The importance of repetitive go-around training in IMC or night.
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The importance of repetitive go-around training in IMC or night.
Flight International 30 May-5 June 2017, published an article by David Kaminski-Morrow entitled "EASA seeks to make go-around safer."
Among other comments, the article states high thrust settings generate sudden acceleration and sharp pitch-up moments, and the combination of these - especially in low visibility conditions - can create somatogravic illusions...pilot reactions to this false impression can result in the aircraft being inadvertently pushed nose-down during a go-around." EASA is seeking comment proposals to ensure new aircraft have design features that do not create an unacceptable risk of losing control of the trajectory - and the aircraft as a whole - during a missed approach.
One can read into that last statement the inclusion of still more automation.
While somatogravic illusion has frequently been touted by investigators as a possible contributory cause of take off or go-around accidents there are usually no survivors to confirm this.
EASA in the meantime leans on manufacturers to install additional automation to minimise the chances of pilots of crashing during a go-around. Rather than spend money on more sophisticated computer systems, I would have thought it would be far better to include better go-around training during type rating training in the simulator and in recurrent training.
Go-around accidents have highlighted the lack of instrument flying ability by some pilots used to reliance on automatics. The solution lies in more accent on go-around training during scheduled simulator sessions. The only way instrument flying ability and scan is improved during go-around training is by going back to square one and practicing manual raw data no flight director go-arounds from runway level where fast and efficient instrument scan is vital - particularly during the flap retract and acceleration phase where trim changes are continually happening. Practice makes perfect.
Among other comments, the article states high thrust settings generate sudden acceleration and sharp pitch-up moments, and the combination of these - especially in low visibility conditions - can create somatogravic illusions...pilot reactions to this false impression can result in the aircraft being inadvertently pushed nose-down during a go-around." EASA is seeking comment proposals to ensure new aircraft have design features that do not create an unacceptable risk of losing control of the trajectory - and the aircraft as a whole - during a missed approach.
One can read into that last statement the inclusion of still more automation.
While somatogravic illusion has frequently been touted by investigators as a possible contributory cause of take off or go-around accidents there are usually no survivors to confirm this.
EASA in the meantime leans on manufacturers to install additional automation to minimise the chances of pilots of crashing during a go-around. Rather than spend money on more sophisticated computer systems, I would have thought it would be far better to include better go-around training during type rating training in the simulator and in recurrent training.
Go-around accidents have highlighted the lack of instrument flying ability by some pilots used to reliance on automatics. The solution lies in more accent on go-around training during scheduled simulator sessions. The only way instrument flying ability and scan is improved during go-around training is by going back to square one and practicing manual raw data no flight director go-arounds from runway level where fast and efficient instrument scan is vital - particularly during the flap retract and acceleration phase where trim changes are continually happening. Practice makes perfect.
Last edited by Centaurus; 25th Jun 2017 at 14:27.
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Modern jets can be a bit more difficult, especially with low go around altitudes. I agree that proper and frequent training is crucial.
But it is not done. Due to:......not a mandatory parameter in TR's/OPC/LPC's:...lack of imagination from many HOT's:...they are included numerous times in LVO training, but then the A/P + A/T does it for you.
Low level offs are interesting. They are not common, but they can be created by ATC giving a GA at higher than DA. The real world creates incidents and difficulties that are not always trained for, not expected. Let's consider including the following, after a competent GA all engine training has been mastered. These would be included in RST sessions.
1. ATC GA call at 500' above DA IMC = short climb to MAA like a ow level. Single channel ILS on B737 will cause disconnect.
2. ATC GA call before landing flap is selected VMC = about 1200' agl. Cause some confi=usin as the call is "GA F15" but you are already at F15. How many will select F5???
3. ATC GA call "abandon approach" at platform altitude which is 500' below MAA. You'll be F1 or F5 and there will be a 'DUH' moment. What to do with the MCP as the A/P disconnects, or not, depending on if you press TOGA. Full and discretionary use of MCP use is not often trained. It really is confusing for those who do not understand the capabilities of the systems.
In many companies they have a trained monkey single choice GA profile that is written for a GA at DA/MDA due to no contact. One size fits all; until it doesn't. They have trained a 50' wave off (startle factor & mandatory) but again this is from full landing configuration so there is no real difference in the profile.
The screw ups come from GA's made at odd moments. These need some imagination to include in RST, but they're not. Shame.
But it is not done. Due to:......not a mandatory parameter in TR's/OPC/LPC's:...lack of imagination from many HOT's:...they are included numerous times in LVO training, but then the A/P + A/T does it for you.
Low level offs are interesting. They are not common, but they can be created by ATC giving a GA at higher than DA. The real world creates incidents and difficulties that are not always trained for, not expected. Let's consider including the following, after a competent GA all engine training has been mastered. These would be included in RST sessions.
1. ATC GA call at 500' above DA IMC = short climb to MAA like a ow level. Single channel ILS on B737 will cause disconnect.
2. ATC GA call before landing flap is selected VMC = about 1200' agl. Cause some confi=usin as the call is "GA F15" but you are already at F15. How many will select F5???
3. ATC GA call "abandon approach" at platform altitude which is 500' below MAA. You'll be F1 or F5 and there will be a 'DUH' moment. What to do with the MCP as the A/P disconnects, or not, depending on if you press TOGA. Full and discretionary use of MCP use is not often trained. It really is confusing for those who do not understand the capabilities of the systems.
In many companies they have a trained monkey single choice GA profile that is written for a GA at DA/MDA due to no contact. One size fits all; until it doesn't. They have trained a 50' wave off (startle factor & mandatory) but again this is from full landing configuration so there is no real difference in the profile.
The screw ups come from GA's made at odd moments. These need some imagination to include in RST, but they're not. Shame.
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Out last training session had included a interesting variety of go-arounds from above go-around altitude down to the surface. It was very interesting and worthwhile training. But a very important consideration that not has not been discussed above is the difference between the g sensation in the sim and that experienced in real life. Whilst training in the sim. has a value, this is particular manoeuvre should be regularly practiced in the real thing because of this difference.
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I was thinking about my last post whilst working in my garage. Quite why I don't know but something gnawing on the back of my mind. Possibly simulator training is responsible for somotogravic illiusions in the real thing? Being fixed to ground there is only so much movement you can experience. Worse, you may well try to recreate the g loading you generate in the sim. during a go-around in the real thing. So if you have not had the (mis)fortune to experience a recent go-around, your most recent experiences will have been in the sims. As we all know the sim. experience will leave you at ground level and unfortunately some real ones have ended up there as well.
Centaurus, your thread title overplays the training aspects, as does the discussion relative to the background EASA proposal: NPA 2017-06.
The NPA is directed at CA 25 aircraft and manufacturers, there is little training content if any, excepting using new/updated systems, monitoring more automation, and managing what could be greater complexity in operation.
The NPA is based on past accidents where the use of lower GA thrust and modified autotrim operation may have provided alleviation. Although EASA has already discussed this with manufacturers, the benefits appear low especially as there is no clear cut cause; other than to blame the human via more training required with existing systems (manufacturers view?)
The referenced ASAGA study actually makes a better case for training, in particular which instruments to use, and when, and knowledge of critical selections and annunciations.
Pitch, Power, and Speed opposed to just the first two; not more training, just better training of the key aspects.
EASA GA training is in SIB 2014-09 - startle, tunnel vision, communication, and management.
I suspect that the manufacturers will have fun with the part 25 NPA, and doubt that there will be any real activity. Cost will be a driver, particularly when judged against a ‘few’ accidents which involved the targeted features and the difficulty proving that these dominated human behaviour, as much as we might wish to believe that they did.
EASA gets rather tangled up with somatogravic illusions. The dominant component is longitudinal acceleration which tends towards a nose down pitch input; however the speed change from approach to GA is generally small, thus the acceleration is low or short lived. EASA also gets concerned about the combination with high pitch attitude and rate, which if excessive might actually be mitigated with lowering the nose due to illusion.
Re simulation; generally training simulators are incapable of generating accelerations and thus any illusion. EASA discusses some interesting research by NLR who have simulated the effect, but only with what appears to be a simulator within a centrifuge !
The NPA is directed at CA 25 aircraft and manufacturers, there is little training content if any, excepting using new/updated systems, monitoring more automation, and managing what could be greater complexity in operation.
The NPA is based on past accidents where the use of lower GA thrust and modified autotrim operation may have provided alleviation. Although EASA has already discussed this with manufacturers, the benefits appear low especially as there is no clear cut cause; other than to blame the human via more training required with existing systems (manufacturers view?)
The referenced ASAGA study actually makes a better case for training, in particular which instruments to use, and when, and knowledge of critical selections and annunciations.
Pitch, Power, and Speed opposed to just the first two; not more training, just better training of the key aspects.
EASA GA training is in SIB 2014-09 - startle, tunnel vision, communication, and management.
I suspect that the manufacturers will have fun with the part 25 NPA, and doubt that there will be any real activity. Cost will be a driver, particularly when judged against a ‘few’ accidents which involved the targeted features and the difficulty proving that these dominated human behaviour, as much as we might wish to believe that they did.
EASA gets rather tangled up with somatogravic illusions. The dominant component is longitudinal acceleration which tends towards a nose down pitch input; however the speed change from approach to GA is generally small, thus the acceleration is low or short lived. EASA also gets concerned about the combination with high pitch attitude and rate, which if excessive might actually be mitigated with lowering the nose due to illusion.
Re simulation; generally training simulators are incapable of generating accelerations and thus any illusion. EASA discusses some interesting research by NLR who have simulated the effect, but only with what appears to be a simulator within a centrifuge !
