Boeing at X-Roads?
Odd that Boeing had a lot more airliner crashes “in those days” than with current production aircraft.
What we seem to have here is a dose of presentism; i.e., evaluating the merits of past aircraft programs by present standards. By that metric, only the A380 and B787 are successful airliners. All others, a “disaster.”
BTW, AA191 was not a design/production issue. It was a maintenance issue.
What we seem to have here is a dose of presentism; i.e., evaluating the merits of past aircraft programs by present standards. By that metric, only the A380 and B787 are successful airliners. All others, a “disaster.”
BTW, AA191 was not a design/production issue. It was a maintenance issue.
Yes sorry you were correct, it was American not United at Chicago. Point made that it was maintenance that caused the crash or at least root cause. Still grounded the DC10 though. I agree with the posts here and generally with yours; when I said that Boeing was a proper engineering company I meant as opposed to the corporate greed fest / basket case it became where self evidently engineering excellence was second to profitability. As is well documented the change in corporate philosophy came from McDonnell Douglas’s tough guy approach to employee relations after the Boeing take over. The Boeing managers were referred to as ‘boy scouts’ by the more ruthless types who came to prominence. Out sourced work to favourable tax break states, reduced labour costs and less union interference but logistical issues that cost in the end while the execs trousered massive shares. The Joe Sutter days are long gone; a real shame.
i compared all EAD of both B737 and A320 family, as they address hardware/software/procedure issues of manufacturer. They don't really differ in count and seriousness.
Any other data for a FAIR comparison?
Boeing put at least 2 737s from rudder hard-overs into the ground long before the merger. Unlike the MAX, neither plane could possibly be controlled during the event and both gave opposite reactions expected to rudder control inputs.
Corporate greed did disaffect a large number of Boeing workers and they have been more than willing to use the MAX to punish the C-suite for it, making Boeing an easy target for a publicity smear campaign.
Corporate greed did disaffect a large number of Boeing workers and they have been more than willing to use the MAX to punish the C-suite for it, making Boeing an easy target for a publicity smear campaign.
The DC10 intro was not an unqualified success initially. Two catastrophic crashes, Turkish ex Paris and United @ Chicago where the engine fell off: aircraft was pitched up to V2 as per training and the now less aerodynamic wing stalled with a subsequent wing drop and crash. The aircraft was grounded until various modifications were made. A similar story to the 737 Max in some ways. The aircraft had moderate sales and for British interests predominantly in Laker and BCal. Not really a viable competitor to the 747. Boeing was a proper engineering company in those days.
MD-11 with its miniaturized econo-empennage yielding a landing speed second only to Concorde, with its extreme nose high attitude preventing crew from distinguishing between a stuck landing and a bounced landing.
.
They were 98% finished designs at best.
Boeing put at least 2 737s from rudder hard-overs into the ground long before the merger. Unlike the MAX, neither plane could possibly be controlled during the event and both gave opposite reactions expected to rudder control inputs.
Corporate greed did disaffect a large number of Boeing workers and they have been more than willing to use the MAX to punish the C-suite for it, making Boeing an easy target for a publicity smear campaign.
Corporate greed did disaffect a large number of Boeing workers and they have been more than willing to use the MAX to punish the C-suite for it, making Boeing an easy target for a publicity smear campaign.
The issue wasn't brought into general agreement until a board was formed in 2000 to definitively research 737 rudder issues. Attention then focused on the power unit, but I think to this day there is still not 100% agreement that the hot/cold shock was the sole source of the problem. There were multiple significant design changes made during following years to the 737 rudder system, to the point where it could have been characterized as "redesigned" more than "corrected."
The 737 Rudder Story
It's not that they could not have maintained QC, its that they chose not to in favor of cost-cutting and share price.
The lack of consensus on the rudder was Boeing saying "no it wasn't". What is interesting about that is that by denying there was a problem Boeing retained public confidence in the plane whereas, in the case of the MAX, taking full responsibility after the second incident sent that confidence spiraling into the ground.
The lack of consensus on the rudder was Boeing saying "no it wasn't". What is interesting about that is that by denying there was a problem Boeing retained public confidence in the plane whereas, in the case of the MAX, taking full responsibility after the second incident sent that confidence spiraling into the ground.
Same thing with the 747 fuse pin - after the first crash, we couldn't figure out how we could have both engines on one side suddenly depart the aircraft (I was involved in that one) (didn't help that it happened over deep water and they couldn't find the engine debris). After the second crash, they recovered the engines fairly quickly, after which it was fairly obvious what had happened...
The point is that Boeing did not instantly say, in the rudder failures, "Boeing is solely responsible and no other factor exists" the way they did for ET-302, even after the oh-**** moment. No national televised self-flagellation that said "FOR EVERYONE'S SAKE, NO 737 IS SAFE" Instead they maintained "Maybe rudder, probably pilot or weather."
That declaration after ET-302 was the change of course that leads to this conversation today.
That declaration after ET-302 was the change of course that leads to this conversation today.
Figures from an aero magazine
2023 deliveries
Boeing total 528, 737 family 396
Airbus total 735, A320 family 571, A220 68
Airbus plans for 2026 to produce 75 A320neo family per month. (let's see)
2023 deliveries
Boeing total 528, 737 family 396
Airbus total 735, A320 family 571, A220 68
Airbus plans for 2026 to produce 75 A320neo family per month. (let's see)
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The point is that Boeing did not instantly say, in the rudder failures, "Boeing is solely responsible and no other factor exists" the way they did for ET-302, even after the oh-**** moment. No national televised self-flagellation that said "FOR EVERYONE'S SAKE, NO 737 IS SAFE" Instead they maintained "Maybe rudder, probably pilot or weather."
That declaration after ET-302 was the change of course that leads to this conversation today.
That declaration after ET-302 was the change of course that leads to this conversation today.
I don't see how the causal link adds up. Let's just take the critique of the ET-302 affair, as you have often pressed it, as completely and finally settled as correct. How do the failures in that situation (if I've read the criticisms properly, these include at least the Ethiopian government, airline, pilots, and then all who stoked the reactionary response, and the Boeing response as such), mitigate the lack of a new single-aisle design? The much-maligned corporate and senior management, and board, devotion to profit over engineering excellence and preeminence? (Stockholder profit and executive bonus and deferred comp, both) The other quality issues? Oh, and the - if I can risk re-provoking another recitation of the critique - the ill-advised MCAS itself as it was designed and/or certified and/or configured?
All these problems - and I'm in no way claiming to have summed all of them up - would still exist, would they not? Please explain - if the causal link exists, it's just eluded this SLF/ att'y.
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The point is that Boeing did not instantly say, in the rudder failures, "Boeing is solely responsible and no other factor exists" the way they did for ET-302, even after the oh-**** moment. No national televised self-flagellation that said "FOR EVERYONE'S SAKE, NO 737 IS SAFE" Instead they maintained "Maybe rudder, probably pilot or weather."
That declaration after ET-302 was the change of course that leads to this conversation today.
That declaration after ET-302 was the change of course that leads to this conversation today.
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Boeing put at least 2 737s from rudder hard-overs into the ground long before the merger. Unlike the MAX, neither plane could possibly be controlled during the event and both gave opposite reactions expected to rudder control inputs.
Corporate greed did disaffect a large number of Boeing workers and they have been more than willing to use the MAX to punish the C-suite for it, making Boeing an easy target for a publicity smear campaign.
Corporate greed did disaffect a large number of Boeing workers and they have been more than willing to use the MAX to punish the C-suite for it, making Boeing an easy target for a publicity smear campaign.
Boeing put at least 2 737s from rudder hard-overs into the ground long before the merger. Unlike the MAX, neither plane could possibly be controlled during the event and both gave opposite reactions expected to rudder control inputs.
Corporate greed did disaffect a large number of Boeing workers and they have been more than willing to use the MAX to punish the C-suite for it, making Boeing an easy target for a publicity smear campaign.
Corporate greed did disaffect a large number of Boeing workers and they have been more than willing to use the MAX to punish the C-suite for it, making Boeing an easy target for a publicity smear campaign.
As I mentioned elsewhere, the rudder hardover/reversal issue was extraordinarily complex, did not have as clear a "it's the PCU" signal as is often claimed, and did not have the simple resolution of "redesign the part," as it was not accepted that it was the only foreseeable single point rudder system failure. It is true that for some time NTSB was alert to the possibility of accidents that might have been caused by an unexplained rudder hardover. However, until an issue with a PCU on an aircraft that experienced a transient hardover (and landed safely thereafter) was discovered -- after months of exhaustive testing -- there was no clear leading cause, and it wasn't even assumed that there was a single cause.
Meanwhile I don't know how you could excessively "smear" a company that delivered a plane with a door plug that was literally not attached to the passenger compartment of the airframe. The only way that happens is if you throw out the Reason Swiss cheese and replace it with a single gaping hole.
ET-302 misreporting. Other planes have lost doors, some with catastrophic results; no one at the time said "That's it, fold the tent and set fire to the horses."
All the other lost doors, were actually doors as in they were designed to be opened. Also all of the ones I can think of were a result of latent design flaws, usually combined with operator error by baggage smashers or other non technical ground staff that came to light in a bad way. I can't think of anything else to rival the Alaska door plug issue where one of the most basic aircraft construction tasks, install some bolts, were missed repeeatedly by the manufacturer prior to delivery.
All the other lost doors, were actually doors as in they were designed to be opened. Also all of the ones I can think of were a result of latent design flaws, usually combined with operator error by baggage smashers or other non technical ground staff that came to light in a bad way. I can't think of anything else to rival the Alaska door plug issue where one of the most basic aircraft construction tasks, install some bolts, were missed repeeatedly by the manufacturer prior to delivery.
If you can't put aircraft parts together in a scenario simpler than putting together a 20 piece LEGO Star Wars set, you shouldn't be building aircraft and no one should be buying your aircraft.
Some people don't seem to be grasping how outrageous, how detached from layers and layers of best practice, this situation is.
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I can't think of any situation at all in which a commercial airliner was delivered with a structural part of a pressurized compartment completely unattached to the fuselage. There's no comparison. Yes all the hairs should be on fire.
If you can't put aircraft parts together in a scenario simpler than putting together a 20 piece LEGO Star Wars set, you shouldn't be building aircraft and no one should be buying your aircraft.
Some people don't seem to be grasping how outrageous, how detached from layers and layers of best practice, this situation is.
If you can't put aircraft parts together in a scenario simpler than putting together a 20 piece LEGO Star Wars set, you shouldn't be building aircraft and no one should be buying your aircraft.
Some people don't seem to be grasping how outrageous, how detached from layers and layers of best practice, this situation is.
Not trying to change, let alone reduce or minimize, the severity of the situation. That said, isn't there a context point also? That is, "[Even if you used to put aircraft parts together flawlessly or as close to flawlessly as humanly possible, if [now] you can't put aircraft parts together in a scenario simpler than putting together a 20 piece LEGO Star Wars set, youuldn't be building aircraft and no one should be buying your aircraft."
This situation is not one where the severity of the door plug accident (or incident) reaches this level only when the context of all of Boeing's other failings are perceived sequentially, or in any order. It's a standalone quality failure freak-out. Obviously all the failings, business strategy and financial manipulations, and quality and safety matters, all of it, yield the dire future of the company with precious little to justify hope for its return to engineering excellence and preeminence of the past. (But I still contend that even if ET-302 factors are taken exactly as MechEngr has asserted they must be taken, this does not account for the occurence of all the problems or the dire straits in which the company finds itself.)
This needs to be said - and remi thanks for saying it.
Not trying to change, let alone reduce or minimize, the severity of the situation. That said, isn't there a context point also? That is, "[Even if you used to put aircraft parts together flawlessly or as close to flawlessly as humanly possible, if [now] you can't put aircraft parts together in a scenario simpler than putting together a 20 piece LEGO Star Wars set, youuldn't be building aircraft and no one should be buying your aircraft."
This situation is not one where the severity of the door plug accident (or incident) reaches this level only when the context of all of Boeing's other failings are perceived sequentially, or in any order. It's a standalone quality failure freak-out. Obviously all the failings, business strategy and financial manipulations, and quality and safety matters, all of it, yield the dire future of the company with precious little to justify hope for its return to engineering excellence and preeminence of the past. (But I still contend that even if ET-302 factors are taken exactly as MechEngr has asserted they must be taken, this does not account for the occurence of all the problems or the dire straits in which the company finds itself.)
Not trying to change, let alone reduce or minimize, the severity of the situation. That said, isn't there a context point also? That is, "[Even if you used to put aircraft parts together flawlessly or as close to flawlessly as humanly possible, if [now] you can't put aircraft parts together in a scenario simpler than putting together a 20 piece LEGO Star Wars set, youuldn't be building aircraft and no one should be buying your aircraft."
This situation is not one where the severity of the door plug accident (or incident) reaches this level only when the context of all of Boeing's other failings are perceived sequentially, or in any order. It's a standalone quality failure freak-out. Obviously all the failings, business strategy and financial manipulations, and quality and safety matters, all of it, yield the dire future of the company with precious little to justify hope for its return to engineering excellence and preeminence of the past. (But I still contend that even if ET-302 factors are taken exactly as MechEngr has asserted they must be taken, this does not account for the occurence of all the problems or the dire straits in which the company finds itself.)
That's a thing that really needs to be emphasized. Boeing has been working up to this. Slowly, steadily, predictably. Never mind the never ending litany of quality issues and groundings over on the military side (or obscene financial mismanagement). Over here in civilian manufacture there are loose parts, more loose parts, parts rattling around, debris rattling around, years delayed certifications, waivers for safety issues, amendments by Congress for more waivers, contractors doing work on company premises that can't be logged in the system of record by the contractors, on and on, and that's all post MCAS.
I'd love for Boeing to hit its stride again but I can't see how that could be done without a time machine. I feel sad.