Pax sue Boeing in DBX crash
Join Date: Jun 2000
Location: last time I looked I was still here.
Posts: 4,507
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
"Do some pilot stuff", wonderful, I like it. It's what the pax expect us to be; the insurance policy that saves the day when the fridge catches fire and the toilet starts to leak.
There is no doubt that at the end of a long working day, possibly with not a full nights sleep, using the automatics to bring the a/c to 1000' stable on finals is the way to go. It is also more often the case that a/c arrive onto finals via radar control. You are told altitude, speed & HDG. It is easier to dial the number into MCP. However, and sadly not so common anymore, it is wonderful to have open skies, the runway in sight from 30nm out, switch it all off and have a silent raw data relaxed arrival via a CDA to a smooth touchdown. Very satisfying and totally gob stopping for the cadet whose only manually handle was during base training.
I do not have any problem with full use of the automatics. The problem I have is with the philosophy & culture that has replaced the basic handling skills with full use of automatics, so that when the automatics fail or malfunction there is a nervous fall back rather than a confident one. The automatics must supplement the basics not replace them. Modern guys always try to solve problems in the automatics by selecting further modes of automatics, when the best manner might be to disconnect and sort it out with some analysis.
The video 'Children of the Magenta Line' states this wonderfully. Select the level of automation that is best for the moment, and that could zero. The problem is that for some zero is both heresy & terrifying.
There is no doubt that at the end of a long working day, possibly with not a full nights sleep, using the automatics to bring the a/c to 1000' stable on finals is the way to go. It is also more often the case that a/c arrive onto finals via radar control. You are told altitude, speed & HDG. It is easier to dial the number into MCP. However, and sadly not so common anymore, it is wonderful to have open skies, the runway in sight from 30nm out, switch it all off and have a silent raw data relaxed arrival via a CDA to a smooth touchdown. Very satisfying and totally gob stopping for the cadet whose only manually handle was during base training.
I do not have any problem with full use of the automatics. The problem I have is with the philosophy & culture that has replaced the basic handling skills with full use of automatics, so that when the automatics fail or malfunction there is a nervous fall back rather than a confident one. The automatics must supplement the basics not replace them. Modern guys always try to solve problems in the automatics by selecting further modes of automatics, when the best manner might be to disconnect and sort it out with some analysis.
The video 'Children of the Magenta Line' states this wonderfully. Select the level of automation that is best for the moment, and that could zero. The problem is that for some zero is both heresy & terrifying.
But in many airlines the option of a fully manually flown approach and landing, for handling practice, is not allowed, even in low workload severe CAVOK.
For example Virgin allow it when weather and workload conditions allow, BA completely ban the practise.
For example Virgin allow it when weather and workload conditions allow, BA completely ban the practise.
Last edited by cessnapete; 22nd Aug 2017 at 10:12.
Join Date: Dec 2006
Location: Florida and wherever my laptop is
Posts: 1,350
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Ian W, that argument may have be made but in no way proven: you base your case on (rare) situations where the automatics have failed and pilots have failed to intervene correctly. Who knows how a fully automatic system would have responded Hardly convincing!
Similarly your earlier post spoke of being on board an aircraft in fully automatic operation. No you weren't. The autopilot was human programmed and under full human control as was every aspect of decision-making for the entire flight including failure cases.
Similarly your earlier post spoke of being on board an aircraft in fully automatic operation. No you weren't. The autopilot was human programmed and under full human control as was every aspect of decision-making for the entire flight including failure cases.
There are many UAS operating that have not had problems of the kind that are always quoted. The argument made by crews will need to be significantly more convincing than "honest we deal with problems every day that the automatics cannot". Tell that to the people that have created UAS that do automated/autonomous air to air refuelling then recover to automated/autonomous carrier landings.
Controversial, moi?
Flight through rough air, windsheer, strong crosswinds are all situations where the automatics perform worse than humans.
Similarly the Autopilot/Autothrottle system on the B777 is certificated to autoland the aircraft on one engine with a 25 knot x-wind.
In my last company we were allowed to autoland the aircraft up to the aircraft x-wind limit in greater than Cat I conditions. I know of one trainer, severely caught out by an extraordinary set of circumstances (like all these things it is a long story but for another time) who autolanded with a 40 knot x-wind in unforecast Cat II conditions.
Both the B777/787 FCOMs state that a windshear escape manouevre can be flown automatically and the advice contained therein states that SEVERE windshear MAY exceed the performance capability of the automatics and the pilot flying must be prepared to disconnect the automatics and fly manually.
I have personally been in severe turbulence twice and, although the situation was alarming, both autopilot and autothrottle coped admirably before we escaped from the conditions.
Join Date: Jun 2002
Location: Wor Yerm
Age: 68
Posts: 4
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
That's not all aircraft then. But I'm glad to hear some do but frankly I'm not surprised that an aircraft like the triple is so capable. I just wish this level of functionality was available in more aircraft.
So was/is Emirates one of these? If it was, they had better get their cheque book out - unless local law prevents them from being sued. And maybe the shareholders of airlines where manual flying is banned should be informed. Shareholders (and more importantly, passengers and those on the ground) doesn't expect perfectly serviceable aircraft to be crashed because its pilots are neither trained nor familiar with manual flight. As RAT 5 and B2N2 have said, it is expected by everybody (except airlines it appears) that we have to "do some pilot stuff" every now and again to make up for unusual weather and deficiencies in current aircraft design and manufacture.
So was/is Emirates one of these? If it was, they had better get their cheque book out - unless local law prevents them from being sued. And maybe the shareholders of airlines where manual flying is banned should be informed. Shareholders (and more importantly, passengers and those on the ground) doesn't expect perfectly serviceable aircraft to be crashed because its pilots are neither trained nor familiar with manual flight. As RAT 5 and B2N2 have said, it is expected by everybody (except airlines it appears) that we have to "do some pilot stuff" every now and again to make up for unusual weather and deficiencies in current aircraft design and manufacture.
Controversial, moi?
But in many airlines the option of a fully manually flown approach and landing, for handling practice, is not allowed, even in low workload severe CAVOK.
For example Virgin allow it when weather and workload conditions allow, BA completely ban the practise.
For example Virgin allow it when weather and workload conditions allow, BA completely ban the practise.
Now that's refreshing to hear that a company can encourage/discourage rather than simply mandate 'you are to' or ban 'you are not too'. Whilst the latter does have its place, so many things in aviation are grey rather than simply black or white!
PM, #91, I agree that pilots need an understanding the rationale behind systems operation, but modern aircraft systems are now so complex the task of describing them in piloting terms approaches practical limits of training, knowledge retention, and recall.
Thus the point becomes the depth of knowledge required to operate in the expected range of situations. This is often translated into training ‘mechanistic’ SOPs, where the background to the procedure does not need to be known.
Training now focuses on ‘what to think’ opposed to ‘how to think’ about operating aircraft, the latter providing some protection for the unexpected. And when the industry ‘discovers’ a new ‘unexpected’ situation a solution is to create another SOP or train for the exception, effectively doubling the training task with further dependance on the crew for recall and action.
There must be a limit to this, if not we will spend more time training than flying. Cost effectiveness will prevail, but when. Perhaps the time is right for operators to question the expansive demands of training and regulatory compliance; we need an alternative model.
Automation and SOPs should be seen as tools to aid flying, not the means of achieving safely; that requires thought which uniquely requires pilots.
Management have the better opportunities for thinking; don’t expect pilots to rethink a systems interface problem in the last few feet of a landing. Pay attention to ‘small’ changes - modifications, SOPs, training, they may suddenly escalate to big problems.
This accident illustrates the difficulties in this area, particularly the effect of ‘add-on’ equipment.
The aircraft manufacturer has a well proven procedure based on previous designs and operation - TOGA; the avionics vendor recommends the use of existing aircraft procedures, but who brings the two together and asks the difficult questions which are much clearer with hindsight.
Does the new equipment change the assumptions in the original aircraft design.
Will a ‘long landing’ call result in greater exposure for the use TOGA below 5ft.
What are the differences between a pilot judged need for GA vs a machine generated alert.
Will an automated call surprise crews, slowing their reaction and cross checking.
Who holds the responsibility for considering these aspects; perhaps this will be the crux of the legal action.
Thus the point becomes the depth of knowledge required to operate in the expected range of situations. This is often translated into training ‘mechanistic’ SOPs, where the background to the procedure does not need to be known.
Training now focuses on ‘what to think’ opposed to ‘how to think’ about operating aircraft, the latter providing some protection for the unexpected. And when the industry ‘discovers’ a new ‘unexpected’ situation a solution is to create another SOP or train for the exception, effectively doubling the training task with further dependance on the crew for recall and action.
There must be a limit to this, if not we will spend more time training than flying. Cost effectiveness will prevail, but when. Perhaps the time is right for operators to question the expansive demands of training and regulatory compliance; we need an alternative model.
Automation and SOPs should be seen as tools to aid flying, not the means of achieving safely; that requires thought which uniquely requires pilots.
Management have the better opportunities for thinking; don’t expect pilots to rethink a systems interface problem in the last few feet of a landing. Pay attention to ‘small’ changes - modifications, SOPs, training, they may suddenly escalate to big problems.
This accident illustrates the difficulties in this area, particularly the effect of ‘add-on’ equipment.
The aircraft manufacturer has a well proven procedure based on previous designs and operation - TOGA; the avionics vendor recommends the use of existing aircraft procedures, but who brings the two together and asks the difficult questions which are much clearer with hindsight.
Does the new equipment change the assumptions in the original aircraft design.
Will a ‘long landing’ call result in greater exposure for the use TOGA below 5ft.
What are the differences between a pilot judged need for GA vs a machine generated alert.
Will an automated call surprise crews, slowing their reaction and cross checking.
Who holds the responsibility for considering these aspects; perhaps this will be the crux of the legal action.
Last edited by safetypee; 22nd Aug 2017 at 18:03.
B2N2
Yes of course these things are practiced and taught in the sim. But are you saying that when "horrors", the aircraft is full of pax, BA discourage manual handling? Not much of an advertisement for their pilots expertise, or lack of, if the automatics fail.
In my time on the B744 when conditions allowed, weather and workload etc. Hand flying AP/ out A/t out was encouraged.
Yes of course these things are practiced and taught in the sim. But are you saying that when "horrors", the aircraft is full of pax, BA discourage manual handling? Not much of an advertisement for their pilots expertise, or lack of, if the automatics fail.
In my time on the B744 when conditions allowed, weather and workload etc. Hand flying AP/ out A/t out was encouraged.
Last edited by cessnapete; 22nd Aug 2017 at 18:13.
Join Date: Dec 1999
Location: In my own little world
Posts: 1,475
Likes: 0
Received 4 Likes
on
1 Post
I'm starting to wonder how the hell we, and a hell of a lot before and after, managed in the classic 747 without FFRATS. We did though and times have moved on. The airlines now want to mitigate all risk out of flying by reducing manual anything but I can only feel that they are storing up a big problem for themselves with the colusion of the regulator. The answer? I do not know, but I hope it does not take a large loss of life to force a rethink.
Join Date: Apr 2016
Posts: 1
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
alf5071h`s post is by far the most thought provoking thus far on this thread. I would humbly respond as follows.
Advances in automation have reached a level such that a threat of unintended consequences may be in emergence. The original intention of these advances were to assist and ease pilot work load, enable him to remain mentally alert and physically fit to deal with any possible threats that may be encountered. However these advances also mean that pilot work load has been reduced to such a low level that the pilot is inactive for long periods of time and loses concentration. He is carried rather being the carrier. He becomes a passenger and is no longer the pilot, the person whose mind and body commands and directs the flight.
An understanding of HF in this scenario does therefore require require significant expertise to argue and judge the technical, mainly the psychological issues involved. Inevitably and increasingly, the legal beagles do inevitably need the opinion of an expert witness in cases coming before the courts.
Advances in automation have reached a level such that a threat of unintended consequences may be in emergence. The original intention of these advances were to assist and ease pilot work load, enable him to remain mentally alert and physically fit to deal with any possible threats that may be encountered. However these advances also mean that pilot work load has been reduced to such a low level that the pilot is inactive for long periods of time and loses concentration. He is carried rather being the carrier. He becomes a passenger and is no longer the pilot, the person whose mind and body commands and directs the flight.
An understanding of HF in this scenario does therefore require require significant expertise to argue and judge the technical, mainly the psychological issues involved. Inevitably and increasingly, the legal beagles do inevitably need the opinion of an expert witness in cases coming before the courts.
Automation has replaced advancing a lever always used, with pressing a button almost never used.
The designer of that button has responsibility to make it as safe or safer than that which it replaced.
Did they succeed?
Many on here are undoubtedly right that the crew failed.
They make reasonable statements about this, but then draw conclusions that fail a simple test of logic.
They assume that because the crew failed, therefore the design of the button did not fail.
That conclusion simply does not follow.
If this button is going to remove your hand from a perfectly natural control, and then isn't going to do the only thing you could possibly intend it to do, why ISN'T that even enunciated?
Last edited by pilot9249; 23rd Aug 2017 at 03:37.
M.Mouse
Certainly, already happened with Airbus Air France, and Air Asia A320 and SFO 777 mishap.
All caused by simple manual handling failure issues.
If my BA friend has only ever hand flown the A380 route flying, on take off and early initial climb, and then usually well below 1000ft when established on final approach. I find this worrying.
All mandated by rigid Company SOP which appears to discourage airmanship, and flying skills other than in a Sim.
Certainly, already happened with Airbus Air France, and Air Asia A320 and SFO 777 mishap.
All caused by simple manual handling failure issues.
If my BA friend has only ever hand flown the A380 route flying, on take off and early initial climb, and then usually well below 1000ft when established on final approach. I find this worrying.
All mandated by rigid Company SOP which appears to discourage airmanship, and flying skills other than in a Sim.
cessnap... perhaps you should challenge yourself to provide the evidence for your conclusions. Loss of skills vs automation is still an open issue but the balance to date favours degraded mental skills over manual skills.
This accident appears to be more associated with cognitive skills than manual handling.
The action to move the thrust levers forward requires an understanding of the need to do it, which implies an understanding of why thrust did not increase automatically as demanded. The mental model was for automatic thrust, the situation required a change of view to that associated with manual operation. How is this achieved, how do pilots change mode, what might impede this, time, experience, memory recall, startle … https://www.halldale.com/files/halld...ts/Martin.pptx
What features contributed to the need for pilots to change their mental view? And could this change be achieved in a timescale no longer than it takes to read this post?
After though: if pilots were faced by this situation in late Jan 2008, how many would focus their attention on engine malfunction.
This accident appears to be more associated with cognitive skills than manual handling.
The action to move the thrust levers forward requires an understanding of the need to do it, which implies an understanding of why thrust did not increase automatically as demanded. The mental model was for automatic thrust, the situation required a change of view to that associated with manual operation. How is this achieved, how do pilots change mode, what might impede this, time, experience, memory recall, startle … https://www.halldale.com/files/halld...ts/Martin.pptx
What features contributed to the need for pilots to change their mental view? And could this change be achieved in a timescale no longer than it takes to read this post?
After though: if pilots were faced by this situation in late Jan 2008, how many would focus their attention on engine malfunction.
Join Date: Jun 2002
Location: Wor Yerm
Age: 68
Posts: 4
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
If this button is going to remove your hand from a perfectly natural control, and then isn't going to do the only thing you could possibly intend it to do, why ISN'T that even enunciated?
The announciation is not important. The thrust, positive climb rate and appropriate airspeed are. At about 400' the lack of go around guidance, lateral and/or vertical will probably be noticed and then alternative steps will be taken to ensure an appropriate flight path. After landing, you call your technical support people and ask about what just happened. Then the learning starts.
You will find that lots of modes and buttons do not work as advertised. Sometimes you get a message or a ping, sometimes you don't. What is important is that you carry a mental model of what you would like to happen before you need it. Then when you are let down you use another method to get what you want. Saying the button didn't work as advertised when alternative means were available but not used is not really acceptable.
Last edited by Piltdown Man; 23rd Aug 2017 at 09:16. Reason: Slight improvement in text, I think.
Join Date: Nov 1998
Location: netherlands
Posts: 297
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Our company taught us to always advance the throttle manually together with pushing the G/A button versus only using the button. You would then have the tactile feedback of the A/T taking over. Only then would I release the thrustlevers. Pm moniters power output, fma etc.
This was on Boeings and I retired on the B777.
There was a company tendency to use the automatics, but manual flying was not discouraged or forbidden. I normally flew the departure to above 10.000 and the landing from above 10.000, A/T off in all but low cat 1 and cat 3 wx. This depending on flightduration , crewing or crew workload.
This was on Boeings and I retired on the B777.
There was a company tendency to use the automatics, but manual flying was not discouraged or forbidden. I normally flew the departure to above 10.000 and the landing from above 10.000, A/T off in all but low cat 1 and cat 3 wx. This depending on flightduration , crewing or crew workload.
safetypee
Thats just the point, to Go Around to increase power, you/ TOGA move the thrust levers forward, simple 'pilot stuff'. If you have an automatic aid to help, you don't discard the 'pilot stuff,' if the auto system is mishandled as in this case, or fails, you just sit hands in lap and crash?? Most airline SOP would have hands on thrust levers at least below 500ft.
Crews are loosing the ability to instinctively back up with the 'pilot stuff'.
There was no systems failure in the DXB case, just failed basic airmanship.
Thats just the point, to Go Around to increase power, you/ TOGA move the thrust levers forward, simple 'pilot stuff'. If you have an automatic aid to help, you don't discard the 'pilot stuff,' if the auto system is mishandled as in this case, or fails, you just sit hands in lap and crash?? Most airline SOP would have hands on thrust levers at least below 500ft.
Crews are loosing the ability to instinctively back up with the 'pilot stuff'.
There was no systems failure in the DXB case, just failed basic airmanship.
Join Date: Jun 2000
Location: last time I looked I was still here.
Posts: 4,507
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
What is important is that you carry a mental model of what you would like to happen before you need it. Then when you are let down you use another method to get what you want. Saying the button didn't work as advertised when alternative means were available but not used is not really acceptable.
Spot ON. However, there are operators that teach only one method of doing anything; they do not teach all the capabilities of the systems. Thus, when the primary method doesn't work there might not be enough knowledge of the alternatives; or they might be too scared of SOP police to attempt any. Meanwhile the can or worms is getting bigger as lack of action kicks in. By the time WTF has passed and been replaced by a little panic mode it could be too late. Even more undesirable is where the primary method doesn't work and then the guessing starts and the pilot makes it worse and the spiral tightens.
Regarding FMA call outs or not: the monitoring of FMA's is often doubtful. I see people call out FMA's without first thinking 'what is it I want to see'. If you do that first then the actual FMA crates a feedback loop in your brain. I want to see XYZ, I do see XYZ, therefore I've got what I want'. Or not, and then you do something about it. That concept is not taught by most: it is just SOP push this button at this time and the a/c will do that.
I had this interesting moment more than once: we were in the cruise approaching TOD in VNAV PTH. ATC cleared us to descend and PF dialled in the new FL in MCP. Just as they did that FMA changed to ALT HLD. The a/c did not descend, I called "ALT HLD" - PF replied "Check" and we carried on in level flight. This process was repeated and ATC repeated the descent clearance. PF looked at MCP and saw the lower FL and looked confused. I again said "ALT HLD". There was a question mark of 'how did that happen' rather than do something about it. I was then accused of being unhelpful in not alerting PF what to do in the first instance. OMG as eyes rolled to the heavens. You can stare at the FMA all you want, but only if you understand them. In B738 rolling in V/S doesn't always work, unless the FMA pitch is in the correct mode first and MCP adjusted. That causes some confusion and piano playing on the MCP.
It's not quite the same sentiment, but it does add to the concept of 'being ahead of the game'.
An NTSB investigator once said, "A pilot should not take their a/c to a place their brain had not already been a few moments earlier." Add this to the sentiment above and you can have a nice relaxing and successful day.
Spot ON. However, there are operators that teach only one method of doing anything; they do not teach all the capabilities of the systems. Thus, when the primary method doesn't work there might not be enough knowledge of the alternatives; or they might be too scared of SOP police to attempt any. Meanwhile the can or worms is getting bigger as lack of action kicks in. By the time WTF has passed and been replaced by a little panic mode it could be too late. Even more undesirable is where the primary method doesn't work and then the guessing starts and the pilot makes it worse and the spiral tightens.
Regarding FMA call outs or not: the monitoring of FMA's is often doubtful. I see people call out FMA's without first thinking 'what is it I want to see'. If you do that first then the actual FMA crates a feedback loop in your brain. I want to see XYZ, I do see XYZ, therefore I've got what I want'. Or not, and then you do something about it. That concept is not taught by most: it is just SOP push this button at this time and the a/c will do that.
I had this interesting moment more than once: we were in the cruise approaching TOD in VNAV PTH. ATC cleared us to descend and PF dialled in the new FL in MCP. Just as they did that FMA changed to ALT HLD. The a/c did not descend, I called "ALT HLD" - PF replied "Check" and we carried on in level flight. This process was repeated and ATC repeated the descent clearance. PF looked at MCP and saw the lower FL and looked confused. I again said "ALT HLD". There was a question mark of 'how did that happen' rather than do something about it. I was then accused of being unhelpful in not alerting PF what to do in the first instance. OMG as eyes rolled to the heavens. You can stare at the FMA all you want, but only if you understand them. In B738 rolling in V/S doesn't always work, unless the FMA pitch is in the correct mode first and MCP adjusted. That causes some confusion and piano playing on the MCP.
It's not quite the same sentiment, but it does add to the concept of 'being ahead of the game'.
An NTSB investigator once said, "A pilot should not take their a/c to a place their brain had not already been a few moments earlier." Add this to the sentiment above and you can have a nice relaxing and successful day.
In passing, in my early career 747s had no TOGA, hadn't been invented.
We did though have a sort of TOGA assist , it was called a Flight Engineer. He certainly wouldn't sit and watch the thrust levers at idle in a Go Around.
The advent of automation on the -400 did initially tend to modify your 'pilot stuff' On an early conversion Sim I pressed the new fangled TOGA switches on take off, released the brakes, and transferred my gaze out of the window. At about 30 kts I noticed the power still at idle and called Stop. The Training Captain queried my actions, after I replied "the TOGA has failed". "What's wrong with your arm?" he said, good advice!
We did though have a sort of TOGA assist , it was called a Flight Engineer. He certainly wouldn't sit and watch the thrust levers at idle in a Go Around.
The advent of automation on the -400 did initially tend to modify your 'pilot stuff' On an early conversion Sim I pressed the new fangled TOGA switches on take off, released the brakes, and transferred my gaze out of the window. At about 30 kts I noticed the power still at idle and called Stop. The Training Captain queried my actions, after I replied "the TOGA has failed". "What's wrong with your arm?" he said, good advice!
Last edited by cessnapete; 23rd Aug 2017 at 12:46.
PM, ”Saying the button didn't work as advertised when alternative means were available but not used is not really acceptable”.
Many pilots would agree with that view; I would also agree providing the situation is considered and stated, place the activity in context.
Over the years aviation has changed dramatically with increasingly complex operational situations and technology, yet the human has not changed. The industry appears to be approaching the limits of human effectiveness, particularly with decreasing opportunity to gain experience - learning on the job.
Thus it is even more important to consider what we might expect of human performance in specific situations, and if we judge that unacceptable, then action is required to alleviate the human limitation (automation, decision aiding, annunciation) or protect them from the situation (system operating logic).
More often this judgment is made by pilots, particularly in this forum. We harshly judge ourselves, especially when we know the outcome of accidents; we conclude (with subconscious hindsight bias) that ‘we would not make that mistake’, and thus expect others to act similarly.
We are our worst enemies; we have grown up with the changes which we may not have noticed, and overtime gained experiences well beyond that which might be found today.
In order to judge - comment, we must identify what has changed, systems and situations, and then consider the effect of these in limiting human performance.
It's not where the line of judgement is drawn, but who makes that judgement. Look to management, regulator, and manufacturer, but first look to ourselves.
Compare with http://www.pprune.org/safety-crm-qa-...ml#post9853313
cessnap.., ”Crews are loosing the ability to instinctively back up with the 'pilot stuff'.”
I agree, but why blame individuals if they are trained or encouraged to think otherwise, or are unable to achieve a level of experience or confidence to do something which deviates from SOPs.
This accident highlights the limitations of an SOP mentality (depends on the identification of all possible situations); what do you do if the expected changes do not occur; seek an alternative published SOP, or an unpublished ‘airmanship’ SOP ?
RAT
but what happens if the brain has never been in the situation before, or even biased not to think about these situations.
Many pilots would agree with that view; I would also agree providing the situation is considered and stated, place the activity in context.
Over the years aviation has changed dramatically with increasingly complex operational situations and technology, yet the human has not changed. The industry appears to be approaching the limits of human effectiveness, particularly with decreasing opportunity to gain experience - learning on the job.
Thus it is even more important to consider what we might expect of human performance in specific situations, and if we judge that unacceptable, then action is required to alleviate the human limitation (automation, decision aiding, annunciation) or protect them from the situation (system operating logic).
More often this judgment is made by pilots, particularly in this forum. We harshly judge ourselves, especially when we know the outcome of accidents; we conclude (with subconscious hindsight bias) that ‘we would not make that mistake’, and thus expect others to act similarly.
We are our worst enemies; we have grown up with the changes which we may not have noticed, and overtime gained experiences well beyond that which might be found today.
In order to judge - comment, we must identify what has changed, systems and situations, and then consider the effect of these in limiting human performance.
It's not where the line of judgement is drawn, but who makes that judgement. Look to management, regulator, and manufacturer, but first look to ourselves.
Compare with http://www.pprune.org/safety-crm-qa-...ml#post9853313
cessnap.., ”Crews are loosing the ability to instinctively back up with the 'pilot stuff'.”
I agree, but why blame individuals if they are trained or encouraged to think otherwise, or are unable to achieve a level of experience or confidence to do something which deviates from SOPs.
This accident highlights the limitations of an SOP mentality (depends on the identification of all possible situations); what do you do if the expected changes do not occur; seek an alternative published SOP, or an unpublished ‘airmanship’ SOP ?
RAT
but what happens if the brain has never been in the situation before, or even biased not to think about these situations.