EASA changing their safety strategy.
Thread Starter
EASA changing their safety strategy.
A welcome, or at least interesting change in strategy by EASA.
Patrick Ky; "EASA is moving away from a legal approach to regulating to one that is focused on safety. The rulemaking branch was reshaped to team with the oversight branch for better understanding of how the rules are implemented and what their effects are, he said. The regulators were also reminded to focus more on risk than on prescriptive rulemaking. We are not aviation lawyers.
Regulation is not the goal. The goal is safety.”
A cynical view of this might question that if EASA have been not focused on safety, then what have they been doing?
And why continue to implement rules without fully understanding their effect?
" ... EASA should rely more on mature safety management systems that are already in place, and partner on best practices, rather than prescribing those practices. This is a fundamental change,”
Is the assumption that mature safety management systems exist correct; if so how are these 'good' systems identified.
Is the implied causal link that maturity implies a good safety system correct?
We are only as good as the next accident; in modern operations many emerging risks may not be clearly identifiable.
Ky Outlines Vision for More Flexible EASA | Business Aviation News: Aviation International News
Patrick Ky; "EASA is moving away from a legal approach to regulating to one that is focused on safety. The rulemaking branch was reshaped to team with the oversight branch for better understanding of how the rules are implemented and what their effects are, he said. The regulators were also reminded to focus more on risk than on prescriptive rulemaking. We are not aviation lawyers.
Regulation is not the goal. The goal is safety.”
A cynical view of this might question that if EASA have been not focused on safety, then what have they been doing?
And why continue to implement rules without fully understanding their effect?
" ... EASA should rely more on mature safety management systems that are already in place, and partner on best practices, rather than prescribing those practices. This is a fundamental change,”
Is the assumption that mature safety management systems exist correct; if so how are these 'good' systems identified.
Is the implied causal link that maturity implies a good safety system correct?
We are only as good as the next accident; in modern operations many emerging risks may not be clearly identifiable.
Ky Outlines Vision for More Flexible EASA | Business Aviation News: Aviation International News
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European Aviation Safety Agency
You would have thought that their mission was contained in their title. But no. Like every other European institution all they ever do, in this case for €150 million a year, is bash out rules and regulations. Quite why, only they know, but overall effect of their activity has been to make it highly likely that you'll break a rule - if for no other reason than they changed something - again. I'm sure that if an alien arrived in an EASA office (have you seen their locations?) he would think he's stumbled across a paper factory.
The only good EASA does is to prevent the clowns who work for it interfering elsewhere in the EU system. We do need a central authority, but maybe they should make a new start by eliminating rules and regulations. Let's face it, their task is pretty simple. It's to stop aircraft from bumping into things and things bumping into aircraft.
The only good EASA does is to prevent the clowns who work for it interfering elsewhere in the EU system. We do need a central authority, but maybe they should make a new start by eliminating rules and regulations. Let's face it, their task is pretty simple. It's to stop aircraft from bumping into things and things bumping into aircraft.
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We do need a central authority,
We had ICAO as a "central authority", and ICAO Members who translated ICAO SARPs into law. That worked beautifully for 50 years, then the EU Commission saw a way to add to its empire and EASA was born.
EASA is simply a huge obstruction to the process of translating ICAO SARPs into law, making it a process that takes years instead of months.
The pinnacle of idiocy was EASA's territory grab into airport regulation, on the pretext, as with everything else, that a "level playing field" had to be created. Why? Because doing so is impossible the regulations (Annex 14 with thousands of pointless words added) had to include that bureaucratic nonsense, the "allowable deficiency" or some such, so that no-one actually had to comply with anything they did not comply with up to that point.
All that the "level playing field" means is that EASA regulations represent the standard attainable by the worst, so that every Member's standards have been reduced to the lowest common denominator. Or rather, they would do were it not for the fact that enforcement standards vary wildly among EASA Member States, something EASA carefully pretends does not happen.
EASA is a farcical bureaucracy, staffed by people unemployable elsewhere, cast-offs from Member States' regulatory authorities. Anyone who has sat through many of its workshops, as I have on different subjects, is only too aware of the appalling standard of knowledge among its staff, to say nothing of the bumbling amateurism and zero presentational skills with which these affairs are run.
Returning to the thread, sort of, EASA's disorganised, incompetent and erratic behaviour over the introduction of Safety Management is a case study in bureaucratic stupidity and vacillation.
Last edited by Capot; 2nd Jun 2016 at 23:45.
Thread Starter
Cabot, PM, strong views, but it would be unfair to cite the EU as the problem.
Whist the legal basis of the European Parliament could have influenced the style of safety regulation, it is the mindset that safety can be 'enforced' by regulation which is the real problem. Safety is not definitive, something which can be achieved; it is that which is done, an activity, a dynamic process which must continually evolve.
The EASA regulatory approach to safety is stalling; it is cluttered, a complex ineffectual bureaucracy, and out of touch with real operations. In its defence, the industry is changing faster than regulations can react; thus there is a need to consider a new view of safety, but is the view outlined above sufficient?
Will the change of emphasis towards SMS and oversight be sufficient for the industry's future safety needs? By the time that EASA implements the planned change the industry may well require even more advanced safety activities.
Thus it would be better for EASA to consider a more radical approach to safety, future developments of SMS, new ways of thinking about safety, and hopefully more instep with the practical industry.
Avoid 'catch up' management, set the future standard.
"Safety is a dynamic non-event" (Weick and Sutcliffe).
EASA requires radical change to avoid being seen as a 'non-dynamic entity'.
Whist the legal basis of the European Parliament could have influenced the style of safety regulation, it is the mindset that safety can be 'enforced' by regulation which is the real problem. Safety is not definitive, something which can be achieved; it is that which is done, an activity, a dynamic process which must continually evolve.
The EASA regulatory approach to safety is stalling; it is cluttered, a complex ineffectual bureaucracy, and out of touch with real operations. In its defence, the industry is changing faster than regulations can react; thus there is a need to consider a new view of safety, but is the view outlined above sufficient?
Will the change of emphasis towards SMS and oversight be sufficient for the industry's future safety needs? By the time that EASA implements the planned change the industry may well require even more advanced safety activities.
Thus it would be better for EASA to consider a more radical approach to safety, future developments of SMS, new ways of thinking about safety, and hopefully more instep with the practical industry.
Avoid 'catch up' management, set the future standard.
"Safety is a dynamic non-event" (Weick and Sutcliffe).
EASA requires radical change to avoid being seen as a 'non-dynamic entity'.
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EASA requires radical change to avoid being seen as a 'non-dynamic entity'
I think we have to blame the EU for EASA's existence. The Commission's desire to embrace more and more control over all activities in all Member States is the root cause for that. The "Democratic" oversight that we keepon hearing about is a fig leaf; the Commission does what it wants to, and the Council and Parliament wave it through, mostly with no understanding whatsoever of the victim industry.
Last edited by Capot; 5th Jun 2016 at 17:31.
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The whole processes implemented by EASA are made to suit only bureaucrats and people with too much time... aka lobbyists.
And that is the real problem of the EU as a whole and its authorities such as the EASA. Single opinions of peole with a certain interest do have an influence thats is more than just unhealthy. And as Capot said at least some of the personell is just plainly unsuitable.
Added tot hat come some national CAAs such as the LBA in Germany that are just full of crap and the few people that are good are being trapped in a civil servants system, that simply works by: everything that is not especially allowed is forbidden, not how can we assure a balance between safe and doable.
NCC is one of the stories that could be a success and are not. I´m so sick an tired of this ****. 17 years to pension...
And that is the real problem of the EU as a whole and its authorities such as the EASA. Single opinions of peole with a certain interest do have an influence thats is more than just unhealthy. And as Capot said at least some of the personell is just plainly unsuitable.
Added tot hat come some national CAAs such as the LBA in Germany that are just full of crap and the few people that are good are being trapped in a civil servants system, that simply works by: everything that is not especially allowed is forbidden, not how can we assure a balance between safe and doable.
NCC is one of the stories that could be a success and are not. I´m so sick an tired of this ****. 17 years to pension...
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You would have thought that their mission was contained in their title.
EASA is a farcical bureaucracy, staffed by people unemployable elsewhere, cast-offs from Member States' regulatory authorities. Anyone who has sat through many of its workshops, as I have on different subjects, is only too aware of the appalling standard of knowledge among its staff, to say nothing of the bumbling amateurism and zero presentational skills with which these affairs are run.
Sadly, there is a lot of truth stated in this thread though.
Thank you for your attention!
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Yes I was being harsh, because I think it's time that someone calls "Halt" to EASA's mindless expansion for the sake of expansion, partly by calling a spade a spade.
The move to change EASA's name - and presumably purpose - to allow it to plunge into areas unconnected with safety (which can only be economic) fills me with horror. We can expect the same standards of expertise and professional competence, or rather lack of it, to be applied in a new European Union Aviation Agency, which will, let me guess, simply employ all the ex-EASA staff, probably with a pay increase.
I think we're both saying the same thing, but your version in more, errr, measured. My version stems from the 150 hours or so (I just worked it out) that I have spent undergoing death by Powerpoint, in fractured English, delivered by people with almost no understanding of the Regulation they are proposing.
The worst example, out of many contenders, was a Rule Making Officer (or some-such) introducing the Airports regulation to a workshop a few years ago, who, when asked whether the 800m limitation used was the length of the tarmac end-to-end, or one of the declared distances, did not understand the question. It quickly became apparent that he did not know what was meant by a "declared distance"; when the questioner tried to help by asking if the 800m was, for example, the TORA, he had to ask a platform colleague what a TORA is, over an open microphone. His previous employer was the UK CAA, by the way.
The move to change EASA's name - and presumably purpose - to allow it to plunge into areas unconnected with safety (which can only be economic) fills me with horror. We can expect the same standards of expertise and professional competence, or rather lack of it, to be applied in a new European Union Aviation Agency, which will, let me guess, simply employ all the ex-EASA staff, probably with a pay increase.
a number of so called subject matter experts (policy officers) are in fact not necessarily experts in the subjects that they currently hold responsibility for.
appalling standard of knowledge among its staff, to say nothing of the bumbling amateurism and zero presentational skills with which these affairs are run.
The worst example, out of many contenders, was a Rule Making Officer (or some-such) introducing the Airports regulation to a workshop a few years ago, who, when asked whether the 800m limitation used was the length of the tarmac end-to-end, or one of the declared distances, did not understand the question. It quickly became apparent that he did not know what was meant by a "declared distance"; when the questioner tried to help by asking if the 800m was, for example, the TORA, he had to ask a platform colleague what a TORA is, over an open microphone. His previous employer was the UK CAA, by the way.
Last edited by Capot; 9th Jun 2016 at 11:44.
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a lot of regulator bashing here....and a lot of slating their purpose and skills. I'd be interested in your skills and thoughts about the regulatory landscape, its vision and what you think safety is about...and no, I do not work for EASA!
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In line with the trend of this thread, it is worth noting the EASA complete reversal of it s original position with respects to ATO's for training.
Registered facilities (RF), plain simple structures which have worked well for half a century allowing for aeroclubs to survive and sometimes prosper and expand, under EASA had to become heavy and complex ATO,s ( Approved training organisations).
The change involved huge financial and structural investments, plus a number of staff to be hired which would have allowed only a tiny number of structures to adapt and survive while the majority would simply disappear.
Since 2012 in a race to adapt to meet the deadlines ( deadlines repeatedly posponed) a number of schools and aeroclub were able to make the step..
Now in a complete course reversal EASA, very likely under massive pressures, changed the requirements and reverted to allow setting up of simplified structures they now call DTO,s (Declared training organisations). Even simpler structures when compared to previous RF,s
https://www.caa.co.uk/uploadedFiles/...ows%202017.pdf
But some big damage has already been done, General Aviation has been cast a big blow, those structures which had made the painful move to become ATO,s at least the small ones providing Ppl and associated ratings, are left with huge investments and structures which now are no longer needed.
With all due respect, one would think that there would be some embarassment from EASA, but it s not the case, it has been announced as a great achievement.
Macchiavelli and Kafka are still pulling the strings at EASA, otherwise how can anyone explain why EASA fcl,s ( Flight crew licencing rules) are a document of more than 1200 pages, whereas the FAA equivalent is a tenth of it....
EASA fcl,s need a big reshuffling in the name of simplicity, the rules are so open to interpretation so complex, and supplemented by countless amendments, enabling many Caa,s in particular those from southern european countries to negate user s rights.
And when one contacts EASA as I have done many times to ask for clarification, they turn me back to those stubborn Caa,s stating they are not responsible for the enforcements of those rules. But the problem it s not the enforcement of those rules rather the meaning of them...By the way they also suggest to file a complaint at the European Community for which they provide a link....
It s the dog biting his tail, turning round and round.....
Registered facilities (RF), plain simple structures which have worked well for half a century allowing for aeroclubs to survive and sometimes prosper and expand, under EASA had to become heavy and complex ATO,s ( Approved training organisations).
The change involved huge financial and structural investments, plus a number of staff to be hired which would have allowed only a tiny number of structures to adapt and survive while the majority would simply disappear.
Since 2012 in a race to adapt to meet the deadlines ( deadlines repeatedly posponed) a number of schools and aeroclub were able to make the step..
Now in a complete course reversal EASA, very likely under massive pressures, changed the requirements and reverted to allow setting up of simplified structures they now call DTO,s (Declared training organisations). Even simpler structures when compared to previous RF,s
https://www.caa.co.uk/uploadedFiles/...ows%202017.pdf
But some big damage has already been done, General Aviation has been cast a big blow, those structures which had made the painful move to become ATO,s at least the small ones providing Ppl and associated ratings, are left with huge investments and structures which now are no longer needed.
With all due respect, one would think that there would be some embarassment from EASA, but it s not the case, it has been announced as a great achievement.
Macchiavelli and Kafka are still pulling the strings at EASA, otherwise how can anyone explain why EASA fcl,s ( Flight crew licencing rules) are a document of more than 1200 pages, whereas the FAA equivalent is a tenth of it....
EASA fcl,s need a big reshuffling in the name of simplicity, the rules are so open to interpretation so complex, and supplemented by countless amendments, enabling many Caa,s in particular those from southern european countries to negate user s rights.
And when one contacts EASA as I have done many times to ask for clarification, they turn me back to those stubborn Caa,s stating they are not responsible for the enforcements of those rules. But the problem it s not the enforcement of those rules rather the meaning of them...By the way they also suggest to file a complaint at the European Community for which they provide a link....
It s the dog biting his tail, turning round and round.....
