Polish Presidential Flight Crash Thread
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I don't think so...
How the hell atco knows that a/c is on glideslope without effective radar service?
3 times atco confirmed their glideslope as correct.
and than suddenly when it is the most critical (after passing 100m) there is no any instruction for crew to adjust profile or to climb ,until very last moment with the instruction Go around! How he knows that they have to execute go around!
If atc is not able to give information after 100m,then MUST BE info to crew that radar service is terminated
Some things are universal,both for military and civil operation.
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The information about being correct on glide path stops some time before the accident, then you have two "horizon" messages from the crew, that indicate they are not in a correct position.
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On Polish forum former military PAR ATC commented:
Pracowałem ileś lat temu jako KSL (kierownik systemu ladowania) i na podstawie własnych wyliczeń a także Kolegi Witka Z. wychodzi mi na typowego "szczura" pod chmury licząc, że podstawa nie będzie niższa niz 20-30m.
Several years ago I worked as KSL (Landing System Manager) and on the basis of my own calculations and those of colleague Z. Witek it comes to me that they did the typical "rat" under the clouds, hoping that the base not be less than 20-30m.
The "rat" landing can be translated to "scud running".
He probably knows, what he is talking about,
He further comments:
I wrote earlier (about the PF) "he heard something, maybe he saw it, when he flew as a navigator, but he never performed it himself." He "may" do such a manoeuvre only at the airport where he knows the "furniture". He tried and it didn't work out.
In Polish pilots jargon "furniture" are landmarks, buildings, terrain shape and obstacles around the airfield.
You very often fly your pattern on "furniture",
instead of instruments, doing turns and final on certain "furniture" elements.
One more proof, how bad the training was, allowing pilots to get away with
such landings during their career...
Pracowałem ileś lat temu jako KSL (kierownik systemu ladowania) i na podstawie własnych wyliczeń a także Kolegi Witka Z. wychodzi mi na typowego "szczura" pod chmury licząc, że podstawa nie będzie niższa niz 20-30m.
Several years ago I worked as KSL (Landing System Manager) and on the basis of my own calculations and those of colleague Z. Witek it comes to me that they did the typical "rat" under the clouds, hoping that the base not be less than 20-30m.
The "rat" landing can be translated to "scud running".
He probably knows, what he is talking about,
He further comments:
I wrote earlier (about the PF) "he heard something, maybe he saw it, when he flew as a navigator, but he never performed it himself." He "may" do such a manoeuvre only at the airport where he knows the "furniture". He tried and it didn't work out.
In Polish pilots jargon "furniture" are landmarks, buildings, terrain shape and obstacles around the airfield.
You very often fly your pattern on "furniture",
instead of instruments, doing turns and final on certain "furniture" elements.
One more proof, how bad the training was, allowing pilots to get away with
such landings during their career...
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I'd analyse the above graphic (#218) this way:
(throughout bearing in mind reaction time / inertial delays)
Prior to A:
Establishing good glidepath but then offsetting low due to tracking radalt.
From A->B:
Rate of Descent stabilised again: similar to intended glidepath, simply offset low. However radalt tracking falling ground so implies approx zero RoD, 100m alt.
B->C
Response time to second '100m' call.
From C to CFIT:
i) Mistaken attempt to remedy apparent zero RoD. Thus trending to new descent rate: 'the ground incline at around 20s' plus 'intended RoD' (leading to maximum RoD: at about 13 seconds)
ii) Excessive RoD becomes immediately apparent despite 'trust-the-radalt' mindset as terrain is now rising, but combination of:
Glideslope RoD
plus
RoD compensating for previous terrain downslope
plus
effective RoD from terrain upslope
adds up to:
Game Over.
(throughout bearing in mind reaction time / inertial delays)
Prior to A:
Establishing good glidepath but then offsetting low due to tracking radalt.
From A->B:
Rate of Descent stabilised again: similar to intended glidepath, simply offset low. However radalt tracking falling ground so implies approx zero RoD, 100m alt.
B->C
Response time to second '100m' call.
From C to CFIT:
i) Mistaken attempt to remedy apparent zero RoD. Thus trending to new descent rate: 'the ground incline at around 20s' plus 'intended RoD' (leading to maximum RoD: at about 13 seconds)
ii) Excessive RoD becomes immediately apparent despite 'trust-the-radalt' mindset as terrain is now rising, but combination of:
Glideslope RoD
plus
RoD compensating for previous terrain downslope
plus
effective RoD from terrain upslope
adds up to:
Game Over.
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And loosing 50 metres due to inertia while trying to go around? I don't think so...
..."by go around the loss of altitude dependent on sink rate is:
by 3,5m/s - 10m, by 5m/s - 20m, by 8m/s - 50m."
According to simulations they were sinking well over 10m/s...
If you look carefully at the moment of the FO command "Go around",
the sink rate was 18m/s !!!
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Two questions:
1) What is 'APM' in the transcript?
2) Here's a hand grenade into the room - who was actually 'PIC' on the approach and even worse, who was actually sitting in the left seat?
1) What is 'APM' in the transcript?
2) Here's a hand grenade into the room - who was actually 'PIC' on the approach and even worse, who was actually sitting in the left seat?
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1) What is 'APM' in the transcript?
Strong spot lights, in this case put on both sides of threshold
to form "bramka", a gate. The ATC claimed, they were at threshold,
the Yak-40 crew suggested to the Tu-154 crew, the were 200m before RW.
Anyway the Yak-40 crew confirmed them working and in good condition.
2) Here's a hand grenade into the room - who was actually 'PIC' on
the approach and even worse, who was actually sitting in the left seat?
the approach and even worse, who was actually sitting in the left seat?
that Arkadiusz Protasiuk was speaking directly to the microphone, so
it is highly probable he was in the left seat with head set on.
Any other voices of non crew persons are weak an hardly legible.
They might have been sitting near or at navigator position,
ore even standing in the door, but NOT LEFT SEAT.
And, BOAC, stop that rubbish !!!
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BOAC - what's your point? PIC and PF was the same person - A. Protasiuk, in the LHS.
From the other Polish forum we know, that when the President arrived
to the a/c the final report and welcome before boarding was done
by Gen. Blasik, not Cpt. Protasiuk.
So the question is valid: Who was the "PIC"????
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When you look at the Amielin analysis:
The 200, 150, and first 100m call outs were on barometric hight QFE 754.
The second 100m call out, 7 sec later was RA, and deadly,
it caused the PF to do the "death dive"...
To confirm that, in the earlier conversation and pre landing briefing PF tells
navigator to "set RA to 100m".
The 200, 150, and first 100m call outs were on barometric hight QFE 754.
The second 100m call out, 7 sec later was RA, and deadly,
it caused the PF to do the "death dive"...
To confirm that, in the earlier conversation and pre landing briefing PF tells
navigator to "set RA to 100m".
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As far as "stop that rubbish" is concerned, I will say this:
For all the Polish people who are seeking to apportion blame for this tragic accident:
1) It seems abundantly clear to me, and I suspect most 'professional pilots', that it was the Polish Air Force that killed everyone on board
2) It seems clear to me also that there may have been some sort of PAR in use, but it was only being used by ATC to 'monitor' the approach as is done in the UK sometimes. The a/c was not receiving a talkdown.
3) As far as 'who was PIC' is concerned, see 1) above
For all the Polish people who are seeking to apportion blame for this tragic accident:
1) It seems abundantly clear to me, and I suspect most 'professional pilots', that it was the Polish Air Force that killed everyone on board
2) It seems clear to me also that there may have been some sort of PAR in use, but it was only being used by ATC to 'monitor' the approach as is done in the UK sometimes. The a/c was not receiving a talkdown.
3) As far as 'who was PIC' is concerned, see 1) above
The greaphic still bothers me as being wrong due to a false asumption.
The projected line of descent follows the terrain very close, especially in the final moments, because it is derived from the asumption, that the callouts are RA. I´ve flown fast jets, even with those it would not be possible to follow the terrain in that kind of exact way as is suggested in the grapic even in landing configuration at 150 kts. You would always be behind. In an approach in bad weather no sound crew would follow a radar altimeter in that way, the necessary changes would be too big and the approach would be totally unstable. And it would show on the graphic with at least a 5 sec. delay, until the stick- and power changes would change the flight path.
Therefore i looked in that altitude thing again and i´m wondering, what this pressure altitude call with the number 745 could be. Its not hPa, its not mbar, it could be TORR (the standard atmosphere in torr would be 760). Am i somehow wrong? There was only one time talking about "airpressure 745" at time 10:24:49,2, at that time being still way up and for sure not yet ready to change for QFE setting. Later on nothing.
Did they really had the correct altimeter setup?
franzl
The projected line of descent follows the terrain very close, especially in the final moments, because it is derived from the asumption, that the callouts are RA. I´ve flown fast jets, even with those it would not be possible to follow the terrain in that kind of exact way as is suggested in the grapic even in landing configuration at 150 kts. You would always be behind. In an approach in bad weather no sound crew would follow a radar altimeter in that way, the necessary changes would be too big and the approach would be totally unstable. And it would show on the graphic with at least a 5 sec. delay, until the stick- and power changes would change the flight path.
Therefore i looked in that altitude thing again and i´m wondering, what this pressure altitude call with the number 745 could be. Its not hPa, its not mbar, it could be TORR (the standard atmosphere in torr would be 760). Am i somehow wrong? There was only one time talking about "airpressure 745" at time 10:24:49,2, at that time being still way up and for sure not yet ready to change for QFE setting. Later on nothing.
Did they really had the correct altimeter setup?
franzl
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As far as "stop that rubbish" is concerned...
Meant no offence...
Last edited by Ptkay; 2nd Jun 2010 at 09:31.
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Originally Posted by retiredF4
Did they really had the correct altimeter setup?
it is to be understood: 993 hPa, 754 mmHg QFE.
(in military in Poland they fly QFE)
Later 10:30:21 the ATC gives them "pressure 7-4-5"
10:30:24 PF confirms "7-4-5"
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Ptkay,
what data are the 'heights' plotted in this 'simulation' based on?
If i didnt miss anything (e.g. Amielin finding access to the FDR recordings or other radar data), the heights plotted in the chart are simply deduced from height call outs found in the CVR script and, later on, from the 'struck heights' of the respective trees.
And thus it is his interpretation, that the first call outs refer to barometric altimeter readings (down to the 1str 100m call out), and refer to RA readings beginning with the second 100m callout.
Although this scenario might seem likely, it is based on no substantial data.
So taking Amielin's plot to deduce that the first call pout were on barometric height and the later ones on RA height seems to be a bit like 'thinking in circles'....they are there because Amelin has put them exactly at these points....since they are the basis of the whole 'simulation'.
Regards, ihg
Originally Posted by Ptkay
When you look at the Amielin analysis:
The 200, 150, and first 100m call outs were on barometric hight QFE 754.
The second 100m call out, 7 sec later was RA, ...
The 200, 150, and first 100m call outs were on barometric hight QFE 754.
The second 100m call out, 7 sec later was RA, ...
If i didnt miss anything (e.g. Amielin finding access to the FDR recordings or other radar data), the heights plotted in the chart are simply deduced from height call outs found in the CVR script and, later on, from the 'struck heights' of the respective trees.
And thus it is his interpretation, that the first call outs refer to barometric altimeter readings (down to the 1str 100m call out), and refer to RA readings beginning with the second 100m callout.
Although this scenario might seem likely, it is based on no substantial data.
So taking Amielin's plot to deduce that the first call pout were on barometric height and the later ones on RA height seems to be a bit like 'thinking in circles'....they are there because Amelin has put them exactly at these points....since they are the basis of the whole 'simulation'.
Regards, ihg
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For all the Polish people who are seeking to apportion blame for this tragic accident:
1) It seems abundantly clear to me, and I suspect most 'professional pilots', that it was the Polish Air Force that killed everyone on board
2) It seems clear to me also that there may have been some sort of PAR in use, but it was only being used by ATC to 'monitor' the approach as is done in the UK sometimes. The a/c was not receiving a talkdown.
1) It seems abundantly clear to me, and I suspect most 'professional pilots', that it was the Polish Air Force that killed everyone on board
2) It seems clear to me also that there may have been some sort of PAR in use, but it was only being used by ATC to 'monitor' the approach as is done in the UK sometimes. The a/c was not receiving a talkdown.
It is so clear.
there is no a little radar service. you take responsibility or you aren't responsible to separate a/c from obstacles and other a/c. You are pregnant or you aren't pregnant.
there is no between. Ask anyone who was rated as military atco. Military flying recognizes proc norms and rdr norms and procedures.
So if it is radar guided than it is one story if it is not radar guided it is another story.
Under no conditions atco is able to give glideslope information and heading information without radar service.
As smolensk atco gave glideslope info and headings(even with two digits) we are talking about radar service.
BAD PRACTICE DOESN'T MEAN OFFICIAL RULE!
and we may bet now that Russian books for military atcos just excatly recognizes those issues.
Since we have exact rule avoinding by atcos 40% goes to Russian Military ATC system.
Very similar with the situation ATR 42 in LYPR at 2000, when atco vectored a little bit into high terrain area. he wasn't responsible for separation! really?
I told you bad practice is not rule.
