Serious Incident: Boeing 737-8AS, EI-DPA at Faro, 24 October 2011 Report
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Serious Incident: Boeing 737-8AS, EI-DPA at Faro, 24 October 2011 Report
Serious Incident: Boeing 737-8AS, EI-DPA at Faro Portugal, 24 October 2011 Report released 14 Aug 2014 http://www.aaiu.ie/node/667
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Undetected damage overnight on ramp attributed to microburst. Front of aircraft moved 5m. laterally. Trouble on take-off.
"The investigation determined that the probable cause of the incident was “undetected structural damage caused to the rudder system by violent wind gusts associated with a microburst, while the aircraft was parked.”
One of the contributory factors cited by the report was “the absence of a requirement in the Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM) to comprehensively check the flight control systems of an aircraft which has been subjected to an extreme meteorological event.”
The AAIU has issued a single safety recommendation to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).
The investigation also determined that “given the situation in which they found themselves once the aircraft became airborne, the issues were operationally well handled by the flight crew."
'Significant' storm damage to Ryanair jet not detected until later flight - Independent.ie
"The investigation determined that the probable cause of the incident was “undetected structural damage caused to the rudder system by violent wind gusts associated with a microburst, while the aircraft was parked.”
One of the contributory factors cited by the report was “the absence of a requirement in the Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM) to comprehensively check the flight control systems of an aircraft which has been subjected to an extreme meteorological event.”
The AAIU has issued a single safety recommendation to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).
The investigation also determined that “given the situation in which they found themselves once the aircraft became airborne, the issues were operationally well handled by the flight crew."
'Significant' storm damage to Ryanair jet not detected until later flight - Independent.ie
Great job by the crew
Nowadays, opinions on crew airmanship rarely appears in official reports. Perhaps that is because of risks of litigation. That is a real pity since it is left to readers to make up their own mind on how they would have handled the situation, rather than read expert opinion from the investigation team who may have access to more information than currently appears in official reports.
In this incident there was a haste to engage the autopilot after take off despite every indication of a serious flight control problem? Another example of automation dependency, maybe? Or perhaps a company SOP mandating autopilot engagement as soon as practical after take off.
Similarly, while the skill of the first officer to undertake the subsequent landing was judged by the captain to be unquestionable, others may feel it would have been prudent for the captain to have taken over control early in the event and assumed command responsibility; particularly since an unknown defect was causing such significant control difficulties soon after lift off. While CRM is undoubtedly a laudable concept, captains should avoid the reputation of being perceived as "the good,ole boy" simply because it is the first officer's "leg". As it turned out, the incident was clearly a serious flight control anomaly especially as neither pilot knew at that stage the true cause of the defect.
This is not to decry the captain's assumed capability of the first officer to handle an emergency on "his leg" but rather to open up a discussion in these Pprune pages of the wisdom or otherwise of some command decisions within a multi-crew operation. The flight had a happy ending and presumably the crew were given a pat on the back. While the result perhaps justifies the captains decisions to give his first officer complete handling of the situation, some may have a different point of view? Hence this post.
Last edited by Centaurus; 21st Aug 2014 at 06:34.
There can be merit in leaving the FO as PF. It avoids the switching of mental models. It allows the Cp to have the QRH. It increases the capacity of the Cp as s/he keeps a monitoring function. None of this stops a changeover of control later on.
DH
As long as he/she is coping I'd be inclined to leave the P2 handling the aircraft at least intially for all the reasons you've mentioned.
I must admit that I'd be very inclined to insist on doing the landing, if only so that if it all does go slightly wrong and the aircraft goes off the side or end then it's solely down to me and I can carry the can/shoulder the blame (with the authority goes the responsibility, though perhaps that's an old fashioned way of thinking
).
None of this stops a changeover of control later on.
As long as he/she is coping I'd be inclined to leave the P2 handling the aircraft at least intially for all the reasons you've mentioned.
I must admit that I'd be very inclined to insist on doing the landing, if only so that if it all does go slightly wrong and the aircraft goes off the side or end then it's solely down to me and I can carry the can/shoulder the blame (with the authority goes the responsibility, though perhaps that's an old fashioned way of thinking
).
