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Polish Presidential Flight Crash Thread

Old 22nd May 2010, 23:54
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Apparently CRM doesn't exist in the Russian way of flying - they have a hierarchy, that basically goes like this:

* If the Captain is flying, you shut up and do your other job of watching the aircraft (not the pilot).

* If the F/O is flying, the Captain has the right to scream at him at any time and take control.

* The navigator navigates. He doesn't monitor anyone.

* The Flight Engineer engineers. He only says anything when the engine fails or he is operating the throttles.

A simplified over-view, but one that hopefully gets the point across.

There was a video on YouTube of the Captain demonstrating that the flight controls don't do anything during approach on autopilot. He wasn't exactly gentle in making his point...

ECAM Actions.
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Old 23rd May 2010, 00:20
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Agreed. CRM appears to be casting ever larger shadows over the recent crashes.

In my personal opinion, the lack of CRM is not only an Eastern Europe phenomenon. I have seen it first hand how the modern concept of CRM is misunderstood as an idea of simple task-sharing (who makes which call-outs & flicks which switches) and politeness to lesser ranking crew members.

I feel that those who wrote the book on CRM, did so for native English speakers who grew up in a more open culture. The books need to be re-written in plain language. CRM is about sharing, teamwork & agreement - not just command with a smile.
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Old 23rd May 2010, 00:34
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Apparently CRM doesn't exist in the Russian way of flying
This crew was Polish. As almost opposite from Russian as you can be in culture. Having operated with both (737) I can be pretty sure on that fact at least.
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Old 23rd May 2010, 07:20
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This crew was Polish. As almost opposite from Russian as you can be in culture. Having operated with both (737) I can be pretty sure on that fact at least.
Civillian Polish people are different indeed. The army culture, however, differs less, as the influences were exerted during the Warsaw Pact years.
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Old 23rd May 2010, 13:53
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I still think we will need to read the final report to be able to make any reliable assumptions (when we can never know absolutely what is going through someone's mind) about the mindset and actions of the accident crew. Here we just do not have access to the CVR records and FDR that show what was said and done prior to the accident.

Did someone else enter the cockpit? If so, who was it and what did they say, if anything, to the crew? For all we know they could have been told, "Look, don't take any chances here; we can just divert if you don't like the look of the weather," instead of, "You must get us in there at all costs."

Too, the captain could have been intending to just shoot one low approach to save face and then divert, rather than try at all costs to land.

We just cannot really say much about any of this now so why bother trying? This might be the reason these threads can only get to a certain point before they wither and die, having generated much more heat than light. If you are seriously interested in flight safety then you can just go off to read expertly-written crash reports. It is often very instructive to compare the reality shown much later to the speculation presented as near-fact while the wreckage is still burning, when that might be well taken as a cue to remain silent unless holding sure knowledge of some relevant facts. "Military pilots are cowboys," for instance, means all of them, and to the same degree?
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Old 23rd May 2010, 14:12
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Chucks, very good point.

Let's hope the next preliminary report will be more detailed
and worth discussing.

At the moment it looks like the political importance of this case
makes the investigators even more careful and reluctant to
jump to any premature conclusions.
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Old 23rd May 2010, 16:54
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Well, Russian bloggie audiences were also wondering re the accepted ? culture, habits and ways, in the Polish crew. Hard to tell, on one side - Warsaw Block heritage, on the other hand - NATO.
One would think it's not for nothing, that even in Civil Aviation in Russia the Captain has been and is called "KVS" - Commander of the Flying Vessel". On the other hand, there were put forward many suggestions by Russian aviators that "in this case the team didn't back up the Commander properly, while operating a TU is a must to be a team work, it is not a small military aircraft, only all together or it's a fail. This looks like a matter of team work failure."

For this matter, one of the most frequent questions asked on the Rus. side - was "how many years they are together?" (the interest was not the separate flying hrs of the crew members) It is strongly suspected (on the Rus. side that "abroad it's another culture, they pride in training crew members separately so well that they can be mixed and shifted in all possible combinations, and they change crew members specially and on purpose." While traditional approach in Rus. has been described as aiming for as little rotation as possible, reaching perfect understanding and how to say, automated all together work, that they rely on each other and understand each other from a glance.
Different cultural approaches may exist indeed.
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Old 23rd May 2010, 18:36
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Alice, thanks, very valid points.

There was a discussion in Poland, about how often this crew flew
together before.

Some claimed that just once, others that 10 times.

Taking into consideration flight time of the navigator on the Tu-154,
(also argued between 30 and 60h), just one flight to Thaiti
makes 15-20h, depending on holdings, diversions etc.

So it's hardly possible they made 10 flights together.

On the other hand there was no written manual for the crew of four
in the 36th. The only manuals they had, were the factory manuals
for the minimum crew of three. (See MAK report.)

Certainly a CRM case, the same as in Mirosławiec CASA accident.

Both pilots looking out of the window, nobody watching instruments.
In Miroslawiec the AP was off, nobody noticed the a/c banking
and they hit the ground wing first, here the AP kept the a/c level,
but also the sinking rate of 8m/s, far too fast...

The result was the same...
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Old 23rd May 2010, 22:43
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On the other hand, Ptkay, I'm thinking - the IL, that went away shortly before TU.
One would think that Russian IL had no problems with navigator flight time and crew team-work trained, like TU, it was a big and heavy plane - and still it couldn't ground! Tried twice, from 100 meters went away twice - means they haven't seen the ground. or were feeling disoriented or that something goes wrong.
It were to pick up away security and FSB, for a second, to take them out of Smolensk after the end of the events (they say they were brought in before the 7th, the Tusk visit, and stayed on to the 10th, Kachin'sky visit) - one would think that ministry sent after its people a very quality plane and crew, with no problems or lack, in anything.

It may be that for large plane that was sent to export out the FSB security men the Northern aerodrome was exactly same little familiar as for the Polish. When on earth do you need security people in large quantities in the small quiet Smolensk - where nothing never happens - but once a year the Polish arriving for Katyn memorial days.
That aerodrome is not the most popular place in the world to say the minimum. Who ever but military planes frequented it - and only they would be familiar with the tricky terrain and technical and whatever - details.

You can't help noticing that a small maneuvrable Yak - landed, while of the two big heavy - one gave up the other - may be also gave up, by the way, also wanted to go off away from 100 metres - but somehow mis-managed the approach - or their automated piloting system did - something clearly happened why haven't they went off away from 100 metres.
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Old 24th May 2010, 12:09
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Another interview by Mr. Klich, this time for the RMF FM radio station.

Edmund Klich: Smolensk disaster is the effect of many years of negligence in the training

He confirmed, among others, two things:

1. The fifth person remained in the cockpit till impact.
2. They knew exactly, they are going below 100m, below minima.
3. They probably concentrated on RA instead of QFE altitude for the decision.
4. The indirect reason is in the faulty training system in the PAF.

Q: What has happened on that plane at the decision height, which is a hundred meters above the airport level? Was the crew aware that this is the moment in which to decide, whether to proceed with landing or to perform a go-around?

Edmund Klich, They were aware..

Q: And what has happened then?

Edmund Klich: They continued descent.

Q: With the full awareness that they do not see the earth? Because the land was not visible.

Edmund Klich, I just can not talk about awareness of individual crew members, but there was such a brief signal, which should bring to everyone's mind that this is the height.


Source:

Edmund Klich: Katastrofa smole?ska skutkiem wieloletnich zaniedba? w szkoleniu - Wywiady - Opinie w RMF24

Google T?umacz

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Old 24th May 2010, 12:34
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Alice, could you comment on what Vasili Yershov said on
the smolensk.forum.ws portal about the accident.

This is widely commented in Polish press and on Polish forums.

Generally what we hear, is that he blames
"extreme inexperience" of the Polish crew.

According to Polish media his main opinion was:

When landing in difficult weather conditions it is very important that each crew member works strictly according to procedures. Typical error in these situations is that all members of the crew, especially inexperienced, in a panic move tend to distract from their procedural obligations to "help" the commander in "search" of the earth. Normally, they eventually "find" it, as in the case. Such incidents in aviation history can not be numbered.

Original discussion here:

? ????????? ???? ??????? • ?????????? ?????

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Old 24th May 2010, 13:13
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@chuck
Yep, from what we know - also from these Yak-40 crew member - they did not intend to land. They just wanted to confirm visibility at MDA and either land ot divert.
Some supporting proofs are autopilot working until 5 sec before crash and not fully extended gear. And gear is surprising as they were rather close to the threshold.

&
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Old 24th May 2010, 13:44
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They probably concentrated on RA instead of QFE altitude for the decision.
He didn't say that.

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Old 24th May 2010, 13:54
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Originally Posted by arrakis
He didn't say that.
He did say that:

Q: A ta sygnalizacja, czy ta wysokość decyzji była uzależniona od wysokości nad poziomem ziemi, czy od wysokości nad poziomem lotniska?
Edmund Klich: Po szczegółowym zapoznaniu się, bo ja wczoraj analizowałem ten zapis, bo my jeszcze nie jesteśmy na tym etapie łączenia danych z rejestratorów, łączenia danych z wysokości, porównania z terenem, ale mając ten zapis i mając pewien szkic terenu, no można to wywnioskować. Raczej to była wysokość radiowa.

Q: The warning at the decision height was dependent on the height above ground level or from height above the airport?
Edmund Klich: After a detailed studying, because yesterday I was analysing the record, because we're not yet at that stage of combining data from recorders, combining data from the height, the comparison with the terrain, but with the record and with a sketch of the site, well, it can be concluded. It was rather the radio altitude.
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Old 24th May 2010, 14:05
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They are talking about an aural waring, that indicated to the crew, they went below the decision heigth. E. Klich doesn't want to be very specific, but it looks like he's talking about the aural warning from the RV-5M radioaltimeter, generated when past the decision height set on it.
Nothing to do, with what you were suggesting.
I don't know, what should be the setting of DH on RA in a Tu-154M during approach/landing, but it was probably their last chance to pull-up.

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Old 24th May 2010, 15:04
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OK, I just quoted, for everybody to make his mind himself,
about what he meant by that.

Klich really remained very mysterious, but nobody can blame him...
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Old 24th May 2010, 15:40
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According to the Tu-154M FM I just checked, they should set this time DH on RA at 60 m. When hearing aural warning and still no runway lights visible - which was the case I presume - they should abort approach/landing or whatever they were doing. 60 m on RA means still flying above runway elevation.


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Old 24th May 2010, 15:51
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Originally Posted by arrakis
60 m on RA means still flying above runway elevation.
That's true, but according to Klich, they ignored the warning.
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Old 24th May 2010, 17:21
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Guys - a rad alt minimum is only valid if the terrain before the runway is reasonably flat. There is no way a radio DH would have been published for that runway. If they used one, they made it up and suffered as a result..
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Old 24th May 2010, 18:06
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If you wanted to use radar altitude to keep yourself safe on a non-precision approach (for the layman, non-precision doesn't mean "sloppily flown" but "flown without altitude guidance," what we call "the glideslope," a electronic signal that gives a 3° sloping path towards a point about 1000 feet in from the landing end of the runway) then you would really need a runway with an absolutely flat clearway of considerable length. In this case I believe it has been said that the terrain actually slopes up towards the threshold so that one could imagine first going down to X radar altitude but then being forced to pull up to keep that value. That would be a rather hairy thing to try in a light aircraft moving at about 80 knots. To try it in a large aircraft moving much faster...

About the only recognised way to use radar altitude I am aware of is during a Category II ILS approach, when you set 100 feet radar altitude as your decision height. Part of that procedure is knowing that you may well touch down on the runway during the missed approach if you cannot see it at decision height since you are going to be descending in a stabilised approach on a 3° glideslope at around 500 feet per minute, depending on your groundspeed. So if you are exactly 100 feet high when you make your decision to go around, the aircraft is going to make runway contact in exactly 12 seconds, when there is, of course first the delay inherent in your making that go/no go decision and then the lag in the aircraft's change of flight path.

This is assumed to be relatively safe because you are reading the radar altitude over a flat clearway just before the runway threshold while in a stabilised configuration. (You will cross the threshold itself at exactly 50 feet, normally.) It is nothing like flying towards a runway while trying to hold a steady value on a fluctuating radar altimeter while simultaneously trying to see a runway that is just "somewhere out there" in thick fog. There would be so many variables in that to make it a very difficult trick to pull off safely.

You can see from this that the Category II ILS approach is a rather demanding procedure, and in fact it is usually only allowed to be performed by crews with special training. To try and incorporate just one of its elements, the use of radar altitude, in some sort of improvised approach can definitely get you into serious trouble.

There is an old saying that runs, "The superior pilot uses his superior judgment to stay out of situations requiring his superior ability." Of course that is in an ideal world!
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