PPRuNe Forums - Swiss A321 tail strike during go around at Geneva March 2014

PPRuNe Forums (https://www.pprune.org/)

- Safety, CRM, QA & Emergency Response Planning (https://www.pprune.org/safety-crm-qa-emergency-response-planning-93/)

- - Swiss A321 tail strike during go around at Geneva March 2014 (https://www.pprune.org/safety-crm-qa-emergency-response-planning/588870-swiss-a321-tail-strike-during-go-around-geneva-march-2014-a.html)

Swiss A321 tail strike during go around at Geneva March 2014

https://aviation-safety.net/wikibase/wiki.php?id=164623

Via Aviation Safety Network:

Quote:

Narrative:
Flight SWR2806, an Airbus A321, operated a scheduled domestic service from Zürich to Geneva, Switzerland. On this flight, the copilot was Pilot Flying.
After an uneventful cruise, the approach to runway 05 was normal. The approach was stable, without autopilot and without automatic thrust control. The crew received the landing clearance on short final approach when the aircraft was at 500 ft. agl.
The copilot felt the touchdown was unusually hard (1,4 g) and had the feeling that the aircraft had bounced for a brief moment, but that was not the case. She decided to go around. The rear of the aircraft touched the runway during the go around, sustaining minor damage.
A new approach was carried out to the runway 05 by means of radar guidance. This, like the subsequent landing, was uneventful.

Causes
The serious incident occurred due to the rear of the commercial aircraft touching the runway, because the pilot flying pulled the sidestick firmly to the backstop when initiating a go around.
The following factors have contributed to the serious incident:
- Because of the limited experience, the pilot flying estimated that the landing was a bounced landing.
- Since the two sidesticks are not linked, the tactical feedback was missing from the pilot monitoring, which made it difficult for him to recognize the brusque sidestick movement in time.
- The crew did not perceive the high pitch up.

The investigation has identified the following factor, which did not affect the development and the course of the serious incident, but which is still a risk factor:
- The air navigation service did not specifically inform the crew that the tailstrike had been observed during the go around.

Aircraft damage
https://cdn.aviation-safety.net/phot...4430HB-IOC.jpg

Quote:

- Since the two sidesticks are not linked, the tactical feedback was missing from the pilot monitoring, which made it difficult for him to recognize the brusque sidestick movement in time.

Let the debate commence.

In the case of a number of colleagues and myself, it started circa-1985.

European policy low time FOs

The Euro policy of hiring low time FOs needs to be changed to hiring FOs with more hours and jet experience.

Why ? Look at the U.S this kind of incident does not happen.

Quote:

Originally Posted by Jimmy Hoffa Rocks (Post 9637372)

The Euro policy of hiring low time FOs needs to be changed to hiring FOs with more hours and jet experience.

Why ? Look at the U.S this kind of incident does not happen.

The AIRBUS flight ops notes are good to read for bounced landing recovery which talk about maintaining pitch attitude, etc,

That's an interesting comment because, and I may be wrong, but I don't recall any tail strikes on A320's in the UK during the 80's and 90's, but in those days the majority of A320 FO's had at least 1500 hours. I should add that the problem of flying A319, A320 and A321, which I understand require different pitch up angles, and hence the longer A321 is more likely to have a tail strike, especially if the F/O and Captain think there are in a A319

Here is a few questions for A320 pilots:

(a) I seem to recall that the rear section of the A320 in the 80's was not reinforced against tailstrikes, as the software protected such an attitude, am I right or has something changed.

(b) Why is the pitch up for landing, T/O and go around not standardised across the A319, A320 and A321, to the A321 pitch up. I wouldn't imagine it would be significant in performance for a relatively small aircraft operating out of a large airport.

(c) During a go around, would that require pulling the sidestick to the back stop, surely the pilot would select the attitude to the correct nose up attitude for the aircraft variant.

Homsap:

a) No, tailstrike not prevented by software. On latter models an indicator is on the PFD to show limits and a 'Pitch Pitch' aural warning from the FWC. Edit: There was a ELAC update a few years back that 'helped' avoid but wouldn't prevent tailstrike during landing in case of gross mishandling.

b) It is standard, there is little difference between 319/320/321 (never flown the 318) The 319/320 pretty much the same. 321 flies like a bigger aircraft but pitch the same

c) Indeed, it would be very very rare to hit the backstop of the sidestick controller. We are never really meant to hit the limits, but I do on roll on occasion. On pitch, I can think of 2 events in my time on it.

It is no issue flying the different variants unless you mishandle the aircraft to an extreme.

Tom775257...

I found this in UK AAIB report, this doesn't agree with your point (b):

Aircraft information. The Airbus A321 entered service in 1994. The aircraft has a longer fuselage than the A320 and different tailstrike geometry. The manufacturer advises that, with the main gear oleo fully compressed and wings level, the pitch attitude limit for the A321 is 9.7° and for the A320 it is 11.7°.

Or are you saying your airline applies the pitch of 9.7 across the A319/A320/A321 as that would seem the seem the sensible approach.

The AAIB report can be found at:

https://assets.publishing.service.go...EUXF_07-16.pdf

Sorry I wasn't clear enough. What I mean is that your pitch attitudes to fly are fairly similar between the aircraft in the various flight phases. So your approach/flare pitch attitudes are similar and should be nowhere near the tailstrike pitch limit in any of the types.

Tailstrike pitch attitude is indeed different between the various A320 series members. For example we call 'pitch pitch' during the flare on the A321 at 7.5 degrees and at 10 degrees on the A320 to alert the other pilot to lower the nose.

Tom77557......

You figures are are interesting as they give a margin below the Airbus figures, but is there any reason why within an airline you couldn't apply 7.5 pitch up on both the A320 and A321, as it would seem less prone to error?

I think in the previous quoted G-EUXF the co pilot (PF) had a figure of 11.7 in his/her mind at the time of the tail strike.

Just to add, in the G-EUXF tailstrike the PFR recorded 9.8, so the Airbus limit of 9.7 is spot on for the A321, and the co pilot (PF) had a total of 430 flying hours. The report also states the following:

"The co-pilot was aware of the potential for a tailstrike on the A321 but recalled being advised during training that 11° nose-up was the pitch attitude for ground contact on landing".