ASL/DHL overrun LIME/BGY Italy
Rex what you said was correct regarding RW28, but there has been a VOR approach to RW10 for a while now, and circle to lands are no longer required really. There is however a night curfew, where RW10 is used for take off and RW28 (even with a tailwind) are preferential for landing due to noise. Although I'm pretty sure a runoff is pretty noisy...
Here are a few pictures I took today.
The one below shows what remains of the Localiser transmitter- probably the reason the ILS is NOW unserviceable......
New temporary perimeter fence..
This one is self explanatory
Here are a few pictures I took today.
The one below shows what remains of the Localiser transmitter- probably the reason the ILS is NOW unserviceable......
New temporary perimeter fence..
This one is self explanatory
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Relieved the crew (and especially those on the ground) were uninjured. For those who might be viewing these posts who aren't freight dogs; the sobering photos depict the risks involved of multi-sector night freight operations, often at or close to a/c performance limits, tired (hanging in your straps) mixed with challenging weather conditions and minimum fuel. Very often, we push the boat out to get the job done (and it's sadly taken for granted). We're all thinking the same thing of course. I decided to go around a few months ago from just above the runway (20 ft) (somewhere else) due to control problems in v strong Xwinds. It was a surreal situation in that I could hardly believe I was actually doing the GA from such a low level. Took all my concentration - little or no spare capacity remaining. The decision was a no-brainer but even so, the temptation for me to continue with the landing and to try and resolve it in the flare was ENORMOUS. Can't quite state that enough. It would have ended badly if I'd have tried to remedy it throughout the flare - no doubt at all.
I hope this crew will be afforded some respect. They're having a very bad time.
I hope this crew will be afforded some respect. They're having a very bad time.
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https://postimg.org/image/i7j19bsn5/
Not sure if that's real or fake, but made me chuckle - apparently that's the post-accident statement of the driver that was hit by plane...
Not sure if that's real or fake, but made me chuckle - apparently that's the post-accident statement of the driver that was hit by plane...
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Double Back,
with respect you either don't understand English, don't understand Boeing , or don't understand that any escape manoeuvre trumps an overrun any day.
"I would disagree on training that. The most likely cause would be a long landing, but that would be the first mistake then. Landing long and THEN deciding to GA would be two mistakes in a row.
It gets into the field of aborting after V1, even on a long RWY."
A go-around after landing (balked landing) is one of the few ways that you can save your sorry ass if you landed too deep/fast , Boeing acknowledges this in the FCTM, the only proviso being that this option is no longer viable/recommended if you have deployed TR's.
There are a few videos on youtube of the manoeuvre being performed shortly after touchdown in places like Funchal, admittedly, it is rarely done after aircraft have properly touched down, this mainly being due to our super sharp colleagues selecting reverse ASAP (as also demanded by Boeing)
In the right (or maybe better read "wrong") circumstances it is however a viable escape plan if you haven't opened reverser sleeves, but, I have never seen it trained in Sim in 27 years of B737 Ops.
with respect you either don't understand English, don't understand Boeing , or don't understand that any escape manoeuvre trumps an overrun any day.
"I would disagree on training that. The most likely cause would be a long landing, but that would be the first mistake then. Landing long and THEN deciding to GA would be two mistakes in a row.
It gets into the field of aborting after V1, even on a long RWY."
A go-around after landing (balked landing) is one of the few ways that you can save your sorry ass if you landed too deep/fast , Boeing acknowledges this in the FCTM, the only proviso being that this option is no longer viable/recommended if you have deployed TR's.
There are a few videos on youtube of the manoeuvre being performed shortly after touchdown in places like Funchal, admittedly, it is rarely done after aircraft have properly touched down, this mainly being due to our super sharp colleagues selecting reverse ASAP (as also demanded by Boeing)
In the right (or maybe better read "wrong") circumstances it is however a viable escape plan if you haven't opened reverser sleeves, but, I have never seen it trained in Sim in 27 years of B737 Ops.
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In the right (or maybe better read "wrong") circumstances it is however a viable escape plan if you haven't opened reverser sleeves, but, I have never seen it trained in Sim in 27 years of B737 Ops.
Exactly my point. In a few over-run accidents the reports concluded that the a/c could have got airborne safely if full thrust had been applied immediately after touchdown. The a/c still had enough energy with the (short) remaining runway; but it never had a change of stopping in time. It would take a major change in mind-set and huge courage to do so. The lowest GA I've seen in the sim is the mandatory 'wave off' at 50' caused by ATC. i.e. you do not make the decision, it is commanded. Even a W/S GA is at a higher height and in new generation a/c is a command; but in severe conditions lower down it should be obvious. Watching the various youtube videos of very low GA's, due turbulence and instability, I am impressed by the decision making to do so, less impressed by some of the 'press-onitis' demo's. For the turbulent GA's it is pilots' decision and they must have felt falling over the edge in terms of being in control of the landing manoeuvre. Well done to them; but it is a totally different decision to make once the wheels touchdown and the end of the runway is looming. You know you've landed long, be it via a float, balloon or incorrect GP below 500'. Indeed you know you are going to land long well before touchdown. The manoeuvre is not difficult, it is the decision that is foreign. Surely much of our training is to experience situations which can surprise us and to teach us what it feels like to manage the scenario, including the decision making process. Given that over-runs due to long landings is an occurrence every year, somewhere in the world, why not teach what to do as a final resort? Most operators think that by having a rigid 500' gate policy they have done enough. Not so. There are plenty of airports where 'late landing clearance' is used and an ATC GA can be called very late.
A windshear GA at very low level is difficult to create in a sim and in the modern jets the WS warning kicks in. What needs to be added in training is the pure pilot generated feeling of "I don't like this, so let's get out of here." Not an SOP, not an auto command, just gut instinct followed by action. Surely that is what simulators are for.
Exactly my point. In a few over-run accidents the reports concluded that the a/c could have got airborne safely if full thrust had been applied immediately after touchdown. The a/c still had enough energy with the (short) remaining runway; but it never had a change of stopping in time. It would take a major change in mind-set and huge courage to do so. The lowest GA I've seen in the sim is the mandatory 'wave off' at 50' caused by ATC. i.e. you do not make the decision, it is commanded. Even a W/S GA is at a higher height and in new generation a/c is a command; but in severe conditions lower down it should be obvious. Watching the various youtube videos of very low GA's, due turbulence and instability, I am impressed by the decision making to do so, less impressed by some of the 'press-onitis' demo's. For the turbulent GA's it is pilots' decision and they must have felt falling over the edge in terms of being in control of the landing manoeuvre. Well done to them; but it is a totally different decision to make once the wheels touchdown and the end of the runway is looming. You know you've landed long, be it via a float, balloon or incorrect GP below 500'. Indeed you know you are going to land long well before touchdown. The manoeuvre is not difficult, it is the decision that is foreign. Surely much of our training is to experience situations which can surprise us and to teach us what it feels like to manage the scenario, including the decision making process. Given that over-runs due to long landings is an occurrence every year, somewhere in the world, why not teach what to do as a final resort? Most operators think that by having a rigid 500' gate policy they have done enough. Not so. There are plenty of airports where 'late landing clearance' is used and an ATC GA can be called very late.
A windshear GA at very low level is difficult to create in a sim and in the modern jets the WS warning kicks in. What needs to be added in training is the pure pilot generated feeling of "I don't like this, so let's get out of here." Not an SOP, not an auto command, just gut instinct followed by action. Surely that is what simulators are for.
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We practiced baulked landings in the sim during last sim. training session.
Training dep. here does try to be innovative and give us the best training you can find on B744.
So some do train this very important manoeuvre.
Icelandic operator by the way.
Training dep. here does try to be innovative and give us the best training you can find on B744.
So some do train this very important manoeuvre.
Icelandic operator by the way.
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No matter how much You train, there will always be a scenario that is unique.
Sure, 98-99% of what can be expected is, or can be trained.
But training has it limits in view of cost, so EFFECTIVE training is something else as dragging students through all possible scenarios in an endless training program. You would create robots, that get lost if the reality does not fit their training experiences.
The best part of training should be honing the decision making process, because that is what keeps people alive.
Sure there have been cases where a GA after TD would have had a better outcome, as there are instances that aborting the T/O after V1 would have had saved lives. Easy in hindsight, reading the accident report.
But for me a touchdown is selecting reverse, no idea how one could train initiation a GA after TD without stomping this basic rule.
Training those one off scenarios would introduce a new set of risks and thus lives, IF a pilot elected to use them in circumstances that did not validate them.
O yes, I did make a few long landings. Good weather, a nice headwind, good braking coefficient, long RWY. Nobody getting nervous in the office. No issue, but when I would have ended with the nose gear past the THR lights, I would have had ran into serious trouble.
And please captplaystation, do not question my knowledge of the English language, I might not be as fluent as a native speaker, but apart from the fact I master four more, I consider it more than enough to take part in this discussion. As is my 22 years experience on B747 200-300 and 400 series. As is my comprehension of one off decisions that saved the day for one, but killed others.
Sure, 98-99% of what can be expected is, or can be trained.
But training has it limits in view of cost, so EFFECTIVE training is something else as dragging students through all possible scenarios in an endless training program. You would create robots, that get lost if the reality does not fit their training experiences.
The best part of training should be honing the decision making process, because that is what keeps people alive.
Sure there have been cases where a GA after TD would have had a better outcome, as there are instances that aborting the T/O after V1 would have had saved lives. Easy in hindsight, reading the accident report.
But for me a touchdown is selecting reverse, no idea how one could train initiation a GA after TD without stomping this basic rule.
Training those one off scenarios would introduce a new set of risks and thus lives, IF a pilot elected to use them in circumstances that did not validate them.
O yes, I did make a few long landings. Good weather, a nice headwind, good braking coefficient, long RWY. Nobody getting nervous in the office. No issue, but when I would have ended with the nose gear past the THR lights, I would have had ran into serious trouble.
And please captplaystation, do not question my knowledge of the English language, I might not be as fluent as a native speaker, but apart from the fact I master four more, I consider it more than enough to take part in this discussion. As is my 22 years experience on B747 200-300 and 400 series. As is my comprehension of one off decisions that saved the day for one, but killed others.
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After a long career in aviation,I have learned that I'm not the most clever of pilots,so need to avoid situations,that may require me to display extraordinary skills.
Looking at the weather radar image for the time of the incident,it would appear that the gust front of the storm would be just about smack bang over the field.
There would have been enough clues,....ATC actual tower reports of the deteriorating conditions,aircraft weather radar imagery( often cluttered due raindrop size,but in this casemost probably,a clear red line approaching the field)..wall to wall lightning,TAFs which most definitely forecast the storm..
All this scary stuff would not have gone un-noticed by the crew..
I can only imagine,they had run out of options,with no fuel left to divert,and therefore assessed the Bergamo landing as the least of all threats!....Otherwise...why would you!
Looking at the weather radar image for the time of the incident,it would appear that the gust front of the storm would be just about smack bang over the field.
There would have been enough clues,....ATC actual tower reports of the deteriorating conditions,aircraft weather radar imagery( often cluttered due raindrop size,but in this casemost probably,a clear red line approaching the field)..wall to wall lightning,TAFs which most definitely forecast the storm..
All this scary stuff would not have gone un-noticed by the crew..
I can only imagine,they had run out of options,with no fuel left to divert,and therefore assessed the Bergamo landing as the least of all threats!....Otherwise...why would you!
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The best part of training should be honing the decision making process, because that is what keeps people alive.
Excellent. Sadly not enough operators follow that philosophy; certainly not in the trained monkey world.
But for me a touchdown is selecting reverse, no idea how one could train initiation a GA after TD without stomping this basic rule.
Just as a discussion point, landing performance is calculated without TR's. I hated the technique I observed by many F/O's, especially on shorter runways with auto brakes set, where they would remove their hands from the correct position on the Thrust Levers to holding the REV T/L's during the flare with the a/c still in the air; waiting to snap them open ASAP. IMHO this is conditioning the mind that you WILL land. Their brain is in land mode and their hands are NOT is G/A mode. There is no rush. I preferred the philosophy of - land, speed brakes up, a/c brakes working, steer, "I want to stay on the ground", select Rev Thrust. On B738 the braking remains the same after TR's are deployed.
Training does have its costs and limitations, including time available and effectiveness; I agree. However, these type of events do happen perhaps more than we think. Training might imply repetition, while a one-off experience can be of enough value to remain with you. I know that my first low level GA in CAVOK in the a/c stayed with me for my whole career.
What I used to do, when I had the freedom to decide as a trainer, was to design scenarios to experience elements of recent accidents. i.e. learn from others mistakes/misfortune and avoid the accident. Isn't that a basis of eduction? I wonder how many airlines introduced double flameout ditching in their recurrency program after Sully; compared to how many had done so before? The same after the BA 777 flameout at LHR? Is that realistic training? Yes they did happen, but how many times in the last 30 years worldwide? You can't do everything, indeed, but you can be as realistically effective as possible in developing relevant skills. Some of these one-off bizarre scenarios are fun; very challenging, but would the time have been better spent improving skills in more likely and useful areas?
All engine GA's from various positions in a Circling. It has been said that normal all engine GA's are the most common mess-ups, and they are simple. Imagine in real life if the same manoeuvre was messed up during tight circling. There are many others we can think of, I'm sure.
I'm sure there will be a wide spectrum of opinions on the philosophy; no right or wrong.
Excellent. Sadly not enough operators follow that philosophy; certainly not in the trained monkey world.
But for me a touchdown is selecting reverse, no idea how one could train initiation a GA after TD without stomping this basic rule.
Just as a discussion point, landing performance is calculated without TR's. I hated the technique I observed by many F/O's, especially on shorter runways with auto brakes set, where they would remove their hands from the correct position on the Thrust Levers to holding the REV T/L's during the flare with the a/c still in the air; waiting to snap them open ASAP. IMHO this is conditioning the mind that you WILL land. Their brain is in land mode and their hands are NOT is G/A mode. There is no rush. I preferred the philosophy of - land, speed brakes up, a/c brakes working, steer, "I want to stay on the ground", select Rev Thrust. On B738 the braking remains the same after TR's are deployed.
Training does have its costs and limitations, including time available and effectiveness; I agree. However, these type of events do happen perhaps more than we think. Training might imply repetition, while a one-off experience can be of enough value to remain with you. I know that my first low level GA in CAVOK in the a/c stayed with me for my whole career.
What I used to do, when I had the freedom to decide as a trainer, was to design scenarios to experience elements of recent accidents. i.e. learn from others mistakes/misfortune and avoid the accident. Isn't that a basis of eduction? I wonder how many airlines introduced double flameout ditching in their recurrency program after Sully; compared to how many had done so before? The same after the BA 777 flameout at LHR? Is that realistic training? Yes they did happen, but how many times in the last 30 years worldwide? You can't do everything, indeed, but you can be as realistically effective as possible in developing relevant skills. Some of these one-off bizarre scenarios are fun; very challenging, but would the time have been better spent improving skills in more likely and useful areas?
All engine GA's from various positions in a Circling. It has been said that normal all engine GA's are the most common mess-ups, and they are simple. Imagine in real life if the same manoeuvre was messed up during tight circling. There are many others we can think of, I'm sure.
I'm sure there will be a wide spectrum of opinions on the philosophy; no right or wrong.
The importance of decision making, #49, #51; I agree.
However, decision making depends on good information. Airbus has been very proactive in generating new, more realistic landing performance; has Boeing done this yet (AC25.32 para 11)?
European operations (EASA) plan to used improved runway braking assessment and reporting; has this been implemented (also in AC 25.32 as guidance for US operations)?
Also sound decision making depends on judgement; not "can we land in these conditions" (book figures), "should we be landing, what if the runway conditions are worse than reported, what then is the distance safety margin and the last acceptable point of touchdown".
However, decision making depends on good information. Airbus has been very proactive in generating new, more realistic landing performance; has Boeing done this yet (AC25.32 para 11)?
European operations (EASA) plan to used improved runway braking assessment and reporting; has this been implemented (also in AC 25.32 as guidance for US operations)?
Also sound decision making depends on judgement; not "can we land in these conditions" (book figures), "should we be landing, what if the runway conditions are worse than reported, what then is the distance safety margin and the last acceptable point of touchdown".
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There seems to be a feeling among the sky gods that a go around is a sign of failure rather than the preferred safety move.
If it doesnt feel right get the hell out of there and try again - simple.
If it doesnt feel right get the hell out of there and try again - simple.
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Thing is though, if there was a thunderstorm at the end of the runway, would you want to go around? It becomes a land or die trying scenario.
I suspect that the reason for this accident will lie in the decision to attempt the approach in the first place. Racing the storm as they say. Remember American Airlines, at Little Rock?
I suspect that the reason for this accident will lie in the decision to attempt the approach in the first place. Racing the storm as they say. Remember American Airlines, at Little Rock?
Last edited by Fair_Weather_Flyer; 6th Aug 2016 at 21:06.
Thing is though, if there was a thunderstorm at the end of the runway, would you want to go around? It becomes a land or die trying scenario
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The decision was a no-brainer but even so, the temptation for me to continue with the landing and to try and resolve it in the flare was ENORMOUS. Can't quite state that enough.
"the decision to G/A is way harder than to continue the landing"
He would try to distract me in the flare or he would land the airplane halfway down the runway and then ask me "go or stay". Got my attention and although I had to G/A only maybe 5 times in the 26 years since my PPL I always thought that to be one of the most fundamental lessons I ever learned.
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Yes but....
Having already made a (seemingly wrong) decision to continue an approach into the mouth of a CB (sometimes painted inaccurately btw, by your weather radar) we now need another plan B. A thunderstorm could kill us but in all probably won't (but might severely damage the aeroplane). Compare that to an overrun at very high speed and it has very dire consequences. I'm no stranger to landing in Bergamo. The summer storms there can be aggressive in the extreme and when mixed with high terrain nearby are certainly not for the squeamish when they get going. An early decision to divert is "hindsight correct" but armchair philosophy after the event. No one will ever know the exact mindset of the PIC who decided to continue with a landing in such conditions - notwithstanding what they might recall for an ASR. Hopefully though, we'll all learn from it. Thank God it won't be for us to decipher the last seconds from the CVR.
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Rat5
I would disagree on training that. The most likely cause would be a long landing, but that would be the first mistake then. Landing long and THEN deciding to GA would be two mistakes in a row.
It gets into the field of aborting after V1, even on a long RWY.
I would disagree on training that. The most likely cause would be a long landing, but that would be the first mistake then. Landing long and THEN deciding to GA would be two mistakes in a row.
It gets into the field of aborting after V1, even on a long RWY.
There, fixed that for you.
I hated the technique I observed by many F/O's, especially on shorter runways with auto brakes set, where they would remove their hands from the correct position on the Thrust Levers to holding the REV T/L's during the flare with the a/c still in the air; waiting to snap them open ASAP. IMHO this is conditioning the mind that you WILL land. Their brain is in land mode and their hands are NOT is G/A mode. There is no rush. I preferred the philosophy of - land, speed brakes up, a/c brakes working, steer, "I want to stay on the ground", select Rev Thrust.