Boeing at X-Roads?
More Boeing woes now they have got proof that the soon to leave CEo cheated on his taxes by using a private jet ofr personal travel, and not declaring it as taxable. I mean do you really have to be a criminal to pass the C suite test in USA these days. He is an accountant too so its not like he clan claim ignorance of the IRS is it.
Also it said it was company policy that he used private jets on business trips , authorized no doubt by the board who also use private jets . This is for security reasons apparently. So what does that men does one person ina million in USA know what the CEo of Boeing looks like? Is he afraid of flying on his own products, is he afraid he might end up on an Airbus which would make an amusing story? Doesn't he have any interested in finding out just how comfortable a middle seat at the back of a 73 really is doesnt he have any experience whatsoever of using the very thing the company he presides over actually makes . Its just laughable, I mean he isnt really that important; if he died they would have a replacement inside a week.
This is not having a go at the USaA we have our own troubles in UK if you follow the story of the people who ran the post office in the UK .who seemingly committed fraud and perverted the course of justice and behaved in a discussing way when discussing the issue internally.. It seems we have a whole slew of people who are actually psychotic in the way they behave and yet end up running corporations
Also it said it was company policy that he used private jets on business trips , authorized no doubt by the board who also use private jets . This is for security reasons apparently. So what does that men does one person ina million in USA know what the CEo of Boeing looks like? Is he afraid of flying on his own products, is he afraid he might end up on an Airbus which would make an amusing story? Doesn't he have any interested in finding out just how comfortable a middle seat at the back of a 73 really is doesnt he have any experience whatsoever of using the very thing the company he presides over actually makes . Its just laughable, I mean he isnt really that important; if he died they would have a replacement inside a week.
This is not having a go at the USaA we have our own troubles in UK if you follow the story of the people who ran the post office in the UK .who seemingly committed fraud and perverted the course of justice and behaved in a discussing way when discussing the issue internally.. It seems we have a whole slew of people who are actually psychotic in the way they behave and yet end up running corporations
$20/mile lol.
Seems like he could catch a ride on ferry flights!
The Post Office scandal is notable not just for its indifference and corruption and duration but outright cruelty.
Last edited by remi; 13th Apr 2024 at 00:12.
The turn came when a government made up a story about how their pilots performed perfectly and the plane still was impossible for any human to control and for some reason the CEO of Boeing clearly stated "It's ENTIRELY our fault."
It's a business case in how a CEO murders their own company.
The strangest part? Against the constant demand that corporations take full responsibility, when one does, the public tears them apart like a pack of wolves going after a wounded buffalo.
It's a business case in how a CEO murders their own company.
The strangest part? Against the constant demand that corporations take full responsibility, when one does, the public tears them apart like a pack of wolves going after a wounded buffalo.
Full responsibility is not when you stand at a podium and say "I accept full responsibility," then go back to your desk and resume business as usual.
B-52, the main gear, both fore and aft, consist of two bogies side by side each having two wheels, the left bogies retract forward and the right retracts aft. Left side operates from No. 1 hydraulic system, right No 2. Each set can be slewed left or right up to 12° for cross wind landing. Steering is through the rudder pedals which rotates the front bogies through +- 55°.
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Full responsibility is when you testify truthfully and voluntarily as to what you have done, what your company has done, the ways in which your company has violated laws or ethical principles, offer up any documentation that wronged parties request, and use your personal resources to repay wronged parties to the best of your ability.
Full responsibility is not when you stand at a podium and say "I accept full responsibility," then go back to your desk and resume business as usual.
Full responsibility is not when you stand at a podium and say "I accept full responsibility," then go back to your desk and resume business as usual.
But Boeing's over-reaction PERHAPS accelerated or intensified the p.r. crisis bu I see no logical basis for contending that Boeing's overall crisis would not have occurred without that over-reaction. Among other serious problems with that argument, what could Boeing have said about the failures of Ethiopian players that would not have been blown back on the company as blaming the pilots NOT only for their (and the airline and government) failures but absolving or excusing Boeing from its obvious failures and mistakes?
For another time, perhaps consider the reference to "the average pilot" which, if I recall correctly, was part of the assessment of reaction times. Average pilot in Ethiopia? I would argue that the regulations (or wherever the ref to an "average pilot" was made) reflect assumptions about aviator professionals in a kind of paradigmatic U.S.-like culture and society, which don't translate over to other places very well, despite all the SARPs and English language formalities.
*Edit: I meant to write "unschooled" not "unscheduled", and this shows I may need better proofreading attention than Johnnie Walker has proven to have.
Last edited by WillowRun 6-3; 13th Apr 2024 at 10:50.
For another time, perhaps consider the reference to "the average pilot" which, if I recall correctly, was part of the assessment of reaction times. Average pilot in Ethiopia? I would argue that the regulations (or wherever the ref to an "average pilot" was made) reflects assumptions about aviator professionals in a kind of paradigmatic U.S.-like culture and society, which don't translate over to other places very well, despite all the SARPs and English language formalities.
Yes this all got lost in the quagmire of politics, racism, diplomacy and the fact Boeing wants to sell it's aircraft to foreign countries. There were numerous MCAS events in the USA prior to the fatals and they all ended uneventfully because the 'average pilot' in the USA figured out what ultimately was going on (runaway trim) and fixed it.
The Aviation Week "Check 6" podcast of April 8 comprised an interesting debate on what Boeing should be looking for in its next CEO. Right near the beginning of the show, Alan Mullaly was held up as a prime example of the qualities required of the next CEO. The panel, which included Richard Aboulafia, commented that Boeing's long slide really began when Alan Mullaly was passed over as CEO in favour of the MacDac mafia (my term for them).
'Boeing: what the next CEO needs to do to ensure quality and turn things around'
Via embedded link;
"Long-term commitment to new learning and new philosophy is required of any management that seeks transformation. The timid and the fainthearted, and the people that expect quick results, are doomed to disappointment." Deming
Management's failure to plan for the future brings about loss of market, which brings about loss of jobs. Management must be judged not only by the quarterly dividend, but by innovative plans to stay in business, protect investment, ensure future dividends, and provide more jobs through improved product and service.
https://theconversation.com/boeing-w...-around-226841
Via embedded link;
"Long-term commitment to new learning and new philosophy is required of any management that seeks transformation. The timid and the fainthearted, and the people that expect quick results, are doomed to disappointment." Deming
Management's failure to plan for the future brings about loss of market, which brings about loss of jobs. Management must be judged not only by the quarterly dividend, but by innovative plans to stay in business, protect investment, ensure future dividends, and provide more jobs through improved product and service.
https://theconversation.com/boeing-w...-around-226841
@neville nobody: You wrote, QUOTE: There were numerous MCAS events in the USA prior to the fatals ....... UNQUOTE:
I for one would be very interested in your supporting evidence for "numerous" above. How many? How many were on the 737 Max and how many on ANY of the earlier 737 models? How many Max in service (in the USA) compared with how many other 737 models in service (in the USA)? And over what period - i.e. from when to when (in years at least)?
I for one would be very interested in your supporting evidence for "numerous" above. How many? How many were on the 737 Max and how many on ANY of the earlier 737 models? How many Max in service (in the USA) compared with how many other 737 models in service (in the USA)? And over what period - i.e. from when to when (in years at least)?
Last edited by AES; 13th Apr 2024 at 18:36. Reason: typos
There were numerous MCAS events in the USA prior to the fatals and they all ended uneventfully because the 'average pilot' in the USA figured out what ultimately was going on (runaway trim) and fixed it
I'm afraid I'm unable to give your statement any credence.
@neville nobody: You wrote, QUOTE: There were numerous MCAS events in the USA prior to the fatals ....... UNQUOTE:
I for one would be very interested in your supporting evidence for "numerous" above. How many? How many were on the 737 Max and how many on ANY of the earlier 737 models? How many Max in service (in the USA) compared with how many other 737 models in service (in the USA)? And over what period - i.e. from when to when (in years at least)?
I for one would be very interested in your supporting evidence for "numerous" above. How many? How many were on the 737 Max and how many on ANY of the earlier 737 models? How many Max in service (in the USA) compared with how many other 737 models in service (in the USA)? And over what period - i.e. from when to when (in years at least)?
Anyway, this is pretty much definitive as to who made the fundamental error. This is aside from the gross design flaw of the system's reliance on a single AoA sensor, which of course will fail every so often, and a bird strike is a likely scenario for failure at or immediately following takeoff.
Consistent with this philosophy, the NTSB notes that FAA certification guidance in
AC 25.1309-1A that allows manufacturers to assume pilots will respond to failure conditions
appropriately is based, in part, upon the applicant showing that the systems, controls, and
associated monitoring and warnings are designed to minimize crew errors, which could create
additional hazards.16 While Boeing considered the possibility of uncommanded MCAS operation
as part of its functional hazard assessment, it did not evaluate all the potential alerts and indications
that could accompany a failure that also resulted in uncommanded MCAS operation. Therefore,
neither Boeing’s system safety assessment nor its simulator tests evaluated how the combined
effect of alerts and indications might impact pilots’ recognition of which procedure(s) to prioritize
in responding to an unintended MCAS operation caused by an erroneous AOA input.17 The NTSB
is concerned that, if manufacturers assume correct pilot response without comprehensively
examining all possible flight deck alerts and indications that may occur for system and component
failures that contribute to a given hazard, the hazard classification and resulting system design
(including alerts and indications), procedural, and/or training mitigations may not adequately
consider and account for the potential for pilots to take actions that are inconsistent with
manufacturer assumptions.
Thus, the NTSB concludes that the assumptions that Boeing used in its functional hazard
assessment of uncommanded MCAS function for the 737 MAX did not adequately consider and
account for the impact that multiple flight deck alerts and indications could have on pilots’
responses to the hazard. Therefore, the NTSB recommends that the FAA require that Boeing
(1) ensure that system safety assessments for the 737 MAX in which it assumed immediate and
appropriate pilot corrective actions in response to uncommanded flight control inputs, from
systems such as MCAS, consider the effect of all possible flight deck alerts and indications on
pilot recognition and response; and (2) incorporate design enhancements (including flight deck
alerts and indications), pilot procedures, and/or training requirements, where needed, to minimize
the potential for and safety impact of pilot actions that are inconsistent with manufacturer
assumptions.
Further, because FAA guidance allows such assumptions to be made in transport-category
airplane certification analyses without providing applicants with clear direction concerning the
consideration of multiple flight deck alerts and indications in evaluating pilot recognition and
response, the NTSB is concerned that similar assumptions and procedures for their validation may
have also been used in the development of flight control system safety assessments for other
airplanes. Therefore, the NTSB recommends that the FAA require that for all other
US type-certificated transport-category airplanes, manufacturers (1) ensure that system safety
assessments for which they assumed immediate and appropriate pilot corrective actions in
response to uncommanded flight control inputs consider the effect of all possible flight deck alerts
and indications on pilot recognition and response; and (2) incorporate design enhancements
(including flight deck alerts and indications), pilot procedures, and/or training requirements, where
needed, to minimize the potential for and safety impact of pilot actions that are inconsistent with
manufacturer assumptions.
AC 25.1309-1A that allows manufacturers to assume pilots will respond to failure conditions
appropriately is based, in part, upon the applicant showing that the systems, controls, and
associated monitoring and warnings are designed to minimize crew errors, which could create
additional hazards.16 While Boeing considered the possibility of uncommanded MCAS operation
as part of its functional hazard assessment, it did not evaluate all the potential alerts and indications
that could accompany a failure that also resulted in uncommanded MCAS operation. Therefore,
neither Boeing’s system safety assessment nor its simulator tests evaluated how the combined
effect of alerts and indications might impact pilots’ recognition of which procedure(s) to prioritize
in responding to an unintended MCAS operation caused by an erroneous AOA input.17 The NTSB
is concerned that, if manufacturers assume correct pilot response without comprehensively
examining all possible flight deck alerts and indications that may occur for system and component
failures that contribute to a given hazard, the hazard classification and resulting system design
(including alerts and indications), procedural, and/or training mitigations may not adequately
consider and account for the potential for pilots to take actions that are inconsistent with
manufacturer assumptions.
Thus, the NTSB concludes that the assumptions that Boeing used in its functional hazard
assessment of uncommanded MCAS function for the 737 MAX did not adequately consider and
account for the impact that multiple flight deck alerts and indications could have on pilots’
responses to the hazard. Therefore, the NTSB recommends that the FAA require that Boeing
(1) ensure that system safety assessments for the 737 MAX in which it assumed immediate and
appropriate pilot corrective actions in response to uncommanded flight control inputs, from
systems such as MCAS, consider the effect of all possible flight deck alerts and indications on
pilot recognition and response; and (2) incorporate design enhancements (including flight deck
alerts and indications), pilot procedures, and/or training requirements, where needed, to minimize
the potential for and safety impact of pilot actions that are inconsistent with manufacturer
assumptions.
Further, because FAA guidance allows such assumptions to be made in transport-category
airplane certification analyses without providing applicants with clear direction concerning the
consideration of multiple flight deck alerts and indications in evaluating pilot recognition and
response, the NTSB is concerned that similar assumptions and procedures for their validation may
have also been used in the development of flight control system safety assessments for other
airplanes. Therefore, the NTSB recommends that the FAA require that for all other
US type-certificated transport-category airplanes, manufacturers (1) ensure that system safety
assessments for which they assumed immediate and appropriate pilot corrective actions in
response to uncommanded flight control inputs consider the effect of all possible flight deck alerts
and indications on pilot recognition and response; and (2) incorporate design enhancements
(including flight deck alerts and indications), pilot procedures, and/or training requirements, where
needed, to minimize the potential for and safety impact of pilot actions that are inconsistent with
manufacturer assumptions.
It was reported in the media at the time of the accidents when journalists starting looking into the history of MCAS events. I remember the whole issue around Boeing’s expectation of pilot standards globally being brought into light and what assumptions are being made.
My forum compatriot Mech Engineer and I have gone round and round about the Ethiopian accident, and he has convinced me, unscheduled* and poorly comprehending (of aeronautics, line ops, most all engineering) as I am, that the pilots and government and airline were not just poor performers, but bad performers, in the preludes to the crash.
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I have read yours and your compatriot's contributions to this thread with great amusement and I can say it's a real shame your crusade to clear the tarnished image of venerated Boeing is largely unknown outside the narrow confines of PPRuNe. The world should really know about the anti-Boeing conspiracy, part of the great antiUSAism, afflicting not just every aviation authority in the world but also once a staunch defender of the freedom (at least, they were that when they certified the pinnacle of American aeronautical ingenuity - MCAS), the once beloved FAA.
This subtle nod to the cleverness of the slice having been said, however, of course it would have been more focused an expression to state that the other poster's views about the acts and omissions of the players in the Ethiopian accident had convinced me (unschooled, etc.) of the occurence and limited relevance of those acts or omissions - but not about their impact. Maybe too much sunshine on a major college campus (and so much movin' and shakin' - the kids are much better than alright) has slurred my recall. Until shown otherwise: zero posts on this string or others have endorsed, copped to, or played along with the exculpatory attitudes expressed by others.
More generally, I'm rather sure the manner in which participation overall in the forum threads about MAX has been conducted, and especially insofar as the Forkner case was concerned, would warrant even under strict scrutiny a "who me? - not guilty" reply to all of the slice's cuts. Except, of course, the one about having read in these esteemed exchanges the echoes of David Chappellet's father's inquiry, and David's answers (Downhill Racer, starring Robert Redford and Gene Hackman (1969) - hint for the unfamiliar, it's the scene with the RITZ crackers).
Psychophysiological entity
HISTORIC. (it's my new thing so that folk don't read 100 words before realising we've gone back in time.)
This mentions the 707 Toronto incident and flying past the gas station sign. Phew!
Boeing advice on "aerodynamically relieving airloads" using manual stabilizer trim
This mentions the 707 Toronto incident and flying past the gas station sign. Phew!
Boeing advice on "aerodynamically relieving airloads" using manual stabilizer trim
More generally, I'm rather sure the manner in which participation overall in the forum threads about MAX has been conducted, and especially insofar as the Forkner case was concerned, would warrant even under strict scrutiny a "who me? - not guilty" reply to all of the slice's cuts.
HISTORIC. (it's my new thing so that folk don't read 100 words before realising we've gone back in time.)
This mentions the 707 Toronto incident and flying past the gas station sign. Phew!
Boeing advice on "aerodynamically relieving airloads" using manual stabilizer trim
This mentions the 707 Toronto incident and flying past the gas station sign. Phew!
Boeing advice on "aerodynamically relieving airloads" using manual stabilizer trim
Have they?
That's not to say that the procedures should be any different, but perhaps the training approach should include (have included) lessons learned in the past five decades.
It was reported in the media at the time of the accidents when journalists starting looking into the history of MCAS events
§ 830.5 Immediate notification
The operator of any civil aircraft, or any public aircraft not operated by the Armed Forces or an intelligence agency of the United States, or any foreign aircraft shall immediately, and by the most expeditious means available, notify the nearest National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) office, when,
a) An aircraft accident or any of the following listed serious incidents occur:
(1) Flight control system malfunction or failure;
The operator of any civil aircraft, or any public aircraft not operated by the Armed Forces or an intelligence agency of the United States, or any foreign aircraft shall immediately, and by the most expeditious means available, notify the nearest National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) office, when,
a) An aircraft accident or any of the following listed serious incidents occur:
(1) Flight control system malfunction or failure;
Real MCAS incidents that didn't result in an obvious upset and that had no finding of a fault on the ground might very well have gone unreported as nothing burgers.