"... any human factors/design problems with the thrust reverser system which contributed to the accident ..."
The AAR pg 29 offers the flight test conditions (slow speed w/ IDLE thrust) used during initial certification of the ThRevsrs -- this shows some of the same test-weaknesses as seen during the A300-600 RUDDER testing (poor test conditions).
From AAR pg 30:
"This accident indicates that changes in certification philosophy are necessary."
On June 14th, 1991, the _Seattle Times_ reported that the FAA never required, and Boeing never tested, the effects of a ThRevrsr deployment at higher altitudes under CLIMB THRUST conditions. AAR pg 25 bottom describes the lack of handling qualities just after ThReversr DEPLOYED. I felt that describing the problem as merely a "lift loss" for that wing was off-target; rather the Yaw x Roll = DIVE aspects, as in AA Flt One / 1Mar62, was a better metaphor.
On September 10th 1991 Niki Lauda called for
a new design philosophy -- that STARTS with the assumption that
faults with Reversers [then considered merely an auxiliary braking device] are
as crucial as faults in flight controls. (_Seattle Times_, Sunday 15, 1991, pg E-2, "Chronology of Lauda saga".
[Keep in mind that the mysterious in-flight upset of the B737-291, at COS, had only recently happened, on 3March91 : Mountain Wave-Rotor? the crash axe? the Board's investigators hadn't yet seriously considered any possible flight control faults in that mysterious B737 inflight upset.]
The _Seattle Times_ then had an excellent aerospace reporting section, and did numerous detailed special reports on the investigation, with some good illustrations.
Not sure that anyone reported on the troubles in locating some of the components, the massive excavation, then learning about the scavengers' prize valve, kept safely in his home.