My reasoning is not to brief all sorts of events and have a different solution for this and that. I flew with a captain who came from one of the larger LCC's and he must have been yapping for about 7-10 minutes about everything from in case a pax fell ill to if the right outer wheel got punctured. That's nonsense from my point of view.
What is important is which type of worksplit to be used, what I as PF expects PNF to do and when, and I inform him of what my actions and intentions will be. Certain standard items such as the SE escape route should be briefed. Otherwise, leave the briefing rather open. Briefing heavily on "side-items" may close the box to much and suddenly you're unable to think outside it. There is actually some benefits with not having a manuscript for each and every scenario...
Put the focus on all non-standard conditions that exists. Perhaps a need for a static take off (We do it frequently on the Saab)? WX?
I'm not sure what you're asking here. You're asking about a takeoff brief? What other kind of briefing do you give? Why a lav fire?
Does your training not cover the use of checklist and procedure?
When you depart, there aren't a lot of things that really need to be discussed aside from getting to the runway, the takeoff, and the departure. On the runway, you'll do one of two things; go or stop. That should be briefed. In the air, you'll be navigating via one of several methods; cover that. Cover the altitude, MSA, and if there's contingency procedure such as a special engine-out procedure, brief that. If you're doing a reduced or flex takeoff, that ought to be addressed in passing.
But picking random emergencies or abnormal procedures and briefing them...what's the point of that? Flavor of the day?
When short of something to brief, or at least something to think about, try this: NICOLA, airline-command (dot) blogspot (dot) com/2007/08/nicola-oldie-but-goody.html
Light hearted, to the point – meets the safety objective?
If this is not what you require, then look through the airline-command blog index.
Your intentions are good, just be careful you don't tread on the toes of the Cabin Crew hierarchy who spend their working life teaching the cabin crew what to do in emergencies.
Many airlines have cut out the flight and cabin crew combined briefings, no doubt in line with commercial pressure of reducing sign on times.I found that cabin crew meeting with the flight crew was an important part of working as a team, introducing each other, communicating face to face, establishing a rapport, CRM etc.. The combined flight and cabin crew questioning were the most valuable part of the briefing as these scenarios 'talked through' the sequencing of what would happen and by whom. There is often the misconception that in an emergency the response from the flight crew to the cabin crew (or pax)will be immediate but actually may take alot longer. It brought a practical application to SOPs. This is also the case in EPs. Interesting, one company I worked for, during a briefing a pilot discussed a fire/toilet scenario. Everyone knew how to put out the fire but that's where it ended. I had worked elsewhere and knew about a method for removing smoke in the cabin. This clearly highlighted a disconnect between manuals and procedures. Change was initiated thereafter.Sure, the door is locked, but communication is still the vital link in maintaining good safety outcomes.
Your intentions are good, just be careful you don't tread on the toes of the Cabin Crew hierarchy who spend their working life teaching the cabin crew what to do in emergencies.
So very true.
My CC briefing...
Follow the cabin supervisors instructions to the letter and we will have no problems whatsoever.
Works like a charm.
If the cabin supervisor reports to me that one (or more) of the CC are misbehaving, they are offloaded, pronto. Did this with the whole CC one time, as these were European girls with a (very able) north African female supervisor. The result? Termination for three, suspension for the rest. From what I found out later, they were trying to railroad the CC supervisor, and I will absolutely have none of this type of nonsense...ever.
411a - I agree perhaps the command portion of CRM needs to emphasized
one time- Remember the Air Canada DC-9 lavatory fire -Cinncinati- the pilots were not given the right information and this was a contributing factor in the pilots delaying diversion and emer descent. Communication that was not up to par cost people their lives.