To Go Around or Not to Go Around - That is the Question
Thread Starter
Join Date: Mar 2017
Location: Ex Europe
Posts: 76
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
To Go Around or Not to Go Around - That is the Question
The Flight Safety Foundation says 54 percent of all accidents could potentially be avoided if the flying pilot had executed a timely go-around, simply bringing up the power and returning for another attempt at landing, often because the first approach was in some way unstable. The FSF recently learned that 83 percent of runway excursions studied over the past 16 years could also have been avoided if only the crew had gone around. In January, the crew of a Boeing 747 waited too long to attempt a go-around during a botched approach to Manas International airport in Kyrgyzstan. The aircraft crashed during the go-around, killing all four crewmembers and 35 people on the ground.
FSF Study: Pilots Still Don?t Go Around | Flying Magazine
The entire study can be found here...
https://flightsafety.org/wp-content/...tudy_final.pdf
As pilots, co-pilots here....why are so few go arounds being executed...in your opinion?
Is the study above accurate in its conclusions?
FSF Study: Pilots Still Don?t Go Around | Flying Magazine
The entire study can be found here...
https://flightsafety.org/wp-content/...tudy_final.pdf
As pilots, co-pilots here....why are so few go arounds being executed...in your opinion?
Is the study above accurate in its conclusions?
Join Date: Jan 2006
Location: Between a rock and a hard place
Posts: 1,267
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
As pilots, co-pilots here....why are so few go arounds being executed...in your opinion?
Then I think every pilot is suffering, to some degree, from the press-on-itis "want to get the job done" syndrome.
Fatigue certainly doesn't help in the decision making process either.
configsafenot, wrong question, similar to FSF ill directed objectives in the report.
Not why do humans violate (we are human), why so few go-arounds, but what features contribute to the everyday successes.
The objective should be to increase the number of successful approaches and landings, not increase the go-around rate.
Not why do humans violate (we are human), why so few go-arounds, but what features contribute to the everyday successes.
The objective should be to increase the number of successful approaches and landings, not increase the go-around rate.
Join Date: Apr 2005
Location: Australia
Posts: 1,414
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Let's not suffer from political correctness when it comes to the cause of many aircraft accidents. There are some countries where the ethnic culture of "real men don't go around" permeates pilot thinking. It's all tied up with loss of face syndrome. 
I've formed the opinion that an increase in the go around rate may well be a good thing. More acceptance of it, less landing risks and a cultural change that an occasional go around is to be expected in normal operations. I went around recently at a major airportwhen the wind suddenly swung around from a head wind to a 12-19 tailwind, all properly done, short P.A. when time permitted and an into wind landing. Mentioned it to some colleagues who seem to think it was a drama. It's a relatively simple manouver not an emergency.
It's a relatively simple manouver not an emergency.
An IMC/night go-around in any jet transport requires careful instrument flying; especially if significant pitch occurs up due under-slung engines. While an automatic pilot go-around still requires careful monitoring of flight instruments, a manual go-around can be a handful and requires fast thinking and fast scanning. There are some pilots so wedded to total automation, that to have to fall back on a manual go-around becomes quite a frightening prospect to them
Consol, I agree in part, because those scenarios contribute to learning, particularly in identifying the need to change the course of action.
However, to what extent can we use normal operations for training or to gain experience? In real threat situations action is a must, elsewhere perhaps 'gaining experience' is judged too expensive.
A more efficient objective would be, as far as possible, to avoid the potential for 'real' scenarios; but as you identify this is not always possible.
We need to train pilots how to identify and manage the unexpected, how to adapt and not rely on a rule or procedure; knowing when / when not to deviate. Training for thinking - how to operate; not just training to fly - how to move controls.
The FSF report specifically targets violation.
The report considers that humans 'deliberately' deviate from the required action. This view assumes that the human is aware of the error, but this overlooks human weaknesses in perception; natural limits of human performance.
What do pilots do when they are not aware of error? Violate rules, but is this deliberate?
However, to what extent can we use normal operations for training or to gain experience? In real threat situations action is a must, elsewhere perhaps 'gaining experience' is judged too expensive.
A more efficient objective would be, as far as possible, to avoid the potential for 'real' scenarios; but as you identify this is not always possible.
We need to train pilots how to identify and manage the unexpected, how to adapt and not rely on a rule or procedure; knowing when / when not to deviate. Training for thinking - how to operate; not just training to fly - how to move controls.
The FSF report specifically targets violation.
The report considers that humans 'deliberately' deviate from the required action. This view assumes that the human is aware of the error, but this overlooks human weaknesses in perception; natural limits of human performance.
What do pilots do when they are not aware of error? Violate rules, but is this deliberate?
Join Date: Mar 2001
Location: I wouldn't know.
Posts: 4,497
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Seeing the number of safety reports, i would guess yes, that many who continue below the gate do so fully knowing that the book says they should go around. Probably not all, but most.
FSF chose to publish the report based on a weak psychological study of human behaviour. The study indicates the difficulty, even the futility of attempting to universally correct specific human behaviour without considering context.
Thus the report expands to cover a range of subjects perceived to be associated with approach and landing accidents, collected under the title of failure to GA. The subsequent widespread view fails to identify the required background knowledge to enable definitive solutions; - more 'should do' opposed to 'how to'.
This is a typical scatter gun approach - "well we hit the wall", but with little hope of killing the bug. But what is the bug, what's the real problem; not GA, it's the need for consistent successful landings.
The FSF might better have revisited the widely acclaimed ALAR tool kit, update and emphasise the relevant proposals, particularly with the advent of TALPA, and the continuing inability of the FAA to mandate rules for landing performance.
Although the stabilised approach criteria originated from ALAR, it was intended as guidance for operators to adapt, particularly for the speed target which was energetically debated at the time, and subsequently identified as inappropriate in recent conferences; this is further complicated by operators using a recommendation as a rule.
The FSF might also encourage the FAA to consolidate advice and definitions relating to landing; there is little point in minimising landing risk by using new data (FOLD), but still refer to an ill defined 'landing zone' or the first '3000 ft' in older documents.
A key component of the ALAR tool kit was the pre-landing briefing where crews could identify threats and risks, mentally prepare for a GA, and consider the landing conditions. Thus any subsequent need for GA should be less of a surprise or have hidden threats.
It might even be possible to remove stabilised criteria if there was greater focus on the landing performance and aiding crews to understand the risks. A continued approach would be based on risk management for the landing, there should be no need for rules and 'either or' decisions; unacceptable risk - then at any stage of the approach don't continue with the intent to land.
Return the power of assessment and decision making (risk assessment) to the crew; particularly because they get many more landings right than not so.
Thus the report expands to cover a range of subjects perceived to be associated with approach and landing accidents, collected under the title of failure to GA. The subsequent widespread view fails to identify the required background knowledge to enable definitive solutions; - more 'should do' opposed to 'how to'.
This is a typical scatter gun approach - "well we hit the wall", but with little hope of killing the bug. But what is the bug, what's the real problem; not GA, it's the need for consistent successful landings.
The FSF might better have revisited the widely acclaimed ALAR tool kit, update and emphasise the relevant proposals, particularly with the advent of TALPA, and the continuing inability of the FAA to mandate rules for landing performance.
Although the stabilised approach criteria originated from ALAR, it was intended as guidance for operators to adapt, particularly for the speed target which was energetically debated at the time, and subsequently identified as inappropriate in recent conferences; this is further complicated by operators using a recommendation as a rule.
The FSF might also encourage the FAA to consolidate advice and definitions relating to landing; there is little point in minimising landing risk by using new data (FOLD), but still refer to an ill defined 'landing zone' or the first '3000 ft' in older documents.
A key component of the ALAR tool kit was the pre-landing briefing where crews could identify threats and risks, mentally prepare for a GA, and consider the landing conditions. Thus any subsequent need for GA should be less of a surprise or have hidden threats.
It might even be possible to remove stabilised criteria if there was greater focus on the landing performance and aiding crews to understand the risks. A continued approach would be based on risk management for the landing, there should be no need for rules and 'either or' decisions; unacceptable risk - then at any stage of the approach don't continue with the intent to land.
Return the power of assessment and decision making (risk assessment) to the crew; particularly because they get many more landings right than not so.
Discussions on the FSF report elsewhere, questions what might change if all of the limitations for a stabilised approach were removed. The objective of stability before landing would remain, but without being 'boxed in' by SOPs, pilots might achieve more 'successes' because they have been allowed to use their expertise and judgement.
A change could also aid identifying the real problem areas in landing. Fast, long landings, might still occur, but this might place greater focus on the earlier stages of the approach.
The FSF data independently lists deviations in glidepath, VS, and airspeed, but jointly these might be as expected if the initial approach vectoring was too high; the pilot puts the nose down, speed increases, high VS. Three issues separated in data, but jointly stemming from a single earlier event.
The industry needs to pay more attention to these 'remote' issues.
A37575, sometimes it helps to be politically correct. Those 'errant' crews who may not be disposed to a GA might similarly have problems identifying or rejecting a high, fast intermediate approach. Similarly, removing a bias might identify problems with ATC or specific operations; or even corporate pressure.
The industry should consider moving time pressured tactical decisions to a more strategic point during the approach. Emphasise the descent / pre landing briefing - 'what ifs' for changes in ATC, wind, runway conditions; encourage crews to be be prepared.
A change could also aid identifying the real problem areas in landing. Fast, long landings, might still occur, but this might place greater focus on the earlier stages of the approach.
The FSF data independently lists deviations in glidepath, VS, and airspeed, but jointly these might be as expected if the initial approach vectoring was too high; the pilot puts the nose down, speed increases, high VS. Three issues separated in data, but jointly stemming from a single earlier event.
The industry needs to pay more attention to these 'remote' issues.
A37575, sometimes it helps to be politically correct. Those 'errant' crews who may not be disposed to a GA might similarly have problems identifying or rejecting a high, fast intermediate approach. Similarly, removing a bias might identify problems with ATC or specific operations; or even corporate pressure.
The industry should consider moving time pressured tactical decisions to a more strategic point during the approach. Emphasise the descent / pre landing briefing - 'what ifs' for changes in ATC, wind, runway conditions; encourage crews to be be prepared.
Many useful observations and discussion points so far. But I see some large (statistically very significant) "elephants in the room" in this FSF study.
First, a review of the contributors (Page 1) indicates no contributors to the discussion or analysis of the study based in Africa or Asia. NONE.
Next, a review of Tables 2, 4 and 5 shows the responses to the questions asked were categorised geographically thus:
• Asia: averaged 25 or 26 % of the respondents
• Africa: averaged less than 1% of respondents
Considering where most of the world’s landing accidents occur (see ICAO stats available at: http://www.icao.int/safety/iStars/Pa...tatistics.aspx ), the results, lessons learned and suggested actions are at best, deeply flawed. In this instance the FSF’s lack of understanding of the effects of geography, economics, politics and culture on aviation safety is apparent.
First, a review of the contributors (Page 1) indicates no contributors to the discussion or analysis of the study based in Africa or Asia. NONE.
Next, a review of Tables 2, 4 and 5 shows the responses to the questions asked were categorised geographically thus:
• Asia: averaged 25 or 26 % of the respondents
• Africa: averaged less than 1% of respondents
Considering where most of the world’s landing accidents occur (see ICAO stats available at: http://www.icao.int/safety/iStars/Pa...tatistics.aspx ), the results, lessons learned and suggested actions are at best, deeply flawed. In this instance the FSF’s lack of understanding of the effects of geography, economics, politics and culture on aviation safety is apparent.
Join Date: Dec 2003
Location: England
Posts: 105
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
To answer the original question posted by Config based on many years as a UK operator,
So few go-arounds are being executed (by UK carriers specifically) because, frankly, the SOP's are predominantly written to be stable by 1000'. We teach our crew to assess and think ahead of the aircraft sufficiently to assist in the process.
I disagree with 172's point about "rarely practiced". I would say in almost every single sim detail GA's are practiced, in one form or another. These include IMC, VMC, OEI, discontinued approach (when FCU selected Alt is below your current alt), manual flight, automatic flight and baulked landings.
I have flown commercial types that require manual only GA's (once the button is pushed) and fully auto types. I average around 1 or 2 per year and very rarely is it perfect. Is it safe, yes. Perfect, rarely.
I have had one GA from an unstable approach (briefed but didn't account for an early Rad Alt 1000) but the remainder have all been weather related. The weather scenario really is binary: you either have the correct met at decide, or you don't.
Are GA's situations in the UK being deliberately violated - by "sound" operators, unlikely. Do flights continue when they shouldn't during rough conditions? Sometimes, but that's what a just safety culture is all about (fill in an ASR, the flight safety team assess it and you chat about it if required so we can all learn). Is a GA a routine manoeuvre? Absolutely, but it is often mis-handled. Is it regularly practiced? Yes, lots.
As for the FSF report - I totally agree with the criticism cited already. A bad report with lack of genuine substance.
No, it is not accurate in its conclusions.
So few go-arounds are being executed (by UK carriers specifically) because, frankly, the SOP's are predominantly written to be stable by 1000'. We teach our crew to assess and think ahead of the aircraft sufficiently to assist in the process.
I disagree with 172's point about "rarely practiced". I would say in almost every single sim detail GA's are practiced, in one form or another. These include IMC, VMC, OEI, discontinued approach (when FCU selected Alt is below your current alt), manual flight, automatic flight and baulked landings.
I have flown commercial types that require manual only GA's (once the button is pushed) and fully auto types. I average around 1 or 2 per year and very rarely is it perfect. Is it safe, yes. Perfect, rarely.
I have had one GA from an unstable approach (briefed but didn't account for an early Rad Alt 1000) but the remainder have all been weather related. The weather scenario really is binary: you either have the correct met at decide, or you don't.
Are GA's situations in the UK being deliberately violated - by "sound" operators, unlikely. Do flights continue when they shouldn't during rough conditions? Sometimes, but that's what a just safety culture is all about (fill in an ASR, the flight safety team assess it and you chat about it if required so we can all learn). Is a GA a routine manoeuvre? Absolutely, but it is often mis-handled. Is it regularly practiced? Yes, lots.
As for the FSF report - I totally agree with the criticism cited already. A bad report with lack of genuine substance.
No, it is not accurate in its conclusions.
Always worked on the mind set of, "this is a GA to a possible landing" and when the weather was bad I'd brief the same to the crew - seemed to really take the surprise and apprehension out of it all
