A388 peels open a B788 on the ground at Changi
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It appears the 787 was taxiing along minding its own business when a 380 reverses into him.
I think the jury is still out on this one.
It could have been ATC's fault for giving clearance to push. If that diagram is to scale, it seems you can't push an aircraft from this gate without hanging an A380 wing over the taxiway. I don't see how you could push the aircraft in an arc to the centerline without reaching the next gate (C23).
http://www.fly-tea.com/cms/lib/skins...rport/WSSS.jpg
Saab to deploy Surface Movement Radars at Singapore Changi Airport
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Unlikely you would think, that an aircraft would taxi into another one...
From WSSS airport charts:" Aircraft on TWY WA are not clear of aircraft pushback from aircraft stands C24 C25 and C26 until at end of pushback." The 380 came out of C23 but still infringed taxiway WA. Ground Control could well have rightly assumed that no conflict was going to arise because C23 was not included in the warning.
From WSSS airport charts:" Aircraft on TWY WA are not clear of aircraft pushback from aircraft stands C24 C25 and C26 until at end of pushback." The 380 came out of C23 but still infringed taxiway WA. Ground Control could well have rightly assumed that no conflict was going to arise because C23 was not included in the warning.
Last edited by portmanteau; 1st Apr 2017 at 10:19. Reason: rethink.
Just follow the magenta - oops - green lights....
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Today we got clearance from SIN GND to push from C25 facing north to release abeam C23. The ground crew tells me: "The standard procedure here is to push abeam C22."
I answered that this instruction is from ATC and I want him to push abeam C23.
The guy ignored me and pushed abeam C22...
Now because the ground crews are scared of a similar incident, another one is due to happen because they do their standard stuff even when being advised to do it in a different way...
It has been a debate amongst crews on many occasions. I'm not sure why, because it's not our area of responsibility; but...there are some airports where the SOP is, pilots ask for push back clearance. It is granted. The pilots tell the push back crew they are cleared. The push back crew then receive the push back instruction direct from ATC. No confusion or possible blame laid on the pilots. We all know that to give an instruction to one person, not in the language of either party, ask them to pass it on to another party whose language is also different is a classic start of a Swiss cheese. The process creates the holes. Why not reduce them. TEM starts on the ground. I wonder if all that holy grail stuff we are force fed, e.g. CRM, checklists, TEM etc. is also in the SOP's of others in the never lengthening chain necessary to get an a/c airborne safely and return to terra firma in similar condition. The links are numerous from rostering, baggage handlers, dispatchers, ATC, engineers, ramp handlers. The possibility of someone opening up the first slice of leaky cheese is huge.
Are only flight crew the primary target of this philosophy? Is it because the majority of accidents are logged as pilot error? What about the more numerous incidents? Are the also pilot error or an error from another link in the chain. It would not surprise me to find out many other links could do with a stout dose of TEM & CRM.
I answered that this instruction is from ATC and I want him to push abeam C23.
The guy ignored me and pushed abeam C22...
Now because the ground crews are scared of a similar incident, another one is due to happen because they do their standard stuff even when being advised to do it in a different way...
It has been a debate amongst crews on many occasions. I'm not sure why, because it's not our area of responsibility; but...there are some airports where the SOP is, pilots ask for push back clearance. It is granted. The pilots tell the push back crew they are cleared. The push back crew then receive the push back instruction direct from ATC. No confusion or possible blame laid on the pilots. We all know that to give an instruction to one person, not in the language of either party, ask them to pass it on to another party whose language is also different is a classic start of a Swiss cheese. The process creates the holes. Why not reduce them. TEM starts on the ground. I wonder if all that holy grail stuff we are force fed, e.g. CRM, checklists, TEM etc. is also in the SOP's of others in the never lengthening chain necessary to get an a/c airborne safely and return to terra firma in similar condition. The links are numerous from rostering, baggage handlers, dispatchers, ATC, engineers, ramp handlers. The possibility of someone opening up the first slice of leaky cheese is huge.
Are only flight crew the primary target of this philosophy? Is it because the majority of accidents are logged as pilot error? What about the more numerous incidents? Are the also pilot error or an error from another link in the chain. It would not surprise me to find out many other links could do with a stout dose of TEM & CRM.
Nothing would surprise me given the way some people taxi aircraft.
In Singapore one night, I was starting up, with my nose gear on the lead in line to the bay on my right. Asiana wanted to go there, so instead of waiting, they taxied between us and the aircraft parked on the next bay. I'd never before seen a 767 wingtip up so close.
How he missed us, the aircraft on the next bay, the aerobridges, and all the other stuff around the bay, I'll never know. He ended up with his cockpit at about the right stop position, but the aircraft about 30º off the guidance line. Some words were said on Singapore ground that probably hadn't been heard there before.
In Singapore one night, I was starting up, with my nose gear on the lead in line to the bay on my right. Asiana wanted to go there, so instead of waiting, they taxied between us and the aircraft parked on the next bay. I'd never before seen a 767 wingtip up so close.
How he missed us, the aircraft on the next bay, the aerobridges, and all the other stuff around the bay, I'll never know. He ended up with his cockpit at about the right stop position, but the aircraft about 30º off the guidance line. Some words were said on Singapore ground that probably hadn't been heard there before.
