two bodies and debris from an Air France jetliner that came down over the Atlantic on June 1 with 228 people on board, a spokesman said.
"We confirm the recovery from the water debris and bodies from the Air France plane," Colonel Jorge Amaral told reporters in the northeastern city of Recife.
He said the two bodies, the first recovered from the downed flight, were those of men.
A plane seat, a nylon backpack containing a computer and a leather briefcase with an Air France ticket inside were the first objects plucked from the sea, he said.
The discovery took place 450km northeast of Brazil's Atlantic archipelago of Fernando de Noronha, itself 370km from the mainland.
Amaral said the blue plane seat has a serial number on it and Air France is checking to confirm that it came from its downed flight 447, which was travelling from Rio de Janeiro to Paris last Monday.
Amaral said the seat was the first item recovered.
The first body was then sighted by a navy vessel and was recovered 20 minuted later by the ship's crew.
The last item recovered so far was the backpack, he said.
Once again 23 of the 24 messages can be traced back to air data.
I must be a bit slow - can you please explain how air data disagreement can lead to the IR portion of the ADIRU failing? The ADR can be switched off leaving the IR running - but not vice versa. Thanks, TP
How probable would it be that the A330 had a "minor" techical fault, spotted on the ground in GIG, before the aircraft left for CDG, but after pressure put by AF ops on the captain, insisted he returned to CDG to have it sorted there? And then, a lightening strike or adverse weather conditions made the problem worse...? Does AF have engineers at Rio or would they have had to fly someone out, thus delaying the arrival of the Aircraft in Paris, which most probably was going to fly somewhere else after? Is AirFrance Ops worrying now that this could leak out and are wondering who to point the finger at?
I'm just wondering whether the focus on the pitot head issue, isn't a bit of a distraction i.e. whilst there is a acknowledged design flaw, that only comes to the fore in really extreme conditions.
Isn't the issue really that commercial passenger aircraft shouldn't be routed through areas known to have problems with convective clouds and wind shear, especially when El Nino is on - a known enhancer of these conditions.
Taking the great circle route, in this instance, sends aircraft directly through the crucible of the weather for this tropical zone - just take a look at the NOAA sea/air temperature graphics for the area.
Surely, sticking to the South American east coast for a few hundred miles more, before heading across the water would reduce the risk.
1. Have the radar turned on- sounds wierd but I`ve seen a few folk fly along with terrain on instead of weather.
2. Deviate early enough(90% of the time the CBs are above you in the tropics especially)then you don`t tend to increase the track miles by much and ergo you don`t burn too much extra fuel either....So fuel shouldn`t be an issue. If you take the gamble to `look` at the storm first by flying up to it you will have more track miles to cover to deviate around it...
3. Often the return on the weather radar will `disappear` the nearer you get to the CB..Are you above it, or not? Or is your weather radar not picking up the ice near the top of the cell. You have to play with the tilt...On really dark, moonless nights I remember the distance from the cell to the next waypoint and if I deviate I know not to turn back until I`m well inside that distance incase the return does the `disappearing act`.
Questions; That last acars msg....cabin vertical speed...Does it mean the cabin is going to `over take` the outside ie airplane in a dive or does it mean decompression??
...Interesting that "male bodies" have been found....Could they have fallen out of a breakking up aeroplane or does it mean that the impact was less severe??
Since the crew primary task then, is to try to regain control before anything else gets done, it is not surprising that distress calls were never made.
If situations can arise then, where using the radio to call a mayday is not possible due to the work load in the cabin, then its time voice activated radio was introduced, if not one simple button to send a distress message.
To not be able to transmit in an emergency situation is a serious flaw that needs to be corrected.
