NTSB says Delta Pilot Error
Join Date: Aug 2005
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I think this would be a very interesting discussion in Tech Log - with many of the participants potentially gaining some insight (such as myself) from it.
Join Date: May 2000
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A320 - PF operates throttles and T/Rs. We have enough guys that are terrified of using more than idle reverse because the company says it costs money. The resultant unexpected consequence is a number of RTOs where idle thrust reverse was so ingrained that full reverse was never selected.
The "monitored approach" aspects of this thread have little to do with the original topic. If people want to continue it I'd be happy to copy the relevant comments to a new one in the "Tech Log" forum which would be more appropriate than "Rumours and News" and leave this one for the actual subject of the NTSB report in question. But only if there are a few indications of agreement that it would meet with approval.
Steve
Steve
I still replay events where I should have, could have but didn't.
A separate thread in Tech would, I think, be a good move.
p.s. I know all multi-crew approaches are monitored. In this case "monitored approach" is just shorthand for a particular SOP.
Back to the subject, re complacency #53.
Complacency, without elaboration does not identify any issues for improving safety or avoiding similar accidents.
Although this was a side excursion, there are many similarities with overruns, which the FAA are well aware of and hence TALPA. However, the FAA do not proposed to mandate TALPA recommendations, leaving the safety responsibility with operators and in turn with the crew.
Were previous efforts to improve landing distance calculation overruled by operators?
In comparison with Europe, US operations might appear to be complacent given the frequency of encountering similar operating conditions. EASA provides extensive advice on contaminated operations, the performance calculation (1) is one of a few sections of part 25 not copied by FAA; this AMC also has extensive operational advice and cautions (although not the best document for operational awareness).
EASA also supports the implementation of OLD - Operational Landing Distance, which is more relevant on contaminated runways than the 'actual' + factor distances favoured by Boeing.
Another significant difference is that European operators are advised to consider contaminated operations as 'non normal' requiring additional risk mitigation - larger performance margins, crew training/awareness; whereas (complacent) US operators appear to treat contamination as an everyday operation.
(1) CS 25 AMC1591
Complacency, without elaboration does not identify any issues for improving safety or avoiding similar accidents.
Although this was a side excursion, there are many similarities with overruns, which the FAA are well aware of and hence TALPA. However, the FAA do not proposed to mandate TALPA recommendations, leaving the safety responsibility with operators and in turn with the crew.
Were previous efforts to improve landing distance calculation overruled by operators?
In comparison with Europe, US operations might appear to be complacent given the frequency of encountering similar operating conditions. EASA provides extensive advice on contaminated operations, the performance calculation (1) is one of a few sections of part 25 not copied by FAA; this AMC also has extensive operational advice and cautions (although not the best document for operational awareness).
EASA also supports the implementation of OLD - Operational Landing Distance, which is more relevant on contaminated runways than the 'actual' + factor distances favoured by Boeing.
Another significant difference is that European operators are advised to consider contaminated operations as 'non normal' requiring additional risk mitigation - larger performance margins, crew training/awareness; whereas (complacent) US operators appear to treat contamination as an everyday operation.
(1) CS 25 AMC1591
The most recent FAA documents (six) on TALPA and avoiding an overrun, @
http://www.skybrary.aero/bookshelf/c...&dateSort=desc
http://www.skybrary.aero/bookshelf/c...&dateSort=desc
