Most secure airport in the world?
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Most secure airport in the world?
An undercover journalist posing as a man looking for employment at Israel’s Ben Gurion Airport managed to snag a position with a contractor — using someone else’s identity card — and put the airport’s much vaunted security credentials to the test.
In a Channel 2 TV report Sunday, David Suleiman, an investigative reporter, said he arrived at an interview with the airport’s sanitation contractor and presented the photo ID of another man, Yaniv Tamir, claiming it was his own. Tamir, who is a friend of Suleiman’s and who gave him his ID card to use, has a full head of hair, dark features and eyeglasses. Suleiman is bald and has light eyes. Nonetheless, when Suleiman presented Tamir’s ID card as his own he was not challenged.
Suleiman said he was asked to fill in some forms for a security check, which he passed that same day, with his false ID.
Hired immediately as a sanitation worker, Suleiman said he had access to sensitive parts of the airport’s operations, including aircraft, and was astounded not to be discovered.
Aboard the aircraft, he was shown filming himself unsupervised accessing the pilot’s cabin, tampering with the door, and generally trying to arouse suspicion.
Arousing none, Suleiman said he “had an idea to see if I could enter the plane and place ‘bombs’ inside cans [of soft drinks]” to emulate a bombing claimed by the Islamic State of a Russian airliner last October which killed 224 people.
The terror group said it brought down the plane using a can of Schweppes Gold soft drink as an improvised explosive device with a detonator, and with the help of airport staff.
Suleiman brought innocent cans of soft drinks and cigarettes into the airport’s supposedly sterile areas without undergoing a security check. He filmed himself placing the cans aboard airplanes while he was working, without anyone noticing.
“Over two days, I worked on 12 airplanes and I could have done whatever I wanted in all 12 of them,” he told Channel 2.
Emboldened by the can operation, Suleiman said he decided to wander around outside the planes, in areas he should not have had access to even as a staffer, to see what would happen.
He wandered to an area where suitcases were being loaded onto an aircraft before passenger boarding and was asked for some help with the bags.
In response, the CEO of the Israel Security Association and the former security chief at the airport, Pini Shiff, said the issue of Suleiman’s real identification “should have been discovered immediately,” and accused the contractor company of negligence during the recruitment process. He said the flaws Suleiman exposed were “very grave.”
Shiff added that security procedures at the airport were immediately changed in the wake of the breaches exposed by Suleiman.
The Israel Airports Authority filed a police complaint against Suleiman for impersonating a public employee.
(c)
In a Channel 2 TV report Sunday, David Suleiman, an investigative reporter, said he arrived at an interview with the airport’s sanitation contractor and presented the photo ID of another man, Yaniv Tamir, claiming it was his own. Tamir, who is a friend of Suleiman’s and who gave him his ID card to use, has a full head of hair, dark features and eyeglasses. Suleiman is bald and has light eyes. Nonetheless, when Suleiman presented Tamir’s ID card as his own he was not challenged.
Suleiman said he was asked to fill in some forms for a security check, which he passed that same day, with his false ID.
Hired immediately as a sanitation worker, Suleiman said he had access to sensitive parts of the airport’s operations, including aircraft, and was astounded not to be discovered.
Aboard the aircraft, he was shown filming himself unsupervised accessing the pilot’s cabin, tampering with the door, and generally trying to arouse suspicion.
Arousing none, Suleiman said he “had an idea to see if I could enter the plane and place ‘bombs’ inside cans [of soft drinks]” to emulate a bombing claimed by the Islamic State of a Russian airliner last October which killed 224 people.
The terror group said it brought down the plane using a can of Schweppes Gold soft drink as an improvised explosive device with a detonator, and with the help of airport staff.
Suleiman brought innocent cans of soft drinks and cigarettes into the airport’s supposedly sterile areas without undergoing a security check. He filmed himself placing the cans aboard airplanes while he was working, without anyone noticing.
“Over two days, I worked on 12 airplanes and I could have done whatever I wanted in all 12 of them,” he told Channel 2.
Emboldened by the can operation, Suleiman said he decided to wander around outside the planes, in areas he should not have had access to even as a staffer, to see what would happen.
He wandered to an area where suitcases were being loaded onto an aircraft before passenger boarding and was asked for some help with the bags.
In response, the CEO of the Israel Security Association and the former security chief at the airport, Pini Shiff, said the issue of Suleiman’s real identification “should have been discovered immediately,” and accused the contractor company of negligence during the recruitment process. He said the flaws Suleiman exposed were “very grave.”
Shiff added that security procedures at the airport were immediately changed in the wake of the breaches exposed by Suleiman.
The Israel Airports Authority filed a police complaint against Suleiman for impersonating a public employee.
(c)
Paxing All Over The World
The Israel Airports Authority filed a police complaint against Suleiman for impersonating a public employee.
My guess is that you could pull this trick at a significant majority of large airports worldwide.
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I don't know cry or laugh on this article. BTW, in my city there are only two condition, when spotters must put their cameras down and leave spotting places because security people drive here and insist on it - for President plane, enforced by State Security, and for El Al traffic, enforced by their own ground security guys 
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My guess is that you could pull this trick at a significant majority of large airports worldwide.
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Since the subject is "secure airport", you might find the following of interest.
FAA Proposes Rulemaking to Further Enhance Airport Safety
FAA Proposes Rulemaking to Further Enhance Airport SafetyJuly 12- Today, the FAA published a Supplemental Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (SNPRM) for safety management systems (SMS) in the airport area. SMS is a formal approach to managing an organization's safety through four key components – safety policy, safety risk management, safety assurance, and safety promotion. Through the SNPRM, the FAA proposes to integrate proactive hazard identification and risk-management based principles into the day-to-day operations at airports.
The supplemental proposal amends the number of airports that would be required to implement the program. The SNPRM proposes SMS at any Part 139 certificated airport that is:
•Classified as a small, medium, or large hub airport in the National Plan of Integrated Airport Systems;
AND
•Identified by the U.S. Customs and Border Protection as a port of entry, designated international airport, landing rights airport, or user fee airport;
OR
•Identified as having more than 100,000 total annual operations which includes takeoffs and landings.
The original NPRM required all Part 139 airports to participate in SMS. Based on the numerous industry comments received, the FAA decided to amend the original proposal to instead apply it to certificated airports receiving the vast majority of passenger enplanements, operations, and international service. The original proposal would have applied to more than 500 certificated airports. The revised proposal would apply to approximately 260 airports. The industry will have 60 days to comment on the revised changes and other requirements proposed in the SNPRM. The comment period ends on September 12, 2016. Read more about SMS in the FAA Fact Sheet. http://www.faa.gov/news/fact_sheets/...m?newsId=20554
FAA Proposes Rulemaking to Further Enhance Airport Safety
FAA Proposes Rulemaking to Further Enhance Airport SafetyJuly 12- Today, the FAA published a Supplemental Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (SNPRM) for safety management systems (SMS) in the airport area. SMS is a formal approach to managing an organization's safety through four key components – safety policy, safety risk management, safety assurance, and safety promotion. Through the SNPRM, the FAA proposes to integrate proactive hazard identification and risk-management based principles into the day-to-day operations at airports.
The supplemental proposal amends the number of airports that would be required to implement the program. The SNPRM proposes SMS at any Part 139 certificated airport that is:
•Classified as a small, medium, or large hub airport in the National Plan of Integrated Airport Systems;
AND
•Identified by the U.S. Customs and Border Protection as a port of entry, designated international airport, landing rights airport, or user fee airport;
OR
•Identified as having more than 100,000 total annual operations which includes takeoffs and landings.
The original NPRM required all Part 139 airports to participate in SMS. Based on the numerous industry comments received, the FAA decided to amend the original proposal to instead apply it to certificated airports receiving the vast majority of passenger enplanements, operations, and international service. The original proposal would have applied to more than 500 certificated airports. The revised proposal would apply to approximately 260 airports. The industry will have 60 days to comment on the revised changes and other requirements proposed in the SNPRM. The comment period ends on September 12, 2016. Read more about SMS in the FAA Fact Sheet. http://www.faa.gov/news/fact_sheets/...m?newsId=20554
Paxing All Over The World
I said 'significant majority' as I didn't want to have to defend a guess at 95%. However, at smaller fields, it might be more difficult as fewer companies and people are involved and more chance that people on the ramp know each other. At any large company/venue, that is not possible. We all know the erosion of quality brought about by the mania to do everything as cheaply as possible ...
Apologies for slight thread drift but you'll get the idea.
I once boarded a Greyhound bus at Orlando, Florida and the security check post 9/11 was a complete drag, everyone and everything was checked thoroughly.
Reboarding at an intermediary minor stop the next day, yup you guessed it, not a hint of interest from the driver. No security check, nada.
It subsequently crossed my mind that actually the crowded bus station at Orlando was undeniably a juicier target rather than any one particular bus, and so to be effective, screening should really have been upon entering the station rather than boarding.
In light of recent events at Istanbul, isn't it about time we made airports in their entirety secure areas? Not saying I like the idea mind you
I once boarded a Greyhound bus at Orlando, Florida and the security check post 9/11 was a complete drag, everyone and everything was checked thoroughly.
Reboarding at an intermediary minor stop the next day, yup you guessed it, not a hint of interest from the driver. No security check, nada.
It subsequently crossed my mind that actually the crowded bus station at Orlando was undeniably a juicier target rather than any one particular bus, and so to be effective, screening should really have been upon entering the station rather than boarding.
In light of recent events at Istanbul, isn't it about time we made airports in their entirety secure areas? Not saying I like the idea mind you
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I really have to raise a related question. It has been bugging me for sone time, and really struck home when I woke on the morning of July 5th to the news that ... nothing much really happened.
So, given that:
* we are in the sights of various crazy ISIS-inspired individuals
* that very same terrorist organisation promised us a "summer of blood"
* we are all more than aware that "security" is largely illusory
* arming oneself in the US is laughably easy...
Yet ... the only bangs I heard on July 4th were from fireworks (thank God - and the DHS )
So, WHERE DID ALL THE TERRORISTS GO?
So, given that:
* we are in the sights of various crazy ISIS-inspired individuals
* that very same terrorist organisation promised us a "summer of blood"
* we are all more than aware that "security" is largely illusory
* arming oneself in the US is laughably easy...
Yet ... the only bangs I heard on July 4th were from fireworks (thank God - and the DHS
)So, WHERE DID ALL THE TERRORISTS GO?
Pre-screening
I seem to remember initial screening for everybody entering the terminal at Domodedovo.
I didn't notice any huge crowd forming or perceive any elevated threat for me, and I am a bit sensitive to such things.
But I would not like to endorse the effectiveness of the procedure either.
Main screening for international passengers is upstairs after immigration and seems quite thorough.
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I seem to remember initial screening for everybody entering the terminal at Domodedovo.
It highlights the obvious flaw that very few people properly check ID cards. As long as they "appear" OK, then everything is fine.
Where I used to work, an outside security contractor/assessor often attempted to gain access using an ID card with a photo of Sean Connery on it.
Where I used to work, an outside security contractor/assessor often attempted to gain access using an ID card with a photo of Sean Connery on it.
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Almost thirty years ago, I read an account, in the "Traveller's Tales" section of the much lamented Far East Economic Review, by a chap who had gone through "security" at PNH behind a man who had an AK 47 slung over his shoulder.
The gun owner calmly took off his assault rifle, put it on the belt for the X ray machine, walked through the portal, was patted down, picked up the gun again, and walked out to the plane with it.
If people act as we expect them to act ("please put your carry on baggage through the scanner") we seldom notice exactly what they are doing.
The gun owner calmly took off his assault rifle, put it on the belt for the X ray machine, walked through the portal, was patted down, picked up the gun again, and walked out to the plane with it.
If people act as we expect them to act ("please put your carry on baggage through the scanner") we seldom notice exactly what they are doing.
My favorite event was at a large far eastern airport that shall remain unnamed to protect the guilty. A smartly dressed fellow put his laptop bag on the belt, which was returned on account of a small bottle of water. Security told him: the water is not allowed through the x-ray machine. Oh, all right, said the man, he took the bottle, sent the bag through x-ray and walked through the metal detector gate with the water. Picked up the bag, and merrily walked to his gate...
Train or bus
But by bus it's just a cursory glance at passports and wave a wand (maybe) over luggage in the under-floor compartments.
In the end, ANY pre-screening or screening will create a bottleneck that will, in turn, create an opportunity for the nutters.
But it's still a better strategy than "no screening" at all.
I just wish that the current screening regimes were a bit more rational and much less self-aggrandising.
I don't know cry or laugh on this article. BTW, in my city there are only two condition, when spotters must put their cameras down and leave spotting places because security people drive here and insist on it - for President plane, enforced by State Security, and for El Al traffic, enforced by their own ground security guys
Its a bit like a New York police officer trying to issue a speeding ticket in London.
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What authority do ELAL security have in a foreign country outside of the airport ?
Sounds crazy? It is.